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INTRODUCTION 
Lord Acton said that power corrupts and absolute power 
corrupts absolutely. This is hundred percent true of economic 
power also. Keeping this in mind, various laws have been 
enacted during the last hundred years in many parts of the world 
for controlling monopolies and unfair trade practices. 
Independence marked the beginning of social consciousness 
to keep within control the economic power in private sector. 
The founding fathers in the preamble to the Constitution of 
India pledged to secure to all citizens economic, social and 
political justice, as well as, equality of status and of oppor-
tunity. It was reaffirmed in the Directive Principles of State 
policy enshrined in the Constitution under Articles 38 and 39. 
These two fundamental principles provide that the State shall 
strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and 
protecting as effecitvely as it may be social order in which 
social, economic and political justice, shall inform all the 
institution of the national life. It directs the State to ensure 
that the ownership and control of material resources of the 
community are so distributed as best to subserve the Common good. 
It also enjoined on the State the duty to secure that the 
operation of the economic system does not result in the 
concentration of wealth and means of production to the Common 
detriment. 
The economic development of the Country^ however, did 
not proceed on the desired lines. Once Nehru asked: "vrtiere 
has the wealth created since independence gone'.' To find out 
an answer to this question, a committee was constituted in 
i960 which came to be knowias Mahalanobies Committee. The 
Gomnittee came to the conclusion that "the concentration of 
economic power in the private sector is more than what could be 
justified on functional grounds". A more pointed attention to 
this problem was drawn by the Congress President at the 
Bhuwaneshwar session. In pursuance of this suggestion the 
Government of India appointed in April 1964 the Monopolies 
Inquiry Commission. 
The Monopolies Inquiry Commission submitted its report 
on October 31, 1965. The report recognised the fact that there 
did exist concentration of economic power in India in the form 
of product-wise and industry-wise concentration and the presence 
of a few industrial houses controlling a larger number of 
companies. It also recognised the existence of a fairly large 
scale of various restrictive and monopolistic trade practices. 
The Monopolies Inquiry Commission recommended-
1. We need not strike at the concentration of economic 
power as such, but should do only when it becomes a 
1. Government of India, Manager of Publications, Report of the 
Monopolies Inquiry Commission, (Chairman K.C.Das Gupta), 
Delhi, at - 159. 
means to the best production (inquality and quantity) 
or to fair distribution; 
2. To accomplish this^ a constant watch must be kept by 
a body independent oi the Government-in addition to what 
is oeing done by Government and Parliament that big 
business does not misuse its power; 
3. Monopolistic condition in any industrial sphere are to 
be discouraged, if this can be done without injury to 
the interests of the general public; 
4. Monopolistic and restrictive practices must be curbed 
except when they conduce to the common good. 
Central to the scheme of legislative recommendations of 
the Monopolies Inquiry Commission was a setting up of a p>ermanent 
body with the duty and responsibility for exercising vigilence 
and for taking action to protect the country against the dangers 
of concentration of economic power, monopolistic and restrictive 
trade practices. It was thought necessary by the Monopolies 
Inquiry Commission that orders of the proposed body should be 
given maindatory force and should be final, subject to an appeal 
to the Supreme Court. 
The Government decision on the report of the Monopolies 
Inquiry Commission was contained in a Resolution which proposed 
to establish an independent statutory body, to be known as the 
.'-IRTP Commission under the proposed Monopolies and Restrictive 
Trade Practices Bill, 1967. After the submission of its Report 
by the joint Committee, it was finally placed on the statute 
book on 27th day of December; 1969 and came into force with effect 
from 1st June, 1970. 
In the implementation of the MRTP Act/ certain 
difficulties were encountered and several cAiscurities and 
lacuna were also noticed in the provisions of the MRTP ^^t with 
the result and the realisation of the objectives underlying 
the enactment was not effective to the desired extent* Experience 
of its working also snowed that several provisions of the Act, 
particularly the provision:; of the Commission need to be 
modified. Certain criticisms were also voiced about the dilution 
of the role given to the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices 
Commission. With a view to removing the anomalies and plugging 
tne loopholes, the Government of India Constituted vide its 
resolution No. 7-6-77 CLV, dated June 23, 1977, a High Powered 
Expert Committee ( the Sachar Committee ) under the Chadrran-
ship of Justice Rajindar Sachar. The Committee was required to 
consider and report inter-alia — 
1. what improvement if any, were required to be made in 
the present administrative structure and procedure 
regarding the enforcement of the provisions of the 
MRTP ACt, 1969; 
2. v^at changes were required to be made in the t-lRTP 
ACt, 1969, in the light of the experience gained 
in the administration and operation of the MRTP 
Act; and 
3. any other matter incidental or ancillary to the 
administration of the MRTP Act, having regard to 
the growth and development of trade, commerce and 
industry. 
The Committee submitted its Report to the Government 
on August 29, 1978, and copies thereof were laid on the table 
of both Houses of Parliament on August 30, 1978. 
The Committee found tha t in i t s functioning the MRTP 
Commission lacked ce r ta in powers. I t recommended the following 
addi t ional powers for the commission-
(a) The Commission should be declared a Court of Record 
and tha t i t should have the power to punish for i t s 
contempt. 
(b) I t should be vested with the power to award compen-
sation against loss or damages caused by any 
monopolistic, r e s t r i c t i v e or unfair trade p rac t i ces 
individual ly or through ' c l a s s ac t ion '2 
(c) I t should be empowered to grant inter im injunction 
in su i tab le cases^. 
(d) The technical ru le of Evidence At should not be 
applicable to the proceedings before the Commission 
and the proceedings should be conducted with minimum 
formality and technica l i ty^ • 
The ComiTiittee also suggested enlarged and more meaningful 
role of the i^TP Commission in matters r e l a t i n g to the prevention 
of concentration of economic power and control of monopolistic 
trade p r a c t i c e s . I t recommended that the Conroission should be 
empowered to pass f inal orders in monopolistic txadol p rac t i ce 
i nqu i r i e s i n s t i t u t e d under section 10(b) . 
In order to implements the recommendations of the 
Sachar Committee and to arm with more powers to the Commission, 
the i^TP (/amendment) Act, 1984 was passed. The amendment 
i n t e r - a l i a incorporated new provisions for the regulat ion of 
2. The Sachar Committee repor t , paras 23-«S0 and 23»51. 
3 . Id, a t 23-,52. 
4 . Id, at 22-.16, 22.17 and 23-.64. 
6. Id, at 23. 29. 
unfair trade p r a c t i c e s ; vest the MRTP Commission with the 
power to issue inter im injunction and award compensation; and 
c rea te a new author i ty - the Director-General of Invest igat ion 
and Regis t ra t ion (by combining the exis t ing twin of au thor i t i e s 
the Director of Invest igat ion and Registrar of Res t r i c t ive Trade 
Agreements). 
But the MRTP (Amendment) Act, 1984 has not subs t an t i a l ly 
changed anything except ce r ta in minor changes which do not boost 
up i t s s t a t u s . The Sachar Committee has recomended to make 
necessary changes in the Scheme of references, but no such 
cnange could be concret ised due to the lack of enthusiasm on the 
par t of the Central Government. 
We now proceed to indica te b r i e f ly the plan of th i s 
s tudy. To keep the present work within feasible l i m i t s of 
accomplishment, i t i s devided i n to s ix chapters . 
Chapter-I deals with the cons t i tu t ion of the l«lRrP 
Commission based on the provisions of the Act. I t also deals 
with the powers and functions of the Director-General of 
Inves t iga t ion and Registrat ion and the Central Government. 
Chapter-II i s devoted to the general powers and functions of the 
MRTP Commission with special reference to the powers of the 
Commission r e l a t i ng to the grant of ad-interira injunction and 
award of compensation. I t also specify the role of the Conunission 
as a court , as a t r ibunal and as an advisory Committee, so tha t 
i t s dynamic r o l e as an expet independent body could be 
v i s u a l i s e d . C h a p t e r - I l l i s devoted t o the s tudy of i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
and c o n t r o l of monopol i s t i c t r a d e p r a c t i c e s . Chapter-IV i s 
devoted to the i n v e s t i g a t i o n and c o n t r o l of r e s t r i c t i v e t r ade 
p r a c t i c e s . In t h i s chap t e r the d e f i n i t i o n of the r e s t r i c t i v e 
t r a d e p r a c t i c e has been c l o s e l y examined. I t a l s o d e a l s with 
the scope of i n q u i r y , na tu r e of the Commission's o rde r and the 
concep t of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t and gate-ways of e s c a p e . 
Chapter-V covers the i n v e s t i g a t i o n and c o n t r o l of 
u n f a i r methods of compe t i t i on . De f in i t i on of the Unfiar t r a d e 
p r a c t i c e has been c l o s e l y examined and some sugges t i ons has 
been given to improve i t . I t a l s o d e a l s with t h e source and 
scope of i n q u i r y and n a t u r e of Cormiission's o r d e r . An 
a t tempt has been made to ana lyse the r o l e of the Commission 
as guardian to the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t as well as the i n t e r e s t of 
the consumers. 
F i n a l l y , Chapter-VI d i s c u s s e s the contemporary 
l a g i s l a t i o n s . hn e f f o r t has been made to analyse the r o l e of 
the enforcement machinar ies of o ther c o u n t r i e s p a r a l l e d to the 
1-4RTP commission. 
C H A P T E R - I 
MRTP COMMISSION AND OTHER ENFORCEMENT MACHINERY 
For carrying out i t s object ives , the Act provides for 
the establishment of an independent s t a tu to ry body - Monopolies 
and Res t r i c t ive Trade Prac t ices Commission. The in ten t ion for 
t l« s e t t i ng up of the Commission was to create a parmanent 
body with the duty and re spons ib i l i t y of exercising vigileuice 
and for taking action to pro tec t the country against the 
dangers of concentration of economic powers and to control 
monopolistic and r e s t r i c t i v e trade p r a c t i c e s . The commission 
i s vested with independent powers to inquire and pass orders 
in r e l a t i o n to r e s t r i c t i v e and unfair trade p r a c t i c e s . In a l l 
other matters, i t plays only an advisory r o l e . 
A. Set up of the Commission 
The s t ruc ture of the MRTP Commission i s almost based 
on the Federal Trade Commission of U.S.A. The Br i t i sh Monopolies 
Commission and Br i t i sh r e s t r i c t i v e prac t ice Court, were experts 
of d i f fe ren t f ie ld were joined together, to solve highly 
technical problems tha t t h e i r economy faced. In India Monopolies 
Inquiry Commission suggested to frame the MRTP Commission almost 
in tile same pat tern , subject of course, to the social and 
economic object ives set forth in the cons t i tu t ion of Ind ia . The 
Monopolies Inquiry Commission recommended as follows-
"Gomming now to the constitution of the Commission 
We recommend that v^ile the minimum number of members 
should be three, the maximum may for the present to 
be fixed at nine. The work of the Commission should 
be a great extent judicial in nature. Most of the 
industrialists strongly expressed the view that the 
Commission should be strong and independent. We 
recommend that the chairman of the Commission should 
be appointed from among persons who are or have been 
judges of the Supreme Court or Chief Justices of 
High Courts:' 
The i-lRTP Act, 1969 provides for the creation of an 
independent body headed bya.Chairman with atleast two other 
members, provided that the number of members does not exceed 
eight. The members are required to be chosen from amongst 
those persons who are experts of different subjects. They 
should be men of ability, integrity and standing. 
Section 5 of the Act provides for the qualification of 
the chairman and members. Section 5 reads as follows-
(1) For the purpose of this Act, the Central Government 
should establish by notification, a Commission 
to be know as Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices 
Commission, which shall consists of a Chairman and not 
less than two members and not more than eight members, 
to oe appointed by the Central Government. 
1. i^ UC Report, at 15. 
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( 2) The Chairman of the Conunission shall be a person 
who is, has been, or is qualified to be, a judge 
of the Supreme Court/ or of a High Court vAio have 
adequate knowledge or experience of or have shown 
capacity in dealing with, problems relating to 
economics, law, commerce, accountancy, industry, 
public affairs or administration. 
(3) Before appointing any person as a member of the 
Commission, the central Government shall satisfy 
itself that the person does not, and will not, 
have any such financial or other interest as is 
likely to affect prejudicially his functions as 
such members. 
In order to enforce the MRTP Act, effectively, the 
Central Government constituted the Commission with a Chairman 
(Justice A. Alagire Swamy and two members. Dr. Subramanium and 
Dr. H.K. Prangapay in August, 1970). Since then the Commission 
has never been able to meet the minimum statutory requirement 
(the Chairman and two members) . As a matter of fact the 
commission has remain without a Chairman or wLth a lone member 
for long durations. 
Before just G.R. Luthra, the MRTP Commission had four 
Chairman and all of them retired on the attainment of their 
age of superannuation. The dates of their laying down.the 
Office Were long before known to the authorities as at least 
this much they knew that statutorily no one can continue as 
Chairmain beyond tne age of 65, The chart below, however. 
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demonstrates the speed with which the vacancies of the 
lA 
Chairman of the commission were filled up: 
- Justice A. Alagiri swami from 5-8-1970 to 16-10-197 2. 
- Justice J.L. Nain from 23-7-1973 to 8-08-1976. 
- Justice S. Rangarajan from 24-2-1978 to 8-09-1981. 
- Justice 3. Madhu Sudan Rao from 3-12-1981 to 4-10-1985. 
- Justice G.R, Luthra from 27-2-1986 to 10-12-1989. 
In the first case it took the Government nine months 
to make up its mind. After the retirement of Justice Nain the 
vacancy was filled in after full one and a half years. Next 
appointment was made after just three months and in the case of 
iB 
Justice Luthra the Government took five months. 
The undue delay on the part of the Central Government in 
filling up of the vacancies of the Chairman and members focus the 
attention of the Supreme Court in Hahiadra and Mahindra V. Union 
2 
of Ind ia / the Supreme Court observed-
" I t i s ODvious from two s u b j e c t i o n s of s ec t i on 5 
t h a t the l e g i s l a t u r e c l e a r l y contemplated t h a t the 
Comission must have a Chairman who would provide 
the J u d i c i a l element and the re must be a t l e a s t two 
o t h e r members vrtio would provide e x p e r t i s e in the 
s u b j e c t s l i k e economics, law, commerce, a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 
so t h a t t he re could be a r e a l l y high powered e x p e r t 
Commission competent and adequate t o dea l with v a r i o u s 
1 A . Kumar B.S, 'Headless I-IRTP Commission and no one i s Bothered 
About' (1990) 20 CLD a t 5 . 
IB. Ibid. 
2. A.I.R. 1979 3C 798 at 806. 
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problems which come before it. It/ however, 
appears that the Central Government paid scant 
regard to this legislative requirement and though 
the office of bhe chairman fell vacant as for 
back as 9th August, 1976/ it failed to make 
appointment of Chairman until 24th February, 1978. 
Of the two other members of the Commission one had 
already resigned earlier and his vacancy was ailso 
not filled with the result that the Commission 
continued with one member for a period of about 
18 months. This was most unfortunate state of 
affair for it betrayed total lack of concern for 
the proper constitution and functioning of the 
Commission and complete neglect of its statutory 
obligation by the Central Government could not 
make necessary appointments and properly constitute 
the Commission in accordance with the requirements 
of the Act. It is difficult to believe that legal 
and judicial talent in the Country has so inrqprovised 
that the Central Government find a suitable person 
to fill the vacancy of Chairman for a year and 
half. Moreover, it must be remembered that the 
appointments, after all have to be made from 
whatever legal and judicial talent is available and 
the situation is not going to improve by waiting 
for a year or two, a new star is not going to 
appear in the legad. firmament within such a short 
time and the appointments can not be held up itidefinitly. 
Indeed, it is highly undesirable that important 
quasi-judicial or administrative posts should remain 
vaccint for a long period of time, because apart from 
impairing the efficiency of the functioning of the 
statutory authority or the administrative inexplicable 
13 
de lay may shake the conf idence of the p u b l i c 
in the i n t e g r i t y of the appointments when made. 
A s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n , l i k e those of 1972 and 1976, 1981, 
19 85 arose in December 1989 v/hen J u s t i c e G.R. Lu th ra then Cha i r -
man of the MRTP Commission was expi red and a Member Mr. D.G. 
Agrav/al r e t i r e d on 31 s t December, 1989, and ano ther Member 
Mr. i^anchanda a l s o completed h i s t enure by Apr i l 1990. 
2A 
In M.L. Sachdeva V. Union of India and others an 
application was filed as a public interest litigation (under 
Article 3 2 of the Indian Constitution) for a direction to the 
Union of India to fill up the posts of Chairman and members of 
the Commission under the MRTP Act, 1969, as under that Act, 
the Commission becomes functional with a bench of two members 
and in view of the fact and it had only one existing member for 
sometime, the Commission had not been functioning. By the order 
made on 20th of April, 1990, the Suprerue Court directed the 
Union of India to constitute the Commission as required by the 
law. There was no compliance with the directions of the 
Supreme Court even after, on request, it had allowed further time 
upto 7th July, for doing the needful. The Supreme Court also 
stated that the Commission is nonfunctional. Thereafter, 
proceeding for contempt were taken against the contemner, the 
Union of India, through the Secretary, Ministry of Industries. 
2A. (1990) 3 Comp. L.J. 297 (3C) . 
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Held that it was the obligation of the Union of India 
to constitute the Commission in the manner prescribed under 
section 5 of the MRTP Act, 1969, and when it failed to do so, 
the Supreme Court had given the direction to comply with the 
requirement of law. The conduct of the Union of India in 
these circumstances must be taken as one of indifference to the 
Court's direction. Therefore, no conclusion other than one 
holding the respondent guilty of contempt can be reached. 
In recent times, instances of noncompliance with Court's 
direction have multiplied; and it is necessary to curb such 
tendency of litigating parties. We, however, do not proposes 
to impose any punishment in view of the offer of unqualified 
appology offered in the affidavit and in the hope that there 
would no recurrence of such conduct. We take judicial notice 
of the fact that the Chairman and a member have, in the 
meantime, be appointed and the Commission in terms of section 5 
of the Act has been reconstituted. 
In order to comply with the order of the Supreme Court, 
the Central Government recommended the name of Justice S.D. Jha 
of Indore High Court to be appointed as the Chairman of the MRTP 
Commission. 3ut he declined the offer on 15th October, 1990 
to become the Chairman of tiie MRTP Commission. The Central 
Government on 23rd October, 1990 appointed Mr. N.C. Gupta as 
a member and on 25th October, 1990 Mr« Sardar Ali was also 
3. The Hindustan Times, 20-10-1990. 
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appointed as a member of the Commission, On 30th October, 
1990 Justice (retired) R.A. Jagirdar of Bombay High Court was 
4A 
appointed as a Chairman of the MRTP Commission. 
3. Casual vacancies in the Office of the Chairman 
The Act prior to its amendment in 1984, did not contain 
any provision for dealing with a situation when a vacancy in 
the Office of the Chairman temporarily caused either due to 
resignation, leave or otherwise. In order to meet such 
situation the High powered Sachar Committee recommended that-
"There is at present no provision for dealing with 
a situation when a vacancy in the Office of the Chairman 
temporarily occur either due to resignation, leave 
or otherwise. This has led to anomalies in the 
functioning of the Commission. Questions have also been 
raised as tDthe whether the Commission can function 
without a Chairman at any time and with only one or 
more members. In order to renoove any doubts in this 
regard it is desirable to provide that where there is 
a vacancy in the Office of the Chairman or the Chadrman 
is temporarily absent or is unable to act, the Central 
Government may, not withstanding any thing contained 
in any other provision, appoint the senior most member 
of the Commission to act temporarily in place of the 
Chairman and the person so appointed to act temporarily 
as Chairman shall have all the powers, functions and 
privileges of the Chairman during the period in which 
he acts in that capacity. 
4. The Times of India, 26-10-1990. 
4A.The Hindustan Times, 31-10-1990, 
5. Para 22,5. . 
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In order to implement the Sachar Committee's recommendation 
Section 6 was accordingly amended. Section 6(3) of the Act 
provides that a casual vacancy caused by resignation or 
removal of the Chairman or any other member of the Commission 
shall be filled by fresh appointment, AS a matter of fact 
the Central Government has not been very prompt in filling of 
the vacancies in the Office of the Chairman by fresh appointment. 
A casual vacancy was caused due to the death of then Chairman 
Justice G.D. Luthra in December, 1989. Till 29th October,1990 
the Central Government was unable to fill the vacancy of the 
Chairman. In order to meet such a situation it was / therefore, 
necessary to amend the Act, to provide for the appointment of 
acting Chairman. Accordingly the I^TP (Amendment) Act, 1984 
has introduced new sub sections 3A and 3B to section 6 of the 
Act. Sub section 3^  of Section 6 reads as follows-
"Where in any such casual vacancy occurs in the 
Office of the Chairman of the Commission, the 
Senior most member of the Commission, holding 
Office for the time being, shall discharge the 
function of the Chadrman until a person appointed 
to fill such vacancy assumes the office of the 
Chairman of the Commission" 
Similarly sub section 3B of Section 6 reads as follows-
'".Vhen the Chairman of the Commission is unable 
to discharge the function owing to absence , illness 
or any other cause, the senior most member of the 
Commission, if authorised so to do by the Chairman 
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the 
in writing sha l l discharge/functions of the 
Chairman u n t i l the day on vrtiich the Chairman 
resumes the charge of h i s function'.' 
So, tlie above amendment makes i t c lear tha t no 
judgement of the Commission can be challenged only on the 
ground that the Commission i s functioning without a fu l l 
time Chairman. 
Section 6(4) of the Act provides-
"No act or proceeding of the Commission shal l be 
inval id by reason only of the existence of any 
vacancy among i t s members or any defect in the 
cons t i tu t ion thereof." 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i ng to note that on several occasions 
the Commission consisted of e i t he r only, one member or a 
Chairman and one member. In several cases, during the course 
of inquiry, p a r t i e s to the inquiry pointedout tha t the Commission 
was not competent to conduct the inqui ry . For ins tance , in 
the monopolistic t rade p rac t ices inquiry against Avery India Ltd. 
the company took t h i s plea and cnallenged the p r i o r i t y of the 
orders passed by the Commission when i t consisted of only one 
member. such an objection was also e a r l i e r ra ised In 
7 
re Graphite India Ltd. , Delhi Pipe Dealers Association V. Indian 
o 
Tube Company and others. However, the meniber then constituting 
the Commission over ruled the objection in all these cases. 
6. MTP inquiry No. 1 of 1975, interim order, dated 2-9-1977. 
7. RTP Inquiry No, 23 of 1974, (1979) Tax LR (1490) MRTPC • 
8. RTP Inquiry No. 1A of 1974, order, dated 30-3-1977. 
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In Delhi Pipe Dealers Association case the Commission 
observed tha t -
" Section 6(4) also provides that no 
act or proceedings of the Comrtiission shal l be 
in val id by reason only of the existence of any 
vacancy among i t s mernbers or any defect in the 
cons t i tu t ion thereof. I t i s c lear , therefore* 
tha t according to the s t a t u t e there i s no 
vacuum j u s t because there i s deplet ion in the 
s trength of the members or j u s t because the 
chairman has r e t i r e d and there i s an in te rva l between 
the ret irement of the old Chairman and appointment 
of new one'.' 
rhe decision of tl\e Calcutta High Court in Bengal Po t t e r i e s 
Ltd. and others V. iMRTP Commission, a lso leads to the same 
the 
conclusion. In th i s case/cour t observed-
"^o doubts. Section 5 provides t ha t the Government 
shal l e s t ab l i sh a Commission which shal l cons i s t of 
Chairman and not l e ss than two and not more than 
e ight members. That i s the cons t i tu t ion of the 
Commission when i t i s so to speak fullfledged, but 
the Act also makes a provision for contingencies 
vrtnen Chairman and some of the members may not be 
avai lable , e i t he r because some of them have resigned 
or r e t i r e d or because they are busy elsewhere. 
Section 16(2) c l ea r ly provides tha t the powers or 
functions of the Commission may be exercised or 
discharged by benches formed by the Chairman of the 
Commission from among the members. There i s also 
9. l o i d . 
iC (1975) 45 Comp. Cases 697. 
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the provision of Section 18(1)(c) , according 
to which the Comrtiission shal l have power to 
regula te the delegation of one or more members 
of such powers and functions as the Commission 
may specify. Moreover section 6(4) also provides 
tha t no act or proceeding of the Commission shal l 
be inva l id by reason only of the exis tence of any 
vacancy among i t s members or any defect in the 
cons t i tu t ion thereof. There i s no merit in the 
contention tha t th i s provision would come in to 
operation only when the Commission has more 
than three members. As a matter of fact , the 
provision would be o t iose i f the Cotntiiission 
had three members viz, one Chairman and two 
merrtoers. I t i s , therefore, c l ea r tha t according 
to the s t a t u t e there i s to be no vacuum'.' 
Thus, i t i s f a i r l y recognised that defect in the 
cons t i tu t ion of the Commission does not inva l ida te the 
proceedings. I t should not, however, provide an excuse to 
the cen t ra l Government to keep the Commission without s t a tu to ry 
minimum i . e . two members. The Central Government should 
take care to f i l l up the vacancies in time, otherwise i t wil l 
u l t imate ly lead to ineff iciency and l e s s confidence in t h i s 
i n s t i t u t i o n by the publ ic . 
C. Rtfnoval of Chairman and rasabera 
Section 7 (1) of the Act provides for removal of the 
members of the Commission by the Central Government on the grounds 
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that who 
a) has been adjudged insolvent, or 
b) has been convicted of an offence which in the opinion 
of the cen t ra l government involves moral turp i tude , or 
c) has been physical ly or mentally incapable of acting as such 
member, or 
d) has aquired such f inancial or other i n t e r e s t as i s l i ke ly 
to affect p re jud ic i a l ly h i s functions as a member, or 
e) has so abused h i s posi t ion as to render h i s continuance in 
office p re jud ic ia l to public i n t e r e s t . The removal on the 
ground of abuse of posi t ion or on the ground of the mentoer 
have been acquired f inancial or other i n t e r e s t conf l ic t ing 
with h i s duty has been nade subject to inquiry and repor t 
made by the Supreme Court on a reference been made by the 
Central Government. This safe-guard i s intended to secure the 
independence of the Commission. 
Section 7(2) reads as follows-
"Notwithstanding any thing contained in 
sub section ( l ) , n o member shal l be removed 
from h i s office on the ground specified in 
clause id) Pr clause (e) of tha t sub section 
unless the supreme court on a reference 
being made to i t in t h i s behalf by the Central 
Governiment, has, on an inquiry held by i t in 
accordance with such procedure as i t may 
specify in t h i s behalf, reported tha t the mennber 
ought, on such grounds, to be removed. 
However, there i s no provision in the Act for the 
removal of the Chairman of the Commission. This i s a serious 
lacuna. Thus, i t i s suggested tha t i f the Chairman i s the person 
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who was a sitting judge of a Supreme Court or a High Court 
prior to his appointment, as a Chairman of the Commission, his 
removal will be governed by the relevant provisions of the 
constitution of India as applicable to a judge of the High Court 
or as a judge of Supreme Court as the case may be (article 124). 
Article 124 (4) reads as follows-
"A judge of the Supreme Court shall not be 
removed from his office except by an order of 
the President - passed after an address by each 
Houses of Parliaunent supported by a majority of 
not less than 2/3 of the members of that House 
present and voting has been presented to the 
President in the same session for such removal on 
the ground of misbehaviour or incapacity. 
Article 124(5) reads as follows-
"Parliament may by law regulate the procedure for 
the presentation of an address and for investigation 
and proof of the misbehaviour or incapacity of a 
judge under clause (4) '.' 
Proviso (b) of Article 217(1) provides that - A judge 
(of High Court) may be removed from his office by the President 
in the manner provided in clause (4) of Article 124 for the 
removal of a judge of the Supreme Court. 
Article 218 provides that - the provisions of clause (4) 
and (5) of article 124 shall apply in relation to a High Court 
as they apply in relation to the Supreme Court with the substituion 
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of references to the High Court for references to the Supreme 
Court. 
^o, i t i s c l e a r from the p rov i so (b) of . \ r t i c l e 217 
and a l s o from A r t i c l e 218 t h a t the same procedure i s to be followed 
t o r the removal of a Judge of tiie High Court as the Judge of a 
Supreme Cour t . 
In any o ther case the removal of a Chairman should be 
yoverned by the p r o v i s i o n s l a i d down under sec t ion 7 of the 
i-lRPP ACt, 1969 for removal of a member of the Commission. 
D. Independence of the Cocami.ssion 
rne r-lRTP Act has l a i d p r o v i s i o n s to secure the independence 
of the Commission. The remunerat ion of the Chairman and o the r 
members of tlie Comnussion cannot be va r i ed to t h e i r d i sadvantage 
a f t e r the appointment . Sec t ion 6 (5) p rov ides t h a t -
" the Chairman of the Commission and o the r 
members s h a l l r ece ive such remunerat ion and 
o ther al lowances and s h a l l be governed by such 
cond i t i ons of s e r v i c e as may be p r e s c r i b e d " 
Provided t h a t the remunerat ion of the Chairman or 
any o the r member s h a l l no t be va r i ed to h i s d i sadvantage a f t e r 
h i s appointment . 
The procedure for removal of a member i t s e l f a g r e a t 
check on the c e n t r a l Government no t to a c t on any extraordinaury 
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ground and a r b i t r a r i l y . In order to ensure the impar t ia l work-
ing of the Chairman and members during the i r tenure and even 
af ter the i r ret i rement clause 8 of section 6 p roh ib i t s them 
for a period of five years (from the date on which they ceased 
to nold Office) from taking any appointment in any industry 
or any undertaking to vrtiich t h i s Act a p p l i e s . l t may be noted 
tha t the contravention of tlriis provision i s not made an offence, 
A person vrtio v io l a t e s , a t the worst be only prevented by an 
injunct ion by a Civi l Court. Section 6 (1) provides tha t 
svery member shall nold office for such period, not exceeding 
five years, as may be specified by the Central Government in 
the no t i f i ca t ion made under sub section (1) of section 5, but 
shal l be e l i g i b l e for reappointment. 
Provided tha t no member snai l hold office as such for a 
t o t a l period exceeding ten years, or af ter he has at ta ined 
the age of s ix ty five years, v^ichever i s e a r l i e r . 
After analysing the above provision one can say tha t the 
MRTP Commission i s independent from the Central Government and 
can ef fec t ive ly inves t iga te the matter refered to i t or suo motu, 
E. Protection Regarding Statement made to the Coromisslon 
and disclosure of Information 
Generally, any statement or evidence given before a 
Court of law by any person can be used againat him, in any other 
proceeding by way of i s toppe l , under ce r t a in circumscances as 
provided in the Indian Evidence Act, However, Section 59 of 
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tne MRTP Act, makes an exception to t h i s general r a l e by 
providing tha t auiy statement maie by a person in the course 
or giving evidence before the Commission shaill not be used 
against him in any Civil or Criminal proceeding except a 
prosecution for giving fa lse evidence by such Statements. 
But the protect ion will be avai lable only i f the Statement 
i s made in respect of a question vrtiich i s required by the 
Commission to answer i s re levant , to the subject matter of the 
inquiry . This provision implements the guarantee against 
se l f - incr imina t ion . However, t h i s protect ion can be claimed 
or 
i f the statement/evidence i s given voluntar i ly or circumstances *^^ eJE 
i t i s not re levant to the subject matter of the inquiry . 
Section 60 of the Act affords protect ion of Commercial 
secrecy by providing that any information, r e l a t i n g to an 
undertaking which has been obtained by or on behalf of the 
Commission for the purposes of the Act, shal l not be disclosed 
otherwise than in compliance with or for the purposes of the 
Act. However, the r e s t r i c t i o n does not apply in ce r t a in 
c a s e s / i . e . -
aj if tne owner of the under talking permits the disc losure 
in writ ing; 
b) i f the disclosure of an information i s made for the purpose 
of any legal proceedingT^ursuant to the Act or of any 
Criminal proceeding which may be taken, whether pursuant to 
the Act or otherwise or for the purpose of any repor t 
r e l a t ing to any such proceeding. 
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F. Protection to the Cotnnalsslon's meinibers etc. 
Section 63 of the Act declares that every member of the 
Commission, the Director General and their Staff shall be deemed, 
while acting in pursuance of the provisions of the Act to be 
public servant within the meaning of Section 2l of the Indian 
Penal Code. The intention underlying the provision to give 
necessary protection to the members, officers and servants to 
discharge their duty and to prevent any obstruction to their 
lawful authority as such public servant, 
G. Director General of Investigation Sc Registration 
The i'lRTP Commission which consists of a Chairman and 
members could not function in isolation unless 
they had the necessary tools to run their business. 
The Act, prior to 1984 .amendment provided for two functionaries 
icnown as tne Director of Investigation anc Registrar of Restrictive 
Trade Agreement. The Director of Investigation was vested 
with the power of making investigation for the purposes of the 
Act. The function of Registrar of Restrictive Trade Agreement 
was mainly to maintain the register of agreements relating to 
:^estrictive Trade Practices and to file application under 
Section 10(a)(iii) before the Commission for conducting an 
inquiry into such practices. It was felt that there should be 
a Government agency who should looK after all the aspects of 
executive functioning in and/or with Commission, viz, registration 
of trade agreements, investigation into complaints about trade 
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practices, under research studies of industries and trade with 
d view to tracing monopolistic, restrictive and unfair trade 
practices referring appropriate cases to the Commission for 
inquiry, conducting proceeding before the Commission in regard 
to them. The Sachar Committee thought it better to do away 
with these two parallel agencies and to provide for creatiou 
of single functionary to perform this duty. The Sachar 
Committee observed -
"In the context of the enlarged functioning 
that we are envisaging for the Commission 
in relation to cause under Chapter-Ill and 
other trade practices and the role that the 
Director of Investigation or the Registrar 
of Restrictive Trade Agreement will have to 
play in regard to those matters, we consider 
that it would be necessary and useful to 
combine the functions of both Director of 
Investigation eind Registrar of Restrictive 
Trade Agreement". 
The MRTP (Amendment) Act, 1984 created a new office of 
the Director General of Investigation U Registration by 
combining the offices of the Director of Investigation and 
the Registrar of Restrictive Trade Agreement. Section 8 of 
the Act after its amendment read as follows-
(1) "The Central Government may by notification 
appoint a Director General of Investigation u 
Registration, and as many Additional, Joint, 
Deputy or Assistant Directors General of 
11. Report of High Powered Committee on MRTP Act and Company Law, 
Sachar Committee (1978) para 22.7, 
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Investigation U Registration, as it 
may thinki-fit, for making investigation 
for the purposes of this Act and for 
maintaining a Register of agreements 
subject to registration under this Act 
and for performing such other functions 
as are or may be/ provided by or under, 
this ACt, 
(2) The Director General may, by written order, 
authorise one of the Additional, Joint, 
Deputy, or Assistant Director General to 
function as the Registrar of agreements 
subject to registration under this Act. 
(3) hivery person authorised to function as the 
Registrar of agreements and ^ ery Additional, 
Joint, Deputy or ^ssistaiit Director General 
shaLLl exercise his powers and dicharge his 
functions, subject to the general control, 
supervision and direction of the Director 
General. 
(4) The Central Government may provide the staff 
of the Commission and may in addition make 
provisions for the conditions of service 
of other Director General, Additional, Joint, 
Deputy or Assistant Director General and 
of the members of the staff of the Commission 
(5) The conditions of service of the Director 
General or any Additional, Joint, Deputy or 
Assistant Director General or any member of 
the Staff of the Commission shall not be 
varied to his disadvantage after his appointment, 
The Office of the Director General is a statutory Office 
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and he enjoys certain statutory powers and performs certain 
functions required of him under special provisions of the Act. 
He is independent of the Commission, and is appointed by the 
Central Government, However/ since he represents a wing of 
the enforcement machinery his role and functions in mauycases 
are not clearly separable from those of the Commission. Thus, 
while some of his powers and functions are specified in the 
Act, others are entrusted to him under the MRTP Rules framed 
under tlie i-lRTP Commission Regulations, 1974, promulgated by 
the i-lRTP Commission, 
and 
The major dut ies / funct ions of the Director General are 
as follows-
1. To conduct investigation; 
2. To maintain a register of agreements subject to 
registration; and 
3. To perform other functions entrusted to him under 
the Act. Ihese includes-
(a) To make applications to the MRTP Commission for inquiry 
into Restrictive Trade Practices (Section 10a (iii)* 
(b) To make applications to tine MRTP Commission for 
inquiry into Unfair Trade Practices (Section 36B(c). 
(c) To appear in inquiry proceeding before the Commission 
(Rule 13A) . 
(d) To take on record the orders made by the Commission 
in respect of restrictive trade practices or an unfair 
trade practices(Section 19). 
(e) To make reference to the Commission for exemption 
of a particular class of goods from the prohibition 
of minimum re-sale price maintenance (Section 41) r and 
(f) To maintain in separate register, the particulars 
in respect of restrictive trade practices investigated 
by him or by the Commission (Rule 11A (6). 
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H. C e n t r a l Government 
Under the I-IRTP Act, 1969, the Central Government has 
been vested with mandatory powers in respect of monopolistic 
trade prac t ices and cases per ta ining to concentration of 
economic power. The deciding authori ty in both the cases i s 
tne Central Government alone. However, in e i t h e r case the 
GoverniTient if i t so chooses can make a reference to the 
Commission for an inquiry and/report . Based on the repor t of 
the i-lRTP Commission the Central Government may pass such orders 
as i t thinks f i t , with regard to the proposals . The MRTP 
Commission has only advisory role in so far as the control of 
economic concentration or monopolistic trade p rac t ices i s 
concerned. The Central Government may, while according any 
approval, sanction, permission, confirmation or recognit ion 
or giving any d i rec t ion or issuing any order or (granting ainy 
exemption in re la t ion to any matter, impose such condit ions, 
l imi ta t ions or r e s t r i c t i o n s as i t may thinks f i t . The Central 
government shall have the power to modify any scheme of finance 
saoiTLLtted to i t under the i«lRTP ACt in such manner as i t thinks 
r i t . If any condition, l imi ta t ion or r e s t r i c t i o n thus imposed 
oy the :entral Government i s contravened, the Central Government 
may r rescind or withdraw the approval, saurxction, permission. 
Confirmation, recognit ion, d i rec t ion or exemption made or 
granted by i t . 
An important role has been envisaged for the Central 
Government in the matters r e l a t ing to the prevention of 
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concen-cration of economic power to the C-omncuon de t r imen t 
and the c o n t r o l of monopol ies . Every proposa l for the 
12 
expansion of under tak ings or for the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of new 
13 
u n d e r - t a k i n g s i s r e q u i r e d to be notu.fled to the Cen t r a l 
Government. I f the Government th ink i t necessa ry , i t may r e f e r 
the proposa l to the MRTP Commission for i n q u i r y and r e p o r t . 
The power to pass f i n a l o r d e r s in t he se p roposa l s l i e s with 
tne Cen t r a l Government. The Cent ra l Government may by 
n o t L f i c a t i o n in the o f f i c i a l Gaze t t e , make r u l e s to c a r r y 
out the purposes of tne MRTP Act . 
Tne Cen t ra l Government may a t any time r e q u i r e the iMi^ TP 
ComiTussion to submit to i t a r e p o r t on the genera l e f f e c t ii-
the pUDiic i n t e r e s t of such t r a d e p r a c t i c e s as , in the opin ion 
of the Cen t r a l Government, e i t h e r c o n s t i t u t e or c o n t r i b u t e 
to monopol i s t i c or r e s t r i c t i v e t r ade p r a c t i c e s or c o n c e n t r a t i o n 
ot economic power to the common d e t r i m e n t . 
i'ne Cent ra l Government s h a l l cause to be l a i d before 
ootji Houses of Pa r l i ament an annual r e p o r t and every r e p o r t 
which may oe subinitted to i t by the MRTP Commission from time 
to t ime, p e r t a i n i n g to the execut ion of the p r o v i s i o n s of tne 
MRTP Act . 
The Cent ra l Government has wide powers and func t ions 
12. Sec . 6 1 . 
13 . 3ec. 62 . 
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r e g a r a i n y i4RTP A c t . They a r e a s f o l l o w s -
i . Power t o examine p r o p o s a l s and p a s s i n g of f i n a l o r d e r s 
14 
in matters relating to substantial expansion, establishment 
of new undertaking and merger, amalgamation and take over 
undertaking. 
17 
2. Appoint iuent of I n s p e c t o r s . 
3 . Power t o ask t h e Commission t o s u b m i t a r e p o r t on e f f e c t 
18 
of t r a d e p r a c t i c e . Making r e f e r e n c e t o t h e Commission f o r i n q u i r y i n t o ; 
19 ( i ) any m o n o p o l i s t i c t r a d e p r a c t i c e . ' 
20 
( i i ) any r e s t r i c t i v e t r a d e p r a c t i c e , and 
21 
( i i i ) any u n f a i r t r a d e p r a c t i c e . 
22 
4. Power to set up the MRTP Commission and to make rules 
providing for conditions of service of members of the Commi-
SSIon. 
5, Power t o a p p o i n t t h e D i r e c t o r G e n e r a l of I n v e s t i g a t i o n and 
24 25 
R e g i s t r a t i o n and t o make r u l e s f o r c o n d i t i o n of h i s s e r v i c e ? 
Power t o a p p r o v a l of c o n d i t i o n s of s e r v i c e of p e r s o n s a p p o i -
n t e d by t h e Commiss ion . 
6 . Imposing of r e s t r i c t i o n s on t h e a c q u i s i t i o n and t r a n s f e r 
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of shares of, or by bodies corporate 
14. Sec. 21. 
15. Sec. 22. 
16. Sees. 23 & 24. 
17. Sec. 44-
18. Sec. 61• 
19. Sec. 10(b) . 
20. Sec. 10(a) (ii) 
21. Sec. 36(B) (b) . 
22. Sec. 5. 
23. Sec. 67(2) (b) . 
24. Sec. 58. 
25. Sec. 67(2)(c). 
25. Sees.30B, 30C, 30D, 30i:, 
C H A P T E R - I I 
GENERAL POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OP IHE COMMISSION 
The anti-monopoly law in India i s d i rected against the 
concentration of economic power in pr iva te sector which i s 
deemed to be detrimental to common goods. I t provides for 
the creat ion of an agency with mult i far ious du t ies to check 
such concentration of economic power on one hand, i t has 
to search out those malpractices which tend to ass imi la te 
the economic power to overawe consumers and public a t large , on 
the other hand, i t has to s teer the economy through, by using 
planning s t r a t eg i e s to achieve social j u s t i c e . 
The KiRTP Act, 1959 lays down a dual machinary for the 
enforcement of i t s provis ions . These are the centra l 
Government and the Commission. To a s s i s t the Commission in 
i t s work the Act, p r ior to i t s amendment in 1984, provided for 
two s ta tu to ry functionaries, narrely, the Director General of 
Invest igat ion and Regis t rar of Res t r i c t ive Trade Agreement. 
However, af ter the ilRTP (Amendment) Act, 1984 both the off ices 
have been merged in to the Director General of Invesigat ion ai.d 
Reg i s t ra t ion . 
The function of the Central Government are to ensure 
tha t the operation of economic system does not r e s u l t in the 
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concentration of economic power to the common detriment, and 
to control monopolies. The power in this regard are exercisable 
by the Government, and if it so chooses, in consulation with 
the commission, which has only advisory role to play. The 
Commission on the other hand is vested with the independent 
power to enquire into restrictive and unfair trade practices 
and to pass final orders. 
Any person aggrieved by an order made by the Central 
Government or the MRTP Commission may prefer an appeal to the 
Supreme Court on one or more of the grounds specified in 
Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ( 5 of 1908). 
Before going into the specific fvinctions of the Commission 
it is relevant to have some idea about the general amptitude 
and ambit of powers that the Commission has been entrusted with. 
A- Power to Grant lajunctioa 
The MRTP Commission has been vested with the powers of 
a civil court for certain purposes laid down in 3.12 of the 
Act. But prior to the MRTP (Amendment) Act,1984, there was 
no provision conferring any power on the i<lRTP Commission to 
issue an interim injunction for the purpose of preventing any 
person from carrying any monopolistic or restrictive or 
unfair trade practices during the pendency of the inquiry. 
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The High Powered Committee (Sachar Committee) which was 
established to go into details of infirnaities of the MRTP 
commission had to admit that although the Commission had all 
those powers which a Civil court possesses but, it is strange 
that it does not have the preliminary power to restrain. The 
Sachar Committee recommended that. 
"The Commission should be authorised not 
only to issue permanent injunction but also 
to issue temporary and interim injunctions 
pending the completion of inquiry. This would 
also leave them a chance to annul or modify 
any interim order if due cause is shown to 
the Commission". 
In order to provide more effective power to the MRTP 
Commission, the MRTP (Amendment) Act, 1984 inserted a new 
section i.e., 12A in the Act'Section 12A reads as follows-
"Where during an inquiry before the Commission 
it is proved whether by complainant. Director 
General/ any trader or class of traders or any 
other person by affidavit or otherwise, that 
any undertaking or any other person by affidavit 
or otherwise, that any undertaking or any persons is 
carrying on, or is about to carry on, any 
monopolistic, any restrictive or unfair trade, 
practices, and such monopolistic or restrictive 
or unfair trade practice is likely to affect 
1, The Sachar Committee Report - para 21-40. 
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pre jud ic i a l ly the public i n t e r e s t or 
i n t e r e s t of any t rader , c l ass of t r aders 
or t raders general ly or any consumer or 
consumers generally/ the Coauuission may, 
for the purpose of staying or preventing 
the undertaking by order .grant a temporary 
injunction r e s t r a in ing such undertaking or 
person from carrying of any monopolistic, 
r e s t r i c t i v e or unfair trade p rac t i ce un t i l 
the conclusion of such inquiry or u n t i l 
further orders'.' 
The iMRTP Commission's temporary injunction has heen 
2 the same force as tha t of an injunction by a Civil Court? I t 
shal l be enforced in the same way as i f i t were a decree or 
order made by a Court and in case the Commission i s unable 
to enforce i t , i t may send such order to the Civil Court, 
within the local l i m i t s of vAiich e i t he r the reg is te red off ice 
of company i s s i tua ted or where the person against whom the 
3 
order is passed voluntarily reside. The Commission has been 
empowered to pass all such interim order as a Civil Court can 
pass order under the provisions of Rule 2A-5 of the order 39 
of the Civil Procedure Code. 
In some cases the MRTP Commission held that irreparable 
injury would cause to the plaintiff. Without irreparable 
2. Sec. 12(2) of the MRTP Act, 1969 4 
3. Sec. 12(c) of the MRTP Act, 1969 (Inserted by Act 30 of 
1984 vide sec. 10). 
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injury no claim can be e f fec t ive ly made. In Consumer Durable 
Dealers Association oc Others V. Godrej Boycl MFG Co.(P) Ltd. 
i t was held that for granting temporary injunction, the p l a i n t i f f 
must be able to prove not only tha t he has priraaH'facie case 
and tha t the balance of convenience l i e s in h i s favour, but , 
a lso tha t i r r eparab le injury would caused to hira, i f i t i s not 
granted. In tiiis case there being no a l lega t ion of any 
i r r e p a r a b l e loss or injury in the applicat ion for injunction 
e i t h e r to the complainant or to any one e l se , and the complainants 
having not come with clean hands, the appl icat ion for temporary 
injunct ion was held l i a b l e to be dismissed. 
The amendment Act, of 1984 has made a considerable 
change in the MRTP Act, 1969 especia l ly in the matter of 
r e s t r a i n t of malpract ice. Like the American s t a t u t e s , the 
provisions of the Act have become qu i te s t r ingen t and e f fec t ive . 
In U.a.H. the Courts have been granting in te r locu tory injunct ions 
time again, against the trade combinations v io la t ing the 
5 
provisions of Clayton Act 1914. Besides the Courts have evolved 
a scheme of priliminary relief based on two principles, first, 
the probability that a violation will be established by a full 
jearing on the mertis cind second, the relative injury to the 
practice or to the public that will be likely to follow the 
granting or denial of interlocutory relief. In case the injury 
4. (1989) 2 Comp LJ. 285 (MRTPC). 
5. Sec. 7 of the Clayton Act 1914. 
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i s subs tan t ia l i t may, be granted otherwise, i t noay be denied. 
p r iva te 
The interlocutory injunction can be obtained even by/litigants. 
The MRTP Commission hasgranted absolute injunction 
restraining a jewellery export house from publishing the impu-
gned luck draw scheme by any media till further order. 
In his brief order Mr. H.C. Gupta observed that the 
the impugned shceme prima- facie would distort competition as a 
consumer would be influenced by the advertisement as to the 
choice of the dealer from whom the Jewellery is to be purchased. 
He further observed that "the distortion of the competition 
would ultimately restrict the Customer^' choice and would be 
6A 
detrimental to the i n t e r e s t of the consumer. " 
Two hundred and twelve appl ica t ions were received by the 
MRTP Commission under section 12A during the year 1987-88 for 
grant of temporary injunctions carrying on monopolistic, r e s -
t r i c t i v e or unfair trade p r a c t i c e s . Until conclusion of inquiry 
by the Commission in to trade p rac t i ce 68 appl ica t ions were 
brought forward from the previous year . Out of these, 198 
appl ica t ions were disposed of by the Commission during the year 
and 82 remained pending under t h i s sect ion with the MRTP 
6. In re Brown Shoe Co., 1956-Trade Case 68, 245 I (E.D.M.) . 
6A The Hindustan Times, 28th December, 1990. 
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Commission as on 1st April, 125 applications were received by 
the Commission during the period April-December, 1988, 117 
applications were disposed of during this period. Thus, 90 
applications under section 12A were pending with the Commission 
7 
on 31st December, 1988. 
B-aequJ-atlon Making Poviera 
The MRTP Commission is an independent, quasi-judicial 
body, therefore, it has all the necessary powers to run its 
business effectively. Section 18(1) of the Act empowers the 
Commission to make regulations regarding the pi?ocedure and con-
duct of its business. Section 18(1) reads as follows; subject 
to the provisions of this Act, the Commission has power to 
regulate-
(a) The procedure and conduct of its business; 
(b) The procedure of bench of the Commission; 
(c) The delegation to one or more menobers of such powersor 
functions as the Commission may specify and subject to 
any general or specific direction given, or condition 
in^osed, by the Commission, a member, to whom any 
powers or functions are so delegated, shall exercise such 
power or discharge those functions in the same manner and 
with the same effect as if they had been conferred on such 
member directly by this Act, and by way of delegation 
and any order or other act or thing made or done by such 
member in persuance of the power or function so delegated 
7. (1989) 2 Comp LJ. 133 (Global Newspot) . 
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shall be deemed to be an order or other 
act or thing made or done by the Commission. 
Further the Commission has power under Section 66 of 
the Act to make regulations for the effective performance of 
its business. Section 66 of the Act reads as follows: 
(1) The Commission may make regulations for the 
effective performance of its functions under 
the act. 
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the 
generality of the for going provisions, such 
regulations may provide for all/any of the 
following matters; 
(a) the condition of service, as approved by the Central 
Government of persons appointed by the Commission; 
(b) the issue of the processess to Government and other 
persons and the manner in which they may be served; 
(c) the manner in vAiich the special section of the 
register shall be maintained and the particulars 
to be entered or filed therein; 
(d) the payment of costs of any proceedings before the 
Ccxnmission by the parties concerned and the genersil 
procedure and conduct of the business of the 
Commission; 
(e) any other matter for which regulations are 
required may be made. 
Regulation making power of the Commission is wide. It 
can maike regulations to run its function effectively. 
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E a r l i e r the r e g u l a t i o n made by the Commission under 
s e c t i o n 65 of the Act were n o t r e q u i r e d to be l a i d be fore 
each House of Pa r l i amen t . However, an amendment made to t h i s 
s e c t i o n in 1983 which come i n t o force from March, 1984, the 
prov i s ion of t h i s s ec t i on have now been brought a t par with 
those of s e c t i o n 67 \i*iich r e q u i r e s the Cen t ra l Government to 
lay Defore each House of Par l i ament , the r e g u l a t i o n framed 
and n o t i f i e d by the Commission. I t may be noted t h a t d e s p i t e 
t h i s change the Commission has been depr ived of the duty to 
r e g u l a t e the funct ion of the D i r e c t o r General which i t h i t h e r 
to enjoyed. This amendment has taken the p i t h and substance 
in the e f f i c i e n t and c o - o r d i n a t e working of the MRTP Coratnission. 
C- Power to Const i tute Benches 
The powers or func t ions of the MRTP Commission may be 
e x e r c i s e d or d i scharged by benches froraed by the Chairman of 
the i'-lRTP Commission from among the members. The Cen t r a l Office 
of the MRTP Commission s h a l l be in Delhi b u t the Commission may 
s i t a t such p l a c e s in I nd i a and such t imes as may be most 
conven ien t for the e x e r c i s e of i t s powers or func t ions under the 
9 
MRTP Act; 
8. Sec. 16(2) of the MRTP Act, 1969. 
9. Sec. 16(2) of the MRTP Act, 1969. 
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Any order passed by the members of the Commission under 
delegation shall be deemed to be the order of the Commission. 
Moreover, section 6(4) of the Act provide that no act or 
proceeding of the Commission shall be invalid by reason only 
any 
of the existence of/vacancy among its members or any defect in 
its constitution. 
But according to Section 5(1) of the Act, the Commission 
shall consist of a Chairman and not less than 2 and not more 
than 8 other members. 
In view of these provisions, the question is whether the 
Commission could function without a chairman at any time or 
with only one or more members. The issue came up for consider-
ation in before the Calcutta High Court in Bengal Potteries 
9A Case. In this case the Commission was not fullfleged (in the 
sense that it did not have one chairman and two members), it 
had only a chairman and one member constituting the bench. The 
Court upheld the validity of the bench and observed that-
"in view of section 16(2) the Commission could 
form a Dench even with less than 3 members. It was 
further/bbserved that section 6(6) of the Act will come 
into play only if ttiere is a difference of opinion 
among the meirbers of the Commission. The power of 
forming a bench by the Chairman under section 16(2) 
of the Act is not dependent or controlled by section 
6(6) because those provisions are contingent and 
9A. Bengal Potteries Ltd. V. MRTPC (1975) 45 
Gomp. Cas. 697 (Cal) . 
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and dependent upon the happening of 
difference of opinion amongst the naernbers". 
A similar s i t ua t ion arose when only one member (Shri H.M. 
Jhala) was functioning from August, 9, 1976 to February 23, 
1978. His j u r i s d i c t i o n to cons t i t u t e the bench was challenged 
9B by Graphite India Ltd* The Commission following the aforesaid 
judgement of the Calcut ta High Chourt held tha t one merrtber could 
va l id ly cons t i tu te the bench. 
Notwithstanding the merit of the aforesaid decis ions, i t 
would, however, be undesirable to allow one-meinber Coninission 
to decide the legal issues to evaluate the economic condit ions 
of our country, to examine the impact on our economy, ef fec t 
on the Competition, public i n t e r e s t , e t c . 
D- Power t o A>*ard Coropensation 
I t i s a well s e t t l e d p r inc ip l e of jurisprudence tha t 
for every wrong there must be a remedy. In a l l the l e g i s l a t i o n s 
the world over, provisions e x i s t s enabling an affected party to 
seek remedy for being conpensated for loss or damage suffered 
by i t a t the hands of a person v*io has indulged in prohibited 
p r a c t i c e s . Thus Section 7 of the Sherman Act 1890 and Section 4 
of the Clayton Act 1914 (U.S.A.) provide tha t any person who 
has been injured in h i s business or property by reason of any 
9B. In re Graphite India Ltd . , 2 R . r . I . 85 (MRTPC). 
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thing forbidden may sue with respect to amount 
in controversy ana recover thr^e fold the damages sustaiined 
and the Cost. The Combines Investigation Act of Canada also 
provides by Section 31.1 the right of any party to recover 
damages from the person who has indulged in trade practices which 
are prohibited. Section 82 of the Trade Practices Act, 1974 
of Australia also provide that a person who suffers loss or 
damage by conduct of a person which is in violation of the 
provisions relating to restrictive trade practices or Unfair 
trade practices may recover the amount of loss or damage by 
action against that other person. 
It is apparent that prohibited practices(whether monopol-
in 
istic, restrictive or unfair), if indulged/are likely to cause 
grave loss or damage to many consumers. A consumer may be 
compelled to pay higher prices. As a result of such practices 
one suffers pecuniary loss because of other unethical practices 
indulged in by the sellers and yet, in the Act prior to its 
amendment in 1984, the only remedy was 'Cease and desist order ,• 
there was no provision for awarding damages against those wbo 
had indulged in such practices. The 'fcease and desist order' 
could at best be a preventive measures for future. It could 
obviously not compensate the injured party for the losses 
already suffered. 
9C. Sec. 37 of the MRTP Act, 1969. 
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The Sachar Committee strongly recommended that the 
Commission should be vested with the power to award compensation 
against loss or damages caused by the any monopolistic, restr-
ictive or unfair trade practices individually or through class 
action. Accordingly the MRTP (Amendment) Act, 1984 introduced 
a new section 12B in this regard. Section 12B(1) provides 
that-
"where, as a result of the monopolistic, restrictive 
or unfair trade practices, carried on by any 
undertaking or ciny person any loss or damage is 
caused to the Central Government or any State 
Government or any trader or class of traders or any 
Consumer may without prejudice to the right of such 
Government, trader or class of traders or Consumer 
CO institute a suit for the recovery of any 
compensation for the loss or damage so caused, make 
an application to the Commission for an order for the 
recovery from that undertaking or owner thereof, as 
the case may be from such person, of such amount as 
the Commission may determine, as compensation for the 
loss/damage so caused'.' 
of 
The scope/this provision is very wide and can invoke-
independently of all the provisions of the Act. The wider scope 
of this provision evident from the fact that an application to 
claim compensation can be made by any trader or class of traders 
or any consumer. The application for compensation should be 
supported by an affidavit of the person making the application 
10. Supra note - 1 paras 23.50 and 23.51. 
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stating the particulars or the extent of loss or damage of the 
alleged monopolistic, restrictive or unfair trade practices. 
However, the Commission may before making any order under 
section 12B direct the Director General to make such investiga-
tion as may be deemed necessary into the allegation and submit 
a report thereon. Section 12B{4) provides that the Commission 
is authorised to pass the appropriate order after inquiry 
directing the defaulting party to make good the loss and 
compensation for the injury caused by its monopolsitic, restrict-
ive and unfair trade practices. However, where any decree for 
the recovery of any amount as compensation for any loss or 
damage has been passed by any court in favour of any person 
or persons, the amount, if any, paid or recovered in pursuance 
of the order made by the Commission under section 123 shall be 
set off against the amount payable under such decree. 
The Commission can award any amount of compensation which 
it deems fit. In Mrs. Bandana Chadha and other V. Sheri Louise 
Slimming Center Bombay» ^\he Commission held that the respondent 
was indulging into unfair trade practices and allowed the 
applicant Rs. 4,07,110 as compensation owing to loss suffered 
by him. The applicant is also allowed to Cost a sum of Rs. 2, 500 
as claimed by him. 
Similarly, the same clinic center was also found guilty 
lOB 
in Heru Anand V. Sheri Louise Slimming Center Bombay; the 
Commission held that the applicant is entitled to a payment of 
iOA. (1990) 20 CLD 46 at 49. 
iOa. (1990) 20 CLD 49 at 53. 
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te. 3,54,480 owing to the loss suffered by her as the r e s u l t 
of unfair trade prac t ice of the respondent. The applicant i s 
a lso allowed to cos t a sum of Rs, 2,500. 
In a l l , 3,273 appl ica t ions including 175 appl icat ions 
brought forward from the previous year for recovery of 
compensation for loss or damage caused by rttonopolistic, 
r e s t r i c t i v e or unfair trade p rac t i ces carr ied out by undertaking 
or persons, were considered by the MRTP Commission during 1987-
88. 367 appl icat ions were disposed of and 2,906 appl icat ions 
remained pending at the end of the year. 
During the period April-December, 1988, 4,544 appl icat ions 
under t h i s sect ion including 2,906 appl icat ions brought forward 
from the previous year were considered by the Commission. Of 
these 868 appl icat ions were disposed of by the Commission 
during the period and the remaining 3,686 appl ica t ions were 
pending as on 31st December, 1988. 
Itie above data show^ tha t the grievances regarding award 
of compensation i s increasing day by day and the Commission i s 
inef fec t ive to solve the problem. I t i s suggested tha t the 
Central Government should sin^jlify the c ruc ia l provisions 
r e l a t i n g to award of compensation. 
11 . (1989) 2 Comp. LJ. 133 (Global Newspot). 
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E- Powers for the Purpose of Inqxilry 
The MRTP Commission is a quasi-judicial body, it has 
power to enquire any matter pending before it to find out 
facts. Section 12(1) of the Act confers on the Commission for 
the purposes of any inquiry xinder the Act the powers as are 
vested in Civil Court under Civil Procedure Code (1908), while 
trying suit in the matter of; 
(a) Summoning and enforcing the attendence of any 
witness and examining him on oath; 
(b) discovering and production of any document or 
other material object producable as evidence; 
(c) reception of evidence on affidavit; 
(d) requisitioning, of any, public record from any Court 
Office; 
(e) issuing any Commission for examining of witness. 
Further, regulation 77 prior, to its deletion by MRTP 
Commission (Amendment Regulation) 1984« provided that stibject 
to the provision of Section 12(1) of the Act, the provision of 
certain orders of the Code of Civil Procedure should apply as 
if they were expressly included in the regulatiions except in 
so far as they aire inconsistent with the express provisions 
of the regulations. New regulation 15 substituted by the MRTP 
Commission (Amendment Regulation) 1984, makes provision which 
are to oe of similar effects. Itius, where the regulations are 
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s i l e n t and section 12 (1) of the Act i s also s i l en t / the 
remaining provisions of the Code of Civi l Procedure (1908) 
have been made applicable mutatis-rautandiS/ subject to the 
requirements of expedience. • So, i t i s hoped that the 
an Commission can p lay /e f fec t ive role to inquire any matter 
pending before i t . 
Section 12(3) of the Act provides t ha t the Commission i s 
empowered to require any person-
(a) to produce before, and allow to be examined and kept 
by, an off icer of the Commission the re levant books, 
accounts or other documents r e l a t i n g to any trade 
p rac t i ce , the examination of u4iich may be required for 
the purposes of the MRTP Act; and 
(b) to furnish an of f icer so specified such information 
regarding the t rade prac t ice as may be required for 
the purposes of the Act, or other information in h i s 
possession in r e l a t i on to the trade car r ied on by 
other person. 
For the purpose of inquiry attendance of witnesses, 
the local l im i t s of the Commission's Ju r i sd ic t ion are the 
12 
limits of the territory of India. 
Ihe powers of the Commission as Civil Court are confined 
to the conducting of any iqnuiry under the Act. In other words. 
12. Sec. 12(4) of the MRTP Act, 1969. 
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the Commission can exercise powers of a Civil Court only 
af ter an inquiry under the Act has been i n s t i t u t e d . 
Any Officer authorised by the Coranission, derived powers 
to c o l l e c t information r e l a t ing to t rade p rac t i ces of any 
undertaking or such other informfeion as may be in the possession 
of any person in r e l a t ion to the t rade carr ied on by any other 
person. In the case of Indian and EastemNews Paper Society, 
the Commission took the view tha t for the purposes of the Act, 
the Commission was empowered under section 12(3) of the Act, 
to co l l ec t the material which could have formed the bas i s of 
i n s t i t u t i n g an inquiry on i t s own knowledge or information. 
F- Powers of Entry, Search and Seizure 
The MRTP Commission i s a quas i - jud ic ia l body, such body 
can function porperly vtien i t s Officers empowered to enter in 
any premises, search i t and seize a l l the documents necessary 
for the purpose of inquiry . Pr ior to the MRTP CAmendment) Act, 
1984 no such power was conferred to the MRTP Commission, But 
the MRTP Amendment Act, 1984, inser ted a nevf-sub section 5 of 
section 12 in to the Act. Section 12(5) now empowers the 
commission to authorise any of f icer of the Commission for entry, 
search and seizure of documents in r e l a t ion to any undertaking 
of which inquiry i s being made under the Act. Section 12(5) 
reads as follows-
13. RTP inquiry No. 78 of 1975, order, dated 10-2-1975. 
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••Where, during any inquiry under this ACt, the 
Commission has any ground to believe that any 
books, papers of or relating to any undertaking 
in relation to which such inquiry is being made or 
>*iich the owner of such undertaking may be required 
to produce in such inquiry, are being, or may be, 
destroyed, mutilated, altered, falsified or screened 
it may by a written order, authorises any Officer 
of the Commission on to exercise the same powers of 
entry, search and seizure in relation to the under-
taking, or the books, or papers, aforesaid as may 
be exercised by the Director - General while holding 
a preliminary investigation under section 11V 
So, it is hoped that the Commission will play an effective 
role to inquire any matter pending before it and make search 
and seizure effectively. 
G- Hearing before the CooKnissioa 
The hearing of proceeding before the Commission would be 
14 
in public except vihere the Commission finds i t des i rab le by 
reason of the confident ia l nature of any offence or matters or 
for any other reason, i t may hear the proceedings in p r i v a t e . 
The Commission i s also empowered to p roh ib i t or r e s t r i c t the 
publ icat ion of evidence given before i t (vrtiether in public or 
in private) or of matters contained in documents f i l ed before 
15 16 
it. In re Anil strach Products Ltd., it was held that hearing 
1 4 . S e c . 17(1) of iMRTP Act , 1969 . 
1 5 . I d . s e c , 17(2)« 
1 6 . (1975) 45 Coaqp. C a s . 600 (MRTPC). 
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of the Commission may be in public, but if desired by the 
Commission, it may hear the proceeding in private or the 
Commission may give direction not to publish the evidence givan 
therein. But this view to withold evidence from the parties 
was not favoured by the Supreme Court in a judgement and 
17 
declared i t to be a v iola t ion of natural j u s t i c e . 
The Commission has en t i r e discretion to determine the 
extent to vftiich persons ent rus ted or claiming to interested in 
the sxibject matter of any proceeding before i t or allowed to 
be heared e i t h e r by themselves or by the representa t ion or to 
cross - examine witnesses or otherwise to take pa r t in the 
18 
proceedings. The Commission is also free to decide the 
circumstances of each such case about the extent of participation 
of such persons. 
H~ aggorceaent; of Orders by the Comnaisaion 
Prior to the MRTP (Amendment) Act, 1984 the MRTP 
Commission was not empowered to enforce its orders. After 
this amendment it was empowered to enforce itsorders effectively. 
The MRTP (.vnendment) Act, 1984 added a new section 12C. In 
order to enforce its orders the Commission is empowered to adopt 
any method provided in Order 21 of Civil Procedure Code (1908). 
Section 12C of the Act provides that-
17. Bombay Oil Industries Pvt. Ltd., V. Union of India AIR 1984 
S.C. 160. 
18. Supra note, 14, Sec. 18(2); 
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"Every order made by the Commission under section 
12A granting temporary injunction or under section 12B 
directing the owner of an underta3cing or other person 
to make payment of any amount, may be enforced by the 
Commission in the Scime manner as if it were a decree 
or order made by a Court in a suit pending therein and 
it shall be lawful for the Commission to send, in the 
event of its inability to execute it, such orders to 
the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction; 
(a) in the case of an order against a Conpany, the 
registered Office of the Company is situated;or 
(b) in the case of an order against any other person, 
the place where the person concerned voluntarily 
resides or carries on business or personally 
works for gain, is situated, and thereupon the 
Court to which the order is so sent shall execute 
the order as if it were a decree or order sent 
to it for execution". 
So, it is hoped that the Commission will function properly 
and enforce its order as a Civil Court effectively. 
I- Monitoring the Enfoirceaent of its Orders 
The Commission is empowered to find out, by means of 
investigation, whether or not orders made by it have been 
complied with. Prior to 19 84 amendment no such power was 
conferred to the Commission to monitor the enforcement of its 
orders. The MRTP (Amendment) Act, 1984 added a new section 13A, 
which empowers the Commission to look after its orders and 
direct the Director General or any Officer of the Comnaission to 
investigate into the matter and submit its report to the 
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Commission. After receiving repor ts e i t h e r from Director 
ieneral or from any other Officer, the Conaraission can take 
any action vftaich i t thinks f i t . 
J - Adv i sory Role o f the ConaBttissioa 
The Central Government may, i f i t considers necessary, 
consult the MRTP Commission. Based on the repor t of the 
commission, the Central Government may pass such orders as i t 
thinks f i t , with regard to the proposals, the Commission has 
only advisory ro le in so far as the control of economic 
concentration or monopolistic p rac t ices i s concerned. The 
Central Government may, while according any approval, sanction, 
permission, confirmation or recognition or giving any d i rec t ion 
or issuing any order, or granting any exemption in r e l a t ion to 
any matter, in5>ose such condit ions, l im i t a t i ons or r e s t r i c t i o n s 
as i t may thinks f i t . The Central Government shal l have the 
power to modify any scheme of finance submitted to i t under 
the MRTP Act in such manner as i t thinks f i t . If any condit ion, 
l imi ta t ion or r e s t r i c t i o n thus imposed by the Central Government 
i s contravened, the Central Government may rescind or withdraw 
the approval, sanction, perraission, confirmation, recognit ion, 
19 
direction, order or exemption made or granted by it. 
19. Supra note 14, sec, 54. 
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K- Atnendlnq & Revoking Orders 
The MRTP Commission is einpowered to amend or revoke 
any of its order at any time in the manner in which it was 
20 
made. This is very significant power. The Commission decides 
matter on the basis of particular economic conditions and other 
relevant considerations. A material change in the relevant 
circumstances may necessitate a fresh look at the case. This 
may call for a revocation or amendment to the earlier order. 
The procedure for revoking or amending the order is the same 
as foilwed in making the original order. 
20, supra note 14, sec. 13(2)' 
C H A P T E R - I I I 
MOSOPOLISTIC TRADE PRACTICES 
The c o n c e p t and p r a c t i c e of monopoly g o e s w i th human-
memory. A c c o r d i n g t o t h e U . S . Supreme C o u r t , t h e o f f e n c e of 
monopoly h a s two e l e m e n t s ; (1) t h e p o s s e s s i o n of monopoly 
power w i th r e l e v a n t m a r k e t ; a n d (2) t h e w i l f u l a c q u i s i t i o n o r 
m a i n t e n a n c e of t h a t power a s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from growth o r 
d e v e l o p m e n t as a c o n s e q u e n c e of a s u p e r i o r p r o d u c t , b u s i n e s s 
acumen, or h i s t o r i c a l a c c i d e n t . 
The e s s e n c e of monopoly i s t h e a b i l i t y t o d i c t a t e t h e 
p r i c e and c o n t r o l t h e m a r k e t w i t h o u t b e i n g m a t e r i a l l y a f f e c t e d 
by t h e o t h e r compe t ing c o n c e r n . I n a l l , m o n o p o l i s t i c t r a d e 
p r a c t i c e s , t he r e p r e h e n s i b l e i s t h e a t t e m p t t o s h u t - o u t compet-
i t i o n . A m o n o p o l i s t i c t r a d e p r a c t i c e s i s e s s e n t i a l l y a t r a d e 
p r a c t i c e v«*iich r e p r e s e n t s t h e abuse of m a r k e t power i n t h e 
p r o d u c t i o n o r m a r k e t i n g of g o o d s , o r i n t h e p r o v i s i o n s of 
s e r v i c e s , by c h a r g i n g u n r e a s o n a b l y h i g h p r i c e s , p r e v e n t i n g o r 
r e d u c i n g c o m p e t i t i o n , l i m i t i n g t e c h n i c a l developntient, d e t e r i o r -
a t i n g p r o d u c t q u a l i t y , o r by a d o p t i n g u n f a i r o r d e c e p t i v e 
p r a c t i c e s . 
1 . U n i t e d S t a t e s of Amar i ca ,V*Gr inne l C o r p n . , 284 US 563, 1 6 . L, 
Ed. 2d . 7 7 8 . 
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Monopoly is a concept of power which manifests itself 
in one's power to - (a) Control production, supply, etc., 
(b) control prices; (c) prevent, lessen or eliminate competition; 
(d) limit technical development; (e) retard capital investment; 
(f) impair the quality of goods. 
Before the MRTP (Amendment) Act, 1984 the concept of 
"monopolistic trade practices" had limited scope. 3ut the MRTP 
(Amendment) Act, 1984 widened the "concept of monopolistic 
trade practices". It includes certain recommendations of the 
Sachar Committee. The Sachar Comitiittee recommended the following 
revised definition of "monopolistic trade practices"; 
"Monopolistic trade practices includes a trade 
practice which has or is likely to have effect 
of-
(a) increasing unreasonably the cost of goodsj 
produced or of Service rendered; 
(b) increasing unreasonably or maintaining in 
any manner, at an unreasonable level, the 
prices of goods sold or resold, or of the 
service rendered; 
(c) increasing unreasonably the profits derived 
from the production, supply or distribution of 
goods or from the performance of any service; 
(d) unreasonably preventing or lessening competition 
in the production, supply, distribution of any 
goods or in the supply of any service; 
(e) limiting technical development or capital 
investment to the common detriment; 
(f) allowing the quality of goods produced, supply 
or distributed or in the performance of 
any service to deteriorate^ 
2. oachar Committee Report, Para 19»-17, 
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The definition of "monopolistic trade practices" has 
been amended by the MRTP (Amendment) Act 1984 incorporating 
certain elements as recommended by the Sachar Committee 
Section-2(i) States as follows: 
"Monopolistic trade practice" means a trade 
practice which has, or is likely to have, the 
effect of-
(i) maintaining the prices of goods or charges 
for the services at an unreasonable level 
by limiting, reducing or otherwise 
controlling the production, supply or 
distribution of goods of any description 
or the supply of any services or in any 
other manner; 
(ii) unreasonably preventing or lessening 
competition in the production, supply or 
distribution of any goods or in the supply 
of any services; 
(iii) limiting technical development or capital 
investment to the common detriment or 
allowing the quality of any goods produced, 
supplied or distributed or any services 
rendered in India to deteriorate; 
(iv) increasing unreasonably:- (a) the cost of 
production of any goods or (b) charges the 
provision, or maintenance, of any services; 
(v) increasing unreasonably:- (a) the prices at 
v*iich goods are or may be, sold or resold, or 
the charges at which the services are, or may 
be, provided; or (b) the profits which are, 
or may be derived by the production, supply or 
distribution (including the sale or purchase) 
of any goods or by the provision of any services; 
(vi) preventing or lessening competition in the 
production, supply or distribution of goods 
or in the provision or maintenance of any 
service by the adoption of unfair methods or 
unfair or deceptive practices". 
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Market power i s an earmark of monopoly power vftiich 
enables an undertaking to indulge in e i t he r r e s t r i c t i v e or 
monopolistic trade p rac t i ces , but there can be no absolute 
standards in th i s matter and market share by i t s e l f may not 
be a safe guide for various s i t u a t i o n s . For example, in 
3 
Alcoa's case. Lord Hand held tha t 90% was suf f ic ien t to 
cons t i t u t e monopoly power, but doubted tha t 64% would c e r t a -
in ly be so, and said tha t 33% would c e r t a i n l y be not . In 
United Shoe's case Judge Wyzanski held tha t 75% was 
5 
su f f i c i en t while in Cellophone's case 20% was held to be 
not su f f i c i en t . In Phi l iadelphia National Bank's case 30% 
cont ro l was considered to be su f f i c ien t t h r e a t . Thus no guide 
l i n e s can be l a i d down to specify the monopoly power. 
In India though market power i s not considered as 
fundamental tool to eschew monopoly power. However, monopoly 
power v*iich r e s t r i c t s , prevents or d i s t o r t s competition i s , an 
another guise to recognise, such market power in the actual 
administrat ion of a n t i - t r u s t l e g i s l a t i o n . The commission i s , 
therefore, empowered to take cogniaance of a l l those trade 
p rac t i ces which r e su l t from such monopoly power. 
3. U.S. V. Aluminium Co. l48^P-2d. 416. 
4. U.S. V. UnitedShoe Machinery Corp. 110 F. Supp. 295. 
5. U.S. V. E-1 Dupont 351 U.S. 377 (1956) . 
6. U.S.V. National Bank 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
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A. Power of lOQttlry: 
The MRTP Commission has l imited power regarding the 
inquiry in to monopolistic trade p r a c t i c e s . The Commission 
has only power to inves t iga te the matter and r epor t to the 
government. Regarding the powers of the MRTP Commission to 
inquire in to monopolistic trade p rac t i ces , the Monopolies 
7 
Inquiry Commission observed : 
"It shall be the duty of the MRTP Commission 
to inquire into every case in which a 
monopolistic undertaking is said to be 
indulging in a monopolistic trade practice. 
It upon inquiry the MRTP Commission found 
that the practice was prejudicial to the 
public interest, whether actually or pote-
ntially, the Commission may pass such order 
as it may thinks fit to remedy or prevent any 
mischief which result or may result from 
such practice" 
It seems, therefore, clear that the Commission was 
to provide with sufficient powers to deal with abuse of market 
power by monopolistic undertaking. 
An inquiry into a monopolistic trade practice can be 
instituted by the MRTP Commission on the basis of either of-the two 
8 
sources. 
7. MIC Report, at 173. 
8. S. 10(b) of the I^TP Act, 1969. 
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(a) a reference made to the Commission 
by the Central Government; or 
(b) the Commission's own knowledge or 
information. 
(i) ReferencQgby the Governiaeati 
The MRTP Act, 1969 empowers the Central Govt, to r e fe r 
the matter r e l a t i ng to monopolistic trade p rac t i ces to the 
Commission for inquiry and report ,Sect ion-31 of the Act 
pos tu la tes tha t af ter the Central Government has referred the 
matter to the Commission, the Commission shal l a f te r hearing, 
as i t thinks f i t , and making inquiry, repor t to the Central 
Government finding thereon. There are two findings one under 
sect ions 10(b) and 31 (i) by the Central Government as to 
whether the owners of one or more undertakings are indulging 
in any trade prac t ice which i s or may be a monopolistic trade 
p rac t i ce and the other under Section 31(2) which i s to given 
by the MRTP Commission. 
Section 31 reads as follows: 
(1) "where i t appears to the Central Government tha t 
the owner of one or more undertaking are indulging 
in any prac t ice vrtiich i s , or may be, a monopolistic 
trade p rac t i ces prevai l in respect of any goods 
or services that government may refer the matter 
to the Commission for an inquiry and the Commission 
sha l l , af ter such hearing as i t thinks f i t , repor t 
to the Central Government i t s finding thereon". 
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(2) If as a r e s u l t of such i n q u i r y , the 
Commission makes a f ind ing to the e f f e c t 
t h a t , having regard to the economic 
c o n d i t i o n s p r e v a i l i n g i n the coun t ry and 
to a l l o the r m a t t e r s v*iich appears i n 
p a r t i c u l a r c i rcumstances to be r e l e v a n t , 
the t r ade p r a c t i c e o p e r a t e s o r i s l i k e l y 
t o opera te a g a i n s t the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , i t 
s h a l l make a r e p o r t to the C e n t r a l Government 
as to i t s f ind ing thereon and on r e c e i p t of 
such r e p o r t , t he Cen t ra l Government may, 
no twi ths t and ing any th ing con t a ined , i n any 
o the r law for the time being i n fo rce , pass 
such o rde r s as i t may t h i n k s f i t t o remedy o r 
p reven t any mischief which r e s u l t from such 
t r a d e p r a c t i c e " 
At the f i r s t s t age t h e r e i s no f i n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n of 
the ques t ion of monopol i s t i c t r a d e p r a c t i c e by the Cen t ra l 
Government. The words 'where i t a p p e a r s ' i n s u b - s e c t i o n ( l ) 
of s ec t ion -31 by t h e i r very n a t u r e m i l i t a t e a g a i n s t the 
sugges t ion of the Cen t r a l Government de te rmin ing f i n a l l y the 
q u e s t i o n of t h e r e be ing an under t ak ing indu lg ing i n mono-
p o l i s t i c t r ade p r a c t i c e s . Only a p r ima- f ac i e opin ion of the 
C e n t r a l Government w i l l s u f f i c e t o enable i t t o e x e r c i s e i t s 
power to r e f e r the mat te r to the I4RTP Commission for an 
i n q u i r y . The order of r e fe rence s e t s in motion i n v e s t i g a t i n g 
the 
machinery of/i-lRTP Commission a p r ima- fac i e view of Cen t r a l 
Government. 
The Cen t ra l Government may make r e f e r e n c e to the MRTP 
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Commission i f appears t ha t there i s priraa-facie material which 
i s re levant for the formation of the opinion tha t the matter 
requi res to be referred under section 3 1 ( i ) . Once the Central 
Government as a reasonable person could come to the conclusion 
tha t i t i s necessary to re fer the matter for inquiry under 
Section 31(1) of the Act, the sufficiency of the mater ial i s 
not for the Court to decide . I t only means to show tha t the 
9 
Central Government has not acted arbitrarily. Whether all 
the facts aai figure given in the report are true or not or 
whether the unreasonableness of price or profit or a particular 
figure is acceptable or not, are questions which have to be 
examined by the MRTP Commission vihen it hold inquiry. 
In seventees, three references were made by the Central 
Government to the MRTP Commission in the matter of Cocacola 
Export Corporation (on July 28, 1973)^ Cadbury Fry India Ltd. 
(on March 22, 1974), and Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. (on 
March 28, 1974}, , Which provoked much debate in legal and 
economic circles. These references were not inquired into 
because of in pending stay orders from the Delhi High Court 
and latter in the Supreme Court. The Delhi High Court disposed 
all the above three cases and rejected the contention of the 
plaintiff's. 
9. Colgate Palmolive India (P) Ltd. V. Union of India (1980), 
50 Camp. Cas, 456, 
10.Id. at 495. 
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The three companies filed appeals against the 
decision of the Delhi High Court before the Supreme Court 
and obtained stay of proceeding before the Commission. The 
appeals were (as on October 31, 1985) pending. In the three 
appeals, the legal issues raised are as folXowst 
(1) Whether it is a condition precedent for the 
exercise of power under Section- 31 of the Act 
that a reference can be made by the Central 
Government only after its first finds that the 
undertaking is a monopolistic vindertaking 
within the meaning of Section-2(j) of the Act; 
(2) Whether the undertaking can be said to be 
a monopolistic undertaking in ttie absence of the 
published figures of the Central Government 
with regard to the total production of the 
goods concerned in India, as is required in 
clause (2) of Explanation II of Section-2(J) 
of the Act; 
(3) Whether the undertaking within the meaning of 
Section-2(v) of the Act in determining as to 
whether an undertaking is a monopolistic 
undertaking or not, in respect of euiy goods, 
regard should be had to the MRTP (Classification 
of Goods) Rules, 1971; and 
(4) Whether the power of the Commission after 
holding an inquiry under Section-31 of the 
ACt, is only to report its findings as to 
whether the trade practice operates or is likely 
to operate.against the public interest or 
whether the Commission is required to inquire into 
and report its finding into the existence of 
monopolistic trade practices. 
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With the amendment in the relevant provisions brought 
about the MRTP (.amendment) Act, 1984, the first three of the 
four issues mentioned above lost their significance Under 
the amended provisions, it is not necessary that for a refer-
ence to be made to the Commission for inquiry into monopolistic 
trade practices the undertaking must be a monopolistic 
undertaking . The Concept of monopolistic undertaking has 
altogether been deleted from the MRTP Act. On 30-7-1987 a 
reference was made by the Central Government to the MRTP 
Commission in the matter of Safety razor blades industries 
in India for inquiry into nvonopolistic trade practices 
under Section 31(1). The matter could not be taken up by the 
MRTP Commission because of the stay granted by the Bombay 
High Court. 
To pass final orders with respect to monopolistic trade 
practices is vested with the Central Government, instead of, 
with the MRTP Commission. The Commission is only empowered 
to make recomnendation to the Central Government for appropriate 
ac tion. 
The Sachar Committee recommended that the MRTP Commission 
must be given powers to inquire into monopolistic trade pract-
ices and pass final orders as it does in the case of restrictive 
trade practices. At the same time the present powers of the 
11. Reference No. 1/1987. (1989) 2 CLJ 131 (Global News'^ t'ot)* 
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Government to make a reference to the Commission and pass 
12 
final orders are to be retained intact. 
This recommendation was only partly accepted by the 
MRTP (Amendment) Act, 1984. The powers of the Commission 
regarding passing of final orders was not incorporated, the 
superniacy of the Government was thus once again established, 
(ii) suo Motu Inquiry: 
the 
Section 10(b) provides that/Commission may inquire 
into monopolistic trade practices on the basis of its own 
knowledge or information. Such an inquiry is known as a 
'Suo motu inquiry*. Before the MRTP (Amendment)Act, 1984 it 
was not clear whether the Corrmission was competent enough 
to institute an inquiry into any monopolistic trade practice 
on its own knowledge or information without a reference 
received by it from the Central Government. But the 1984 
amendment made it clear that the Commission is competent 
enough to inquire into monopolistic trad practices on its 
own knowledge or information. A proviso was added to Section-31 
(!• 
Proviso to sub-section(l) of Section 31 reads as 
follows: 
Provided that where the Commission receives 
any information or comes to know, that the owner 
The 12. Sachar Committee Report para 2l • 23. 
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of any xindertaking is, or the owners of 
two or more undertakings are, indulging 
in any trade practice, which may be, a 
monopolistic trade practice, or that 
monopolistic trade practices prevail in 
respect of any goods or services, it may, 
on its own motion and notwithstanding that 
no reference has been made to it by the 
Central Government under this sub-section, 
make an inquiry into the matter. 
Although, the Commission is empowered to investigate 
monopolistic trade practice, but it could not make up of this 
power because of lack of follow up machinery. The Sachar 
Committee discussed this issue elaborately and recommended the 
amendment of Section 10(b) suitably in order to provide a 
break through for effective control, by the Commission of 
these practices. It also emphasised that investigation by 
the Commission is one of the main objectives of the Act and 
if it fails to provide for effective machanism, the whole 
purpose of the Commission will fall. 
In exercise of its suo motit. powers, the MRTP Commission 
14 
instituted, in June, 1975, an inquiry against Avery India Ltd. 
This investigation was not effectively carried out because of 
13. The Sachar Committee Report at para 21,28,29. 
14. Avery (India) Ltd., MTPE. No. 1/1975, RTP'.S in India Vol.Ill 
p.322. 
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the preliminary objection about, j u r i s d i c t i o n e t c . of the 
Commission to t ry such case ra i sed by the Avery India Ltd. 
But the Commission re jected the contention of the Company, 
Against the Commission's order the company f i l e d an appeal 
to the Supreme Court and tha t appeal i s s t i l l pending. The 
main questions raised in t h i s case by the cort^jany are as 
follows: 
(1) \^e ther the MRTP Commission has any power 
or j u r i s d i c t i o n to inquire in to a monopolistic 
t rade pract ice without a reference being made 
to i t by the Central Government and in the 
absence of an inquiry under Section 37(i)> 
(2) '.Whether on a true construct ion of sect ions 
10,31 and 37 of the MRTP Act, an inquiry in to 
monopolistic trade p rac t i ce can be i n i t i a t e d 
only upon a reference made to i t by the Central 
Government, or upon the knowledge c^tained or 
information derived by the Commission in an 
inquiry under Section 37(1) of the Act; 
(3) Whether the Commission can inquire i n to a 
monopolistic t rade prac t ice (a p a r t from a 
reference by the govt.) only in the case of 
an undertaking which i s a monopolistic 
undertaking; 
(4) Whether the govt, decides not to proceed with 
an inquiry under the MRTP Act a f te r having 
i n i t i a t e d i t , i s i t open to the Commission to 
inquire and proceed with the same, where such 
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inquiry r e l a t e s to a monopolistic trade 
prac t ice i s indulged in by a monopolistic 
undertaking. 
Witnthe amendments in re levant provisions^ p a r t i c u l a r l y 
the delet ion of the term "monopolistic undertaking" , the 
i s sues at s e r i a l No. 3 and 4 above seemsto have l o s t t h e i r 
s ign i f icance . So, i t i s c lear tha t the Commission i s ful ly 
empowered to make necessary i nves t i ga t i on . 
I t may be emphasised that/Comnaission's pos i t ion i s subs-
i d i a r y to the Central Government, the powers which the Commission 
ought to have, are enjoyed by the Central Government. Although 
i t i s the Commission which s tudies the nature, cause and 
e f fec t of these p rac t i ces , given the economic and other 
considera t ions , i t i s the Central Government vrtiich makes t h e i r 
orders as i t thinks f i t . 
The Commission's power regarding monopolistic trade 
p rac t i ce s i s s t i l l d i lu tory , ine f fec t ive any nugatory. There 
does not seem to be any subs tan t ia l improvements in Central 
machanism of monopolistic trade p rac t i ce s , despi te the 
overhauling of the Act in the recent p a s t . 
rrre ~ 
15./MRTP (Araendflaent) Act , 1 9 8 4 . 
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(ill) Report Regarding Monopolistic Trade Practices Notice 
During Restrictive Trade Practice Inquiry; 
The MRTP Commission is empowered to hold inquiry into 
monopolistic trade practices under the provisions of 
Section 37(4) of the Act. Section 37(4) reads as follows: 
Notwithstanding, any thing contained in this 
Act, if the Commission during the Course of 
an inquiry under sub-section(l), finds that 
the owner of any undertaking is indulged in 
monopolistic trade practice^ it may after 
passing such order under sub6ection(l) or 
sub-section (2) with respect to the restrictive 
trade practices as it may consider necessary, 
submit the case alongwith its findings thereon 
to the Central Government for such action as 
that government may take under section 31. 
Even though Section 37 is primarily meant for an inquiry 
into restrictive trade practices, the Commission, neverthless, 
is empowered during the course of an inquiry to take notice 
of the owner of the undertaking indulging in any monopolistic 
trade practice. This course of action is independent of the 
other modes contemplated under sections 10(b) and 31 of the Act, 
Since both restrictive trade practice and monopolistic 
trade practice are anticompetitive in nature, the Commission 
has been empowered to conduct simultaneous inquiries into these 
two practices indulged in by any person. The underlying 
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objective of this provisions appears to be avoiding of 
duplication of proceedings and to give appropriate relief 
in the public interest as speedily as possible, consistent 
17 
with the p r i n c i p l e s of n a t u r a l j u s t i c e . As observed by the 
Bombay High Court in Raymond Wool M i l l s Ltd.U'MlTP Commission 
one of the o b j e c t i v e s of t h i s p r o v i s i o n i s to ' reduce the 
m u l t i p l i c i t y of p roceedings , for vAiat can be found i n the 
same i n q u i r y need not be done again by i n i t i a t i n g another 
i n q u i r y . 
During the course of r e s t r i c t i v e t r a d e p r a c t i c e i n q u i r i e s , 
t he J^TP Commission i n i t i a t e d a c t i o n under Sec t ion 37(4) in 
18 four c a s e s . (1) Gramophone Company of I n d i a L t d . , 
1 9 ?i 
C2) Bengal P o t t e r i e s L td . , (3) Raymond Woolen m i l s L t d . 
, , 21 
and (4) Graph i t e I n d i a L t d . During the course of i n q u i r i e s 
i n t o r e s t r i c t i v e t r a d e p r a c t i c e s a g a i n s t t he se companies, the 
MRTP Commission informed them of i t s i n t e n t i o n to submit the 
case along with i t s f ind ing thereon to the Cen t r a l Government 
under Sec t ion-37(4) for a p p r o p r i a t e a c t i o n . In a l l the four 
c a s e s , the companies concerned f i l e d w r i t - p e t i t i o n i n the 
C a l c u t t a , Delhi and Bombay High Cour ts r e s p e c t i v e l y , and 
16. RRTA V'Gramophone Co, of I n d i a L t d . , (RTP I n q u i r y No,l of 
197 2, o rde r , dated 16-5-74 . 
17 . (1979) 49 Comp, Cas . 687 (Boirbay) . 
1 8 . Supra note 16 . 
19 . Bengal P o t t e r i e s L td . V.^^IRTFC (1975) 45 Comp Cases 697. 
20. Supra note 17 . 
2 1 . 1977 TAX LR 1990 (MRTPC). 
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obtained stay against the inquiry proceedings before the 
Commission. 
22 In Raymond Wool Mills case the Bombay High Court held 
that although Section 37 was primarily meant for investigation 
into restrictive trade practices, nevertheless the Commission 
was empowered during the course of an inquiry to take notice 
of a monopolistic undertaking indulged in restrictive trade 
practice. 
23 In Graphite case , the Calcut ta High Court observed 
t h a t during the course of a r e s t r i c t i v e trade prac t ice , inqui ry the 
Commission was not empowered to inquire in to the posi t ion of 
any undertaking to determine whether i t was a monopolistic 
undertaking or no t . 
There was a l o t of confusion about the wordings of 
Section 37(4) as i t stood before 1984 amendment. On the 
bas i s of the recommendations of the Sachar Committee, 
sub-section(4) of Section -37 has been amended by the 1984 
amendment Act» With t h i s amendment, the controversy regarding the 
s t a t u s of a company as a monopolistic undertaking and the 
Commission's j u r i s d i c t i o n to inquire i n to the s t a tus of an 
undertaking (whether i t i s monopolistic undertaking or not) 
has been removed. 
22. Supra note 17. 
23. Supra note 21 • 
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3. Power to Assess the Effects of Monopolistic Trade Practices; 
Every Welfare legislation is supposed to protect public 
interest. The Crux of the provisions relating to monopolistic 
trade practices is that the Cottunission should study the adverse 
effects of these practices and then refer it to the Central 
Government for appropriate action. The Central Government is 
authorised to make any order it deems fit, to prevent and 
curb such practices the Commission is only authorised to study 
the economic conditions prevailing in the country and all other 
matters which appear in particular circumstances to be relevant. 
If the Commission after inquiry comes to the conclusion, that 
these practices are prejudicial to public interest, it shall 
accordingly, apprise the Government about this information 
and investigation. These provisions are included in Section- 3 2 
(2). Section 32(2) reads as follows: 
"If as a result of such inquiry, the Commission 
makes a finding to the effect that having 
regard to the econonxic condition prevailing 
in the country and all other matters which 
appear in particular circumstances to be 
relevant, the trade practice operates or is 
likely to operate against the public interest, 
it shall make a report to tne Central Government 
as to its findings thereon and on receipt of 
such report, the Central Government may notwith-
standing any thing contained in any ottier law for 
the time being inforce, pass such orders as it 
may thinks fit to remedy or prevent any mischief 
which results or may result from such trade 
practices'.' 
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Before passing appropriate order the Central Government 
must satisfy itself that particular monopolistic trade 
practice is against public interest. What constitute public 
interest for the purpose of making an order under this 
Section is dealt with in Section- 32. Section 32(1) reads as 
follows: 
"For tne purposes of the Act* every monopolistic 
trade practice shall be deemed to the prejudial 
to the public interest except where.... 
(a) such trade practice is expressly authorised 
by any enactment for the time being inforce, 
or 
i.D) the Central Government being satisfied that 
any such trade practice is necessary 
(i) to meet the requirements of the defence 
of India or any part thereof, or for the 
security of the State, 
(ii) to ensure the maintenance of supply of goods 
and services essential to the community/ 
(iii) to give effect to the terms of any agreement 
to which the Central Government is a party, 
by a written order, permit the owner of 
an undertaking to carry on any such trade 
practice. 
The order which the central Government can pass under 
sub-sections(2A) and (3) is notwithstanding anything contained 
in any other law for the time being inforce. The nature of 
the specific orders that can be passed by the Central Government 
under sub-section (3) resembles closely the orders which the 
Central Government can pass under the Industries Act. 
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TO assess the e f fec ts of monopolistic p rac t ices i s not 
subs t an t i a l l y d i f fe ren t from the Commission's power to assess 
public i n t e r e s t . In both the cases the Commission has to 
ascer ta in the probable effects on competition and market power. 
The only difference i s in the nature of curtai lment of these 
prac t ices by two divergent agencies. 
The iARTP (Amendment) Act has not res tored the desired 
pos i t ion of the GonvuLssion which i s s t i l l incompetent to pass 
any orders to r e s t r a i n these p rac t i ces which i t takes pains to 
look i n t o . Ihe Commission s t i l l lacks enthusians and fervour 
ciDout suo motu action, when i t has no power to curb such 
p r a c t i c e s . 
C H A P T E R - IV 
RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES 
The law on r e s t r i c t i v e trade p rac t i ces has i t s ear ly 
or ig in in the English Conunon Law. The old Zoo Common law 
pol icy of free trade could not r e s i s t the dawn of big 
monopolies and trade combinations culminating in the 
p ro l i f e r a t i on of r e s t r i c t i v e and unfai r trade p r a c t i c e s . This 
necess i ta ted the enactment of special l e g i s l a t i o n s to combat 
these p r a c t i c e s . 
In U.K. although the law on r e s t r i c t i v e trade p rac t i ces 
become s t a t u t o r i l y recognised in 1956, i t was embedded deep in 
the common law thoughu The t r a d i t i o n a l law ef fec t ive ly could 
not r e s i s t the dominating overshadow of big monopolies which 
posed a th rea t to the rubr ic of balanced economy, therefore i t 
was pe r t inen t to combat these g ian t forces, with tooth and n a i l , 
2 
by the S t a t e . The need to e f fec t ive ly control these trade 
p rac t i ces as pursued by giaint corporations and t r u s t s was, 
f i r s t l y , f e l t in United S t a t e s . The U.S. Sherman Anti Trust 
Act, 1890 and other subsidiary Acts, are the most ambitions 
attempt, in the Common law world to deal spec i f i ca l ly with the 
1. Wilberforce, Corap c e l l and E l l e s , ' t he Law of Res t r i c t i ve 
Trade Pract ices and i^lonopolies,' 5 (1966), para 6 . 
2. J u l i u s Stone, Social Dimensions of Law and Ju s t i c e , 
8(1977),433. 
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threat, to economic institutions and progress caused by the 
growth of monopoly. According to Wilberforce these anti-trust 
legislations laid down the basis for future antimonopoly laws. 
In India the provisions of law relating to restrictive 
trade practices have been recently introduced and almost the 
same as applicable in U.K. The Monopolies Inquiry Commission 
expressed the view that the term'restrictive trade practice' 
would mean practices whicn obstruct the free play of competitive 
forces or impede the free flow of capital resources into the 
stream of production... thus indicating that a trade practice 
having either these characteristics could be treated as a 
4 
r e s t r i c t i v e trade p r a c t i c e . 
Broadly speaidng, a t rade prac t ice which r e s t r i c t s or 
reduces competition may be termed as a r e s t r i c t i v e trade prac t ice , 
Section 2(o) of the .-ict define the term r e s t r i c t i v e trade 
p rac t i ce in the following words: 
"Rest r ic t ive trade p rac t ice means a trade p rac t ice 
which has, or may have, the ef fec t of preventing, 
d i s to r t i ng or r e s t r i c t i n g Competition in any manner and 
in pa r t i cu l a r , -
(i) which tends to obs t ruct the flow of cap i t a l 
or resources in to the stream of production, or 
3 . J.W. Burns; Anti-Trust-Laws (1958) a report submitted to 
Senate Judic ia l Sub-Committee, 84th Congress. 
4 . MIC, Report, 126, 
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( i i ) which t e n d s t o b r i n g a b o u t m a n i p u l a t i o n 
of p r i c e s , o r c o n d i t i o n s of d e l i v e r y , o r t o 
a f f e c t t h e f low of s u p p l i e s i n t h e raarKet 
r e l a t i n g t o goods o r s e r v i c e s i n such manner 
as t o impose on t h e consumers u n j u s t i f i e d 
c o s t s o r r e s t r i c t i o n s " . 
I t may be n o t e d t h a t t h i s d e f i n i t i o n i s e x h a u s t i v e and 
4 A 
r e s u l t o r i e n t e d . 
I n I n d i a , t h e o b j e c t i v e of t h e r e g u l a t i o n of r e s t r i c t i v e 
t r a d e p r a c t i c e s i s t o promote c o m p e t i t i o n . I t i s t h e e f f e c t 
of t r a d e p r a c t i c e on c o m p e t i t i o n which d e t e r m i n e s v ^ e t h e r o r 
no t a t r a d e p r a c t i c e c o n s t i t u t e s a r e s t r i c t i v e t r a d e p r a c t i c e . 
O r d i n a r i l y , a t r a d e p r a c t i c e t o become ' r e s t r i c t i v e ' must 
h a v e a c t u a l o r p r o b a b l e a d v e r s e e f f e c t on c o m p e t i t i o n . I f , 
any 
however, a traae prac t ice i s covered under/v>f the two sub-clauses 
of sectior: 2(o), i t wil l be presumed to be a r e s t r i c t i v e trade 
p r a c t i c e . This in t e rp re t a t ion i s to be given in view of the 
words ' in p a r t i c u l a r ' and these two instances in p a r t i c u l a r are 
ins tances of r e s t r i c t i v e t rade p r a c t i c e s . This i n t e rp re t a t ion 
hold good in view of supreme Court decis ion in Akadesi Pradhan 
V« Sta te of Orissa where the court in terpre ted the same words 
(in pa r t i cu la r ) used under Ar t i c le 19(6) of the Consti tut ion of 
India with reference to the power of S ta te of monopolies any 
4A. Mahindra u Mahindra V . Union of India , A.I .R., 1979 
3.C. 798. 
5. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1047 . 
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trade, business, industry or service, that interpretation is 
clearly applicable here. 
The decision in Rallli=^ s India Ltd., is patently erroneous 
and laid down "that the two particular instances given in 
Section 2{o) have also to satisfy the primary requirement, viz, 
that competition in the relevant field is prevented, distorted 
or restricted in any manner". This view is clearly contrary 
to that of Supreme Court in Mahindra U Mahindra Ltd V . Union 
n 
of India , where i t was held tha t "the def in i t ion of r e s t r i c t i v e 
trade pract ice given in section 2(o) i s pragmatic and r e s u l t 
or iented de f in i t ion . I t defines r e s t r i c t i v e trade p rac t i ce 
to mean a trade prac t ice which has or may have the e f fec t of 
preventing, d i s to r t i ng or r e s t r i c t i n g competition in any manner 
and, in clauses (i) and ( i i ) , p a r t i c u l a r i s e s two speci f ic 
ins tances of trade p rac t i ces which f a l l within the ca tegor ies 
of r e s t r i c t i v e trade practices'. ' 
The iMRTP Commission has to play a ro le of vigilance in 
order to know the ult imate of the r e s t r i c t i v e t rade p rac t ices 
on competition and to know other factors which though not have 
ant i-competi t ive effect , r e su l t i ng in manipulation of pr ices and 
g 
down fall in technical development 
6. Registrar of Restrictive Trade Agreements V. Rallies India 
Ltd. (1979)49 Camp.Cas.797 . 
7. Supra no t e , 4A. 
8 . iTjre Mathrobhumi p r i n t i n g U Pub l i sh ing Co. , L t d . 1977 Taac LR 
2290 (I^TPC) . 
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A, Po%ier o f I n v e s t i g a t i o n 
One of the main function of the Coramission i s to 
inves t iga te into the nature, causes and effect of r e s t r i c t i v e 
trade agreements. The Act c l e a r l y provides t h a t the Coramission's 
power to inves t iga te i s f inal and dec i s ive . The Commission 
has to take j ud i c i a l notice of these trade p rac t i ce s to combat 
them e f fec t ive ly . 
The inquiry under Section 37 (1) i s of two fold: whether 
a trade prac t ice i s r e s t r i c t i v e and whether i t i s against public 
i n t e r e s t . An inquiry cannot be said to be complete unless both 
these i ssues have been decided by the Commission and t i l l then 
no order can be passed under tha t section 9, Both par t of 
inquiry are an in tegrated whole and the matter cannot be decided 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y without both aspects having been considered. 
Therefore, the Coramission has held tha t there i s nothing unusual 
or wrong in a par ty being ca l led upon to s t a t e the circumstances 
under which i t claims any of the gateways xinder section 38(1) . 
I t would not be proper to dispose of the inquiry piecemeal. 
For i n i t i a t i n g an inquiry under sect ion 37(1), what i s required 
i s only a prima-facie sa t i s fac t ion of the Goimlssion about the 
basic or cons t i tuent facts which appear to represent or cons t i tu t e 
tile trade p rac t ices which are r e s t r i c t i v e in na tu re . 
9. Supra note 4A, 
10. RRTA V. TELCO (1979). 49 Comp. Gas. 30. 
11. In re Mohan i-leaking Breweries Ltd. (1979), 49 Comp. Cas. 
238. 
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The prima-facie satisfaction of the Commission may turn into 
a judicial inference only after the inquiry. Therefore, the 
jurisdiction of the commission can not be dependent, on the 
actual existence of a restrictive trade practice existed. Such 
an approach would destroy the very purpose of Inquiry. This 
approach was adopted by the Commission in Inre Mohan MeakinqBrev. 
12 Ltd., in which the agreements in question entered into by 
the company with its distributors and sole selling agents where 
the source of information of a Suo motu inquiry and the 
Coounission found that information adequate to proceed with the 
inquiry. 
In order to enable the Commission to sa t i s fy i t s e l f 
tha t there ex is t s a prima-facie case for i n s t i t u t i n g a 
s t a tu to ry inquiry in to the alleged r e s t r i c t i v e trade p rac t i ce , 
the law provides for a fact-f inding inves t iga t ion to be 
conducted by the Director General, This inves t iga t ion i s 
refer red to as a preliminary inves t iga t ion . I t i s intended 
to help the Commission to ensure tha t no fr ivolous complaint 
i s made and that the s ta tu tory body i s not t r iggered into 
13 
action for insufficient and unjust cause. In ITC V. MRTPC 
the Calcutta High Court observed— 
"The investigation conducted by the Director 
of Investigation is for the purpose of information 
12. Ibid. 
13. (1976) 46 Comp. Cas. 619. 
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the mind of the Commission vrtiether i t 
would, on the ba s i s of the material 
co l lec ted , decide to hold an inquiry 
against the pe t i t i one r under section 37. 
Section iOCa) c l ea r ly provides tha t the MRTP Commission 
can i n s t i t u t e an inquiry in to a r e s t r i c t i v e trade p rac t i ce on 
any of the following grounds— 
(i) a complaint of fac ts which cons t i tu t e such 
a p rac t i ce , received from any trade.-: or 
Consumers' associat ion having a raefit)ership 
of not l e s s than twenty five persons, or 
from twenty-five or more consumers; 
( i i ) a reference made to the Commission by the 
Central Government or a S ta te Government; 
( i i i ) an applicat ion made to the Commission by 
the Director-General of Inves t iga t ion and 
Regis t ra t ion; and 
(iv) the Commission's own knowledge or information ( i . e . , 3uo .-lotu) . 
(i) Inquiry upon Consumers' or traders' Complaint 
Consumers', t r a d e r s ' , occupy a v i t a l place in the 
administrat ion of antimonopoly laws wherever i t i s appl icable . 
In U.K. the law of r e s t r i c t i v e trade p rac t i ces i s 'Consumer 
Conscious' having i t s bas i s in Common law public i n t e r e s t , while 
14 
as, in U.J.f\. i t i s ' t r ade consc ious ' . In India also 
consumers predominate the policy of anti-monopoly laws. 
14. Neal, Forward to Anti-Trust laws of the U.S./A. (1970) 13 . 
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15 
The term consumer i s not defined in the n e t . 
Section 38(2), however, r e fe r s to the terms Consumers as 
persons consuming for the purpose or ia course of trade or 
business or for public purpose. Thus the term would embrace 
not only the members of the general publ ic as consumers but 
a lso i ndus t r i a l consumers. In h i s separate opinion given 
in Nylon Spiners Case, H.M. Jhala, a members of the MRTP 
Commission, on the use of the term consumer, in Section 2(o), 
observed that the term must be taken to include not only the 
consumer of f inal product but the consumers of raw mater ia ls 
and intermediate products . 
Unlike consumer associa t ion, the term trade associat ion 
i s succinct ly defined under the Act. Section- 2(t) of the Act 
defines the term trade associat ion and read as follows: 
"trade associat ion means a body of persons 
(whether incorporated or not) which i s formed 
for the purpose of fur thering t|ie trade 
i n t e r e s t s of i t s members or of persons prevented 
by i t s members". 
The complaint under section- 10(a) (i) should contain the 
15. ine term 'consumer' novrtiere defined except under Austral ian 
Trade Pract ices Act 1974, vide Section* 4a. which i s too 
wide to De accepted as a true d e f i n i t i o n . 
16. Inre Agreement r e l a t i ng to Nylon Filament Yarn: Exparte 
J.K. Synthetics Ltd. (1976)46 Corap.Cas. 357 (MATPC). 
83 
fac t s complained of vrtiich cons t i t u t e a r e s t r i c t i v e trade 
p r a c t i c e . In All India Motor Transport Congress V. Good year 
17 
India Ltd« and others , the cortplaint of the Motor Transport 
Congress* did not contain the facts which cons t i tu ted the 
alleged r e s t r i c t i v e trade p r a c t i c e s . The Commission, however, 
re jec ted the respondents' p lea that the complaint did not 
merit an inquiry by the Commission since i t did not contain 
f a c t s . The Commission observed-
"A complaint should se t out the bas ic facts on 
which the a l legat ion i s foxinded. The fac t would 
connote something which, according to the complainant 
has already happened or i s happening. I t would 
exclude a l l imagination or something which .has not 
happened or happening . . . .Pac ts are something vrtiich 
are objective and which can be ascertained or 
es tabl ished without the ass is tance of the person 
al leging or refusing the f a c t s . Facts have to be 
dis t inguished from inferences tha t can be drawn from 
the facts or from the evidence vrtiich supports the 
fac ts or proves the f a c t s . The complaint i s the 
18 
pleading and contains what is to be inquired into!J 
Sixty one inquiries under section 10(a)(i) including 
22 brought forward from the previous year were 
considered during April-December, 1988. Five 
inquiries were disposed of during the said period and 
the remaining fifty six inquiries were pending with 
the Commission as on 313t December, 1988. 
17. RTP Inquiry No. 26 of 1974, order, dated 10-2-1975, 46 
Conqp, Cas. 315. 
1 8 . I b i d . 
1 8 A ( 1989)2 Comp. LJ 1 3 2 ( G l o b a l iMewspot) . 
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(ii) References by the Goyernment; 
The Commission is empowered to make investigation into 
restrictive trade practices on reference made to it by the 
Central or State Government. The reference like a corqplaint 
should state facts clearly and explicitly, to provide a 
19 
sufficient material to the Commission to arrive at a conclusion. 
In other words, the reference should not be a mere information 
based on no particular factual situation. In case the refere-
nce is inadequate, the Commission is not bound to make any 
20 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n . 
Reference ought to be the usual method of a p p r i s i n g the 
Commission of the f a c t s by tiie Cent ra l Government or S t a t e 
Government, as suggested by the I'tonopolies I n q u i r y Conxmission. 
But i n a c t u a l p r a c t i c e , t h i s method of in format ion i s seldom 
used by the Cen t ra l or S t a t e Government. This has lowered the 
importance of these r e f e r e n c e s . 
Since the i ncep t i on of the Act, t i l l December, 1982, only 
two r e f e r e n c e s have been made by the Cen t ra l Government. One 
was made in 1978 by the M i n i s t r y of I n d u s t r y i n r e s p e c t of 
p r i c e concer t a l l eged t o be followed by ten t y r e manufacturing 
companies and the o the r was made by the Department of Company 
19 . R a l l i e s I n d i a L td . (RTPE No. 15, Order, da t ed 20-2-1976) ' 
20. I n r e Sarabhai i4. Chemicals, Pv t . L td . (1979)49 Comp. Cas . 
887 (MRTPC). 
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Affairs in 1980 in respect of alleged exclusive dealings in 
passanger cars by M/s. Hindustan Motors Ltd. However, no 
reference has been made by any State Governinent. In the first 
case consent order was passed and in the second case the 
20A 
a l lega t ions were not proved and the inquiry was closed. 
( i i i ; Appllcat:loo by ttoe Director General 
The I'^ TP commission i s a quas i - jud ic ia l body, and has 
power to inquire in to r e s t r i c t i v e trade p rac t i ce on an app l i -
cat ion made to i t by the Director General of Inves t igat ion 
and Regis t ra t ion . Section 1 0 ( a ) ( i i i ) authorised the Director 
General to make an applicat ion to the Commission about the 
alleged r e s t r i c t i v e trade p rac t i ces of the Companies. In 
21 
Shri Ram Pistons U Rings Ltd. V . RRTA, the Commission held 
chat before f inal hearing, the RRTA was bound to show a 
prima-facie case about the r e s t r i c t i v e nature of the trade 
prac t ice alleged, but the prima-facie case did not mean the 
se t t ing out of the impugned clauses of e luc ida t ing the i r 
meaning, assuming that the meaning was absolute ly c l ea r . 
riccording to the Commission, the applicat ion on which the not ice 
was based, and on the bas i s of which the inquiry was s t a r t ed , 
must show a prima-facie case which might require in ce r t a in 
cases, in respect of ce r t a in a l lega t ions , and in respect of 
ce r t a in trade p rac t i ces , broad features or facts of trade 
against vi^ich the agreement was operating or expected to 
20A. 10th oi 11th Annual Reports Pertaining to the Execution of 
the Provisions of idRTP Act, 1969 at 106 and 122. 
21. RTP Inquiry No. 4l of 1976, Order, dated 24-11-1978,(1979)49 
Gomp. cas . 126. 
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operate. 
The application of the Director General may be based on 
an agreement relating to restrictive trade practice registered 
in 
with him/t)ursuant to the provisions of Section 35. However, 
it is not condition precedent for an application to be related 
to registered agreements. Even unregistered agreements may 
also be scrutinized by the Commission on the application of 
the Director General, provided facts that constitute such a 
22 
trade prac t ice are c l e a r l y given. 
The Commission can allow any modification in the appl ica-
23 
t ion by the Director General i f the circuiiistances so demanded. 
When a modified application i s made, i t i s not the contents 
but the relevancy of such amendments that can be only considered 
24 
by the Commission, The Commission may consider the application 
of the Director General about any matter regarding any 
restrictive trade practices, as it may give some clue about 
25 
the restrictive nature of that practice. The modification or amendment in the application of the 
Director General regarding restrictive trade practices became 
a bone of contention in many cases. It was alleged that allowing 
22. RRTA V. Escorts Ltd. (RTP Inquiry No. 87 of 1975), 1978 
rax LR, 2076 (MRTPC)^ 
23. RRTA V. Bata India Ltd. 1976 Tax LR 1311 (l^TPC) . 
24. TELCO Ltd. V'RRTA (1977) 2 SCR 685 at 720. 
25. RRTA V. Alied Distributors ic Co. 1976 TAX LR 1280 (i^TPC) . 
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any modification in the appl icat ion gives r i s e to a new cause 
of action and pleading which i s not avai lable to the Comruission 
under order 6 of the Code of Civi l Procedure, 1908. But the 
Commission held tha t by v i r tue of Regulation 7 2(2) of the 
MRTPC Regulation, 1974, the Commission was allowed to allow any 
par ty to a l t e r or amend, i n t e r - a l i a h i s p leadings . Accordingly 
i t was held tha t the Commission has j u r i s d i c t i o n to consider 
an applicat ion for amendment. This power enables the 
Commission to amend any defect or e r ro r in any proceeding 
including the not ice of inquiry, the not ice has to contain the 
a l legat ion of r e s t r i c t i v e trade p rac t ice made against the 
respondents. The amendment of notice would thus, include the 
27 
amendment of these allegations. Thus, in Premier Tyres case, 
it was held that the power of the Commission to allow modifi-
cation of the notice of inquiry is justified. But such an 
amendment may unnecessarily complicate the procedure and 
some times it may be allowed if it promotes justice and which 
do not lead to vague and hazy conclusion. It should not 
provide a chance for introducing new practices which are not 
28 
ca l led for, in the or ig inal appl ica t ion . 
Sixty-five inqui res under sect ion 1 0 ( a ) ( i i i ) were pending 
with the MRTP Commission at the beginning of the year 1987-88, 
2 6 . RRTA V. TELCO L t d . (1979)49 Comp. C a s . 187 (MRTPC). 
27. Premier Tyres Ltd. V. i4RTPC (1976)46 Comp. Cas'297 (Delhi ) . 
28. Inre S te r l ing Indus t r ies Ltd. (1978) Tax LR 2085 (MRTPC)• 
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1,279 more inqui r ies were i n s t i t u t e d by the Commission dur ing 
1987-88, of the 1,344 i n q u i r i e s under c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the 
Commission, 651 i n q u i r i e s were d i sposed of dur ing the year , 
l e a v i n g 693 i n q u i r i e s pending a t the end of the y e a r . 
831 i n q u i r i e s , i nc lud ing 693 c a r r i e d forward from the 
p rev ious year , were taken up by the MRTP Commission dur ing the 
p e r i o d Apr i l t o December 1988. Of t h e s e , 360 i n q u i r i e s were 
d i sposed of dur ing the sa id p e r i o d , while the remaining 471 
i n q u i r i e s were pending with the Commission as on 31st December, 
igBS?®"^ 
( iv) SUP Mottt I n q u i r y 
An i n q u i r y i n s t i t u t e d by the MRTP Commission on the 
b a s i s of i t s own knowledge or informat ion i s commonly r e f e r r e d 
t o as a 5UO motu i n q u i r y . Sub-c lause ( iv) of c lause (a) of 
s e c t i o n iO a u t h o r i s e s the Commission t o i n q u i r e i n t o a 
r e s t r i c t i v e t rade p r a c t i c e "upon i t s own knowledge or informationl ' 
The Commission can i n i t i a t e an i n q u i r y suo motu on the 
b a s i s of any informat ion r ece ived Dy i t from any source what-
29 
soever , even on the b a s i s of a c o n ^ l a i n t of a s i n g l e pe r son . 
However, the motives of the informat ion are q u i t e i r r e l e v a n t 
p roceedings before the Commission. All t h a t the Commission has 
28A. (1989) 2 Comp. LJ 132 (Global Newspptl* 
29. I n r e Graph i t e I n d i a L t d . (1979)49 Comp. Cas .212 . 
30. Hindustan Lever L t d . V. MRTPC, A . I .R . 1977 3C 1285. 
89 
to examine i s whether or not the prac t ice amounts to a r e s t r -
i c t i v e trade p r a c t i c e . 
I t i s now well - es tabl ished tha t the powers of the 
Commission to order inquiry in to various r e s t r i c t i v e trade 
p rac t i ce i s very extensive. I t s power to t r e a t a defective 
complaint f i l ed under Section 10(a) (1) as the bas i s of 
suo-motu inquiry under section lOCa) (iv) has been upheld in 
many cases . The f i r s t case came before the Commission to 
consider the above question was in 1973. In re J.K. Synthet ics 
31 
Ltd. and others. In this case, the All India Crimpers' 
Association, Bombay (having 23 members) lodged a complaint with 
the Commission against a restrictive trade practice agreement 
among four leading manufacturers of nylon filament yarn in 
India. The Con¥nission did not consider the complaint fit to 
form the basis of an inquiry under section-lO(a)(i), because 
a 
of the inadequancy of/number of complainants. Instead, the 
Commission instituted a suo motu inquiry on the basis of the 
information contained in the complaint. The respondents 
contended that a defective complaint, which was liable to be 
dismissed under section- 10(a) (i) , should not form the basis 
of a suo motu inquiry, since all the clauses of Section iO(a), 
mentioning the various sources of initiating inquiry, were 
mutually exclusive. 
31. RTP Inquiry No. 6 of 1973, Order, dated 5-3-1974; RTP 
in India, Vol. I, p. l40. 
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The Commission rejected the objection and ruled as 
follows: 
1, there is nothing in section LO to limit the sources 
from which the information Qf the Commission might 
be derived; 
2, there was nothing to indicate that it might not be 
derived from a complaint made by a single consumer, 
provided the information was satisfactory and reliable; 
and 
3, there was nothing in section 10 to impose a limitation 
on the jurisdiction of the Commission under section 10(a) 
(iv) to the knowledge or information derived by the 
Commission in the course of another independent inquiry. 
This view of the Commission was upheld by the Calcutta 
32 
High Court , in ITC V» MRTP Commxsaion v*iich h e l d t h a t even 
an i n v a l i d compla in t could be used by the Commission as i t s 
knowledge or i n fo rma t ion . This view was a l so endorsed by the 
Delhi High Court i n riirlon S y n t h e t i c f iber and Chemicals L t d . 
33 
and another V. D i r e c t o r of I n v e s t i g a t i o n * I t was observed by the Court ; 
"Section 10 authorises the Commission to 
inquire into any restrictive trade practice 
not only upon receiving a complaint but ad so 
upon its own knowledge and information^ 
3 2 . 1975 Tax LR 2177 . 
3 3 . (1976) 46 Comp. C a s . 4 1 9 . 
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34 
In case of Sarabhai M. Chemicals the Commission 
observed that any person could bring to the notice of the 
Commission the existence of an agreement constituting a 
restrictive trade practice. On the basis of such information 
the Commission could institute an inquiry suo- motu. 
In all, 201 sua .-notu inquiries were pending under 
section 10(a)(iv) witn the MRTP Commission at the beginning 
of the year 1987-88. 149 fresh inquiries were instituted 
and 73 such inquiries were disposed of by the Commission during 
the year. Thus, 277 Inquiries were pending with the Commission 
as on 31st March,1988. 366 inquiries, including 277 brought 
forward from the previous year, were considered by the 
Commission during April-December, 1988, 51 inquiries were 
disposed of during the said period. Thus 315 inquiries were 
34A 
pending with the Commission as on 31st December, 1988^ 
B. Power to Impose Restxlctloaa 
In MRTP Commission i s a quas i - jud ic ia l body. A j u d i c i a l 
or quas i - jud ic ia l body can only play an effect ive ro le i f i t s 
order i s binding upon the concerned p a r t i e s . In respect of 
r e s t r i c t i v e and unfair trade p rac t i ce s , the Commission i s free 
to inves t iga te the mattera and pass an appropriate o rders . The 
34. In re Sarabhai M, Chemicals (P) Ltd. and another (1979) 
49 Camp. Cas. 887. 
34A'(1989)2 Comp. LJ, 132 (Global Newspot)* 
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Commission i s f inal authori ty to decide the matters re la t ing 
to r e s t r i c t i v e and unfair trade p r a c t i c e s . 
Tne main function of the MRTP Commission as suggested 
by Monopolies Inquiry Commission i s to find out r e s t r i c t i v e 
t rade prac t ices e f fec t ive ly . The Monopolies Inquiry Commission 
observed. 
" . . . even though jud ic i a l inves t iga t ion does not 
reveal the existence of these prac t ices su i tab le 
publ ic i ty should be given of such inves t iga t ion 
for the i n t e r e s t of general public and in case 
an en terpr i se i s found gu i l t y of pursuing these 
prac t ices the Commission should have power to 
check them. . . " 
The order of the Commission should be in the nature of 
d i s c ip l i na ry proceedings against the business undertaking 
alleged to be indulging in an t i - soc i a l prac t ice and the 
consequence of the inquiry in any injunction r e s t r a in ing the 
continuation of the an t i - soc ia l a c t . To curb and control 
r e s t r i c t i v e trade prac t ices has been the main object ive for 
estauDlishing the MRTP Commission. I t has exclusive powers 
regarding these p rac t i ces , as ga ins t the monopolistic trade 
p rac t ices v^ere i t s power i s subject to and subordinate of the 
Central Government. The Commission controls r e s t r i c t i v e 
trade prac t ices in the following manner.: 
35. Monopolies Inquiry Commission - Report, p . 4 . 
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(i) Cea5» and Desist Orders 
In respect of restrictive trade practices, the 14RTP 
Commission is authorised to pass final orders. The Monopolies 
Inquiry Commission envisaged the role of an apex body for 
the MRTP Commission where its orders can not be challenged 
in any court except the Supreme Court. The MRTP Act fairly 
gave this recommendation of the MIC a suitable place, atleast 
36 
with r e s p e c t t o r e s t r i c t i v e t r a d e p r a c t i c e s . The Commission 
i s au tho r i s ed to pass such order whether o r no t the t r a d e p r a c t i c e 
i s r e g i s t e r e d . The scope of the Commission's i n q u i r y under 
s e c t i o n 37 goes beyond an agreement. Even i f impugned agreement 
d i d no t f a l l under any one of the c a t e g o r i e s of Section-33CL), 
i t could s t i l l amount to a r e s t r i c t i v e t r a d e p r a c t i c e s as 
37 
def ined i n s e c t i o n - 2 (o ) . What the Commission i s r e q u i r e d 
t o f ind i n an i nqu i ry under sec t i c» - 37 i s whether the p r a c t i c e 
e x i s t s or n o t . The e f f l u x of time does no t pu t an end to an 
38 
Inqu i ry proceeding under t h i s S e c t i o n . 
I f the Commission comes to the conclus ion t h a t the 
36 . Sec t ion-55 r e a d with »ec t ion-37 of the ACt. Sec t ion -55 
reads as fo l lows : 
Any person aggrieved by d e c i s i o n on any q u e s t i o n 
r e f e r r e d to i n c l ( a ) , c l ( b ) or c l ( c ) of s e c . 2 A or any o rde r 
made by the c e n t r a l Government under C h a p . I l l or Chap.IV, or 
as the case may be , the Commission under s e c . 1 3 or 3ec.36-D 
or Sec.37 may, wi th in 60 days from the d a t e of the o r d e r s , 
p r e f e r an appeal t o the Supreme c o u r t on one or more grounds 
s p e c i f i e d in sec.100 of the CPC, 1908. 
37 . General E l e c t r i c Co. of I n d i a V. MRTPC, RTP', s i n I n d i a Vol . 
I l l , P.351 c a l . 
38. RRTA V. Baroda Rayon Corpora t ion L t d . (1975) 45 Camp. Cas . 
660 (MRTPC)* 
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restrictive trade practices were prejudicial to the public 
interest, it may still direct the parties to the agreement not 
39 
t o r e p e a t the same in f u t u r e . However, Commission's power 
for the cognizance of t he se p r a c t i c e s should no t be based on 
40 
f i lmsy grounds. 
The cease and d e s i s t o rde r need not be a ba ld order b u t 
should con ta in such i n c i d e n t a l , consequen t i a l and supplement 
d i r e c t i o n s as the Commission may think* f i t . The p r o v i s i o n s 
which the order may con ta in should inc lude o b l i g a t i o n s which 
any p a r t y may be r e q u i r e d to comply w i th . The o rder can be 
e i t h e r general or l i m i t e d to p a r t i c u l a r c l a s s of t r a d e r s or to 
p a r t i c u l a r c l a s s of t r ade p r a c t i c e s or to a p a r t i c u l a r l o c a l i t y . 
These o rde r s may soraetiroes con ta in d i r e c t i o n about the r e g u l a t i o n 
41 
of t r a d e to f i t the needs of the p r a c t i c e s . 
In DG (I 6< R) V. K i l l i c k Mixon L t d . & K i l l i c k Halco L t d . , the 
respondent engaged i n t e r - a l i a i n the b u s i n e s s of manufacturing 
machines, d r i l l tubes , hammer and s p a r e s , for the prupose of 
s a l e and d i s t r i b u t i o n of the p r o d u c t s , appointed the f i r s t 
respondent as so le s e l l i n g agent on the terms and c o n d i t i o n s 
39 . R,D, Saxena V.J.K. S y n t h e t i c s L t d . (Spec ia l Appeal No. 249 
of 1976, da ted 1 5 - 6 - 1 9 7 8 ( A 1 1 ) . 
40 . RRTA V. Hind Lanp L t d . , RTP£ No. 13A574 decided on 
19-4-1984 (MRTPC). 
4 1 . In r e Al£a L a o o r a t o r i e s , J«RTPE No. 16/1978 i^ lRTPC o rde r , 
da ted 23-6-1984. 
42 . (1990) 1 CLJ-23. 
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contained in the agreement entered between the two respondents. 
Under the impugned clause, the second respondent prohibited 
the first respondent from dealing directly or indirectly in the 
name or in other name in similar products. The in^sugned 
clause reads as follows: 
"The sole selling agents shall not during the 
currency of their agreement, either directly 
or indirectly in their name or in any other 
name or either themselves or through any agent 
or as agent of or in partnership with any other 
party, deal, sell or be interested in or products 
which the principals may in their discretion, 
consider to cotx^ '^ ete with the products'.' 
This clause was held to be a restrictive trade practice 
within the meaning of section 33(1) (c) of the MRTP, Act; 
1959. As it was deemed to be a restrictive trade practice, it 
was held also to be prejudicial to public interest under 
section 38 of the said Act. The respondents were directed to 
discontinue the said restrictive trade practice and not to 
repeat the same in future. Tne impugned agreement was also 
declared as void. 
The Commission under section 13A is authorised to see 
that the orders that is passed, from time to time are duly 
executed. It may direct the Director General or any Officer 
of the Commission to make an investigation to find out if its 
order, in all its aspect, have been carried out. 
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(ii) Consent Orders 
Ttie MRTP Commission can also adopt an alternative course, 
viz, instead of passing a cease and desist order, it may pass 
consent orders. Section 37(2) of the Act provides that the 
commission may instead of making any order under this section, 
permit the party to any restrictive trade practice, if he so 
applies to take such steps within the time specified in this 
behalf oy tne Commission as may be necessary to ensure that the 
trade practice is no longer prejudicial to the public interest 
and, in any such case, if the Commission is satisfied that the 
necessary steps have been taken within the time specified, it 
may decide not to make any order under this section in respect 
of that trade practice. Thus, section 37(2) clearly contemplates 
two steps - the first is the permission by the Commission to 
the party to take certain steps as may be necessary to ensure 
that the trade practice was no longer prejudicial to public 
interest. The second is that the Commission has to be satisfied 
that necessary steps had been taken within the time specified 
and on such satisfaction, it may decide not to make any order 
under section 37. 
In Delhi Pipe Dealers' Association V. Indian Tube Co. 
42A Ltd. the Commission observed: 
"that from the practical point of view an 
approval under section- 37(2) without full 
42A. 1975 Tax. L .H. 2034 (iMRTPC) . 
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scale inquiry on assumption that conditions 
for passing such an order exist, would 
facilitate the settletnent of dispute between 
the parties, it would eliminate the whole gamut 
of the inquiry and save the parties considerable 
cost of litigation, it would at the same time 
ensure pxiblic interest either by ensuring 
that the trade practices cease to be restrictive 
in chracter or at least that the prejudicial 
caused to be the public by the trade practices 
is eliminated'.' 
Before exercising its power under section 37(2) the 
Commission must come to the conclusion that the applicant is 
a party to a restrictive trade practice prejudicial to public 
interest as the applicant must admit before the Commission 
that he has indulging in such practices. Thus, the Commission 
can exercise its discretion under section-37(2) either after 
a proper inquiry, and after it has oeen established that the 
trade practice is already prejudicial to public interest, and 
when an application has oeen made by the party from which the 
Commission derives its satisfaction that necessary steps have 
been taken; or after the institution of the inquiry proceedings 
the party concedes that the restrictive trade practices are 
prejudicial to public interest and is prepared to take remedial 
43 
measures. 
The MRTP Commission was given this power in order to ensare 
43. In re Hindustan Motors Ltd., (1984) 2 Comp, L.J. 98 (MRTPC). 
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that these practices are voluntarily rectified either by the 
commission under section 37(1) or by the parties under 
section-37 (2) of the Act. Since the pejaa^  sanction are not 
always the appropriate remedy to deter big business houses from 
indulging in such practices, it was thoughtbetter to provide 
them sufficient chance to change their behaviour in order to 
44 
el iminate i t s s t inging e f f ec t s . 
C. Power to Assess P\iblic Interest 
One of the main function of anti-monopoly law i s r e l i eve 
publ ic at large from the unnecessary cons t ra in t s imposed and 
maintained by the economic g i a n t s . But socoe time these 
constaaints may be reasonable and j u s t i f i a b l e because of ce r ta in 
pos i t ive e f fec t s . I t i s the function of the appropriate 
machinery to assess the impending e f fec t s and ul t imate r e s u l t s 
of these r e s t r i c t i v e p r a c t i c e s . 
In ear ly cases the doctr ine ( i . e . public i n t e r e s t ) i s 
45 
already found. in tne Dyer' s Case the condition there in 
complained of was held to be "encounter commonly'.' filow t h i s 
case i s of pa r t i cu l a r i n t e r e s t , as i t i s the acknowledged source 
of Common law against r e s t radn t of t r a d e . Then again in 
46 
Chester f ie ld V. Janseen Lord Hardwicke concluded tha t for the 
44. Ansari, ^.R, 'Effect ive Consunrvsr Resis tance ' Yojna Vol.24/7 
April 1980 at 4 . 
45. (1414) y .a . 2 Hen. 5, p . 26. 
46. (1750) I, A.T.K. 301, 339. 
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shake of public^ equity relieved against contracts such as 
marriage brokage bonds, secret composition with creditors, 
and bargains to procure offices....not because either of the 
parties had been deceived £or neither had, but because 
tile public had suffered a general mischeif. This doctrine 
gradually developed and the present form of public interest 
is derived its source from the Nordenfelt V. Maxim Nordenfelt 
47 
S.uns and .^ munition Co. Lord Macnaghten observed: 
"It is sufficient justification and indeed, 
it is the only justification if the restriction 
is reasonable reasonable that is, in 
reference to the interest of the public, so 
framed and so guarded as to afford adequate 
protection to the party in whose favour it is 
imposed, while at the same time it is no way 
injurious to the public" 
The above test had not crystallized until the decision 
47A 
of the House of Lords in t^ lanaoa Case, where i t was held tha t 
the proposition of Lord Macnaghten was correc t statement of the 
modern law. Recently in Esso.Case §11 t h e i r lordship affirmed, 
once more the c lass ic t e s t l a id down by Loard Macnaghten in the 
Nordenfelt case that the contrac ts in r e s t r adn t of trade are 
contrary to public policy and, therefore, void unless the 
r e s t r i c t i o n i s reasonable. Thus, the t e s t l a i d down by Lord 
Macnaghten in the Nordenfelt case, i s now recognised as being 
the true posi t ion of law. 
47. (1894) ac 535' 
47A Hanson V. Provident clothing U Supply Co., Ltd. (1913)A.C.724 
47a fisso Petroleum Ltd. V. Harper 's Garage (Stourpart . i td.1967) 
1, All E.R. 699. 
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Thus, in U.K. public interest is the touch stone on 
wnich every restrictive trade practice may be justified. Which 
has been followed in India as well. Although the concept of 
public interest in respect of restrictive trade practice is 
not wide, the test laid down are atleast specific to the 
extent of giving an opportunity to the respondent charged with 
indulging into restrictive trade practices to show that public 
interest is likely to be promoted* and not hindered by reason 
of the particular practice complained of passing through any 
of the eight test laid down in section 33. The question will, 
however, remain as to whether or not alleged practice is likely 
to lead to such public detriment as would out weight the 
advantage or benefit claimed to arise by reason of alleged 
any 
practice satisfying o^ those eight condition of Sub section(l) 
of section 38 empowers the Commission, as soon as there is a 
finding that a trade practice is restrictive, to draw an 
adverse inference that the restrictive trade practice is 
prejudicial to public interest and accordingly pass an approp-
riate 'cease and desist* order. In Director General of 
Investigation & Registration V. Shriram Fibers Ltd. and AnotQgr^ 
the respondent had been prohibited from dealing with any other 
company except the companies named in the preamble to the 
agreement between the parties, for promoting the sale of the 
product of the manufacturing company, it was held that the 
48. Sec. 10 of the U.K. Restrictive Trade Practice Act, 1976, 
of MRTP Act, 1969 (sec. 38 based in Verbatim of this 
section). 
49. RTPE No. 1353/1987, decided on 10th July, 1989. 
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aforesaid prohibtion fell within the purview of section 33(a) 
of the Act. Being prejudicial to the public interest, the 
clause in the agreement which prohibited the respondent from 
dealing with any other Company execpt those mentioned therein, 
were held to be void. 
Similarly in Director General of Investigation & Registration 
V. Mekasonic India Pvt» Ltd. in a distributor-ship agreement, 
it had been provided that the distributor-ship agreement would be 
for the territory of Tamil Nadu, Pondicherry, Kerala and 
Andhra Pradesh. The clause in question was held to be a rest-
rictive trade practice within the meaning of section 33(1)(g) 
of the Act. This clause was held also to effect the public 
interest prejudicially in terms of the test laid down of the 
said Act. This clause was directed to be deleted, or 
alternatively, to be amended suitably. 
When the trade restriction is established under 
section 37(l)itis open to the person charged with to show under 
section 38 that the restriction is not against public interest. 
Similarly, if the restriction is helpful for public, the rest-
riction will be allowed to be continued. The Commission held 
in Raymond Woolen Mills Ltd. V. i-lRTP Commission. 
50. RTPE No. 45/1988 decided on 26th July, 1989* 
51. (1979) 49 Comp. Cas. 686 (Bombay). 
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The essence of justification is that a given practice 
produces one or more of the beneficial effects indicated in 
section 38. It is like balancing a see saw or the scales of 
a weighing machine on the one side are the benefits claimed 
and on the order hand, extent of injury to public. The stand-
ard to judge a given trade practice is that of public interest. 
If the respondent amend the provision which is prejudicial 
to public interest, then the Commission can drop the proceeding 
52 
against him. In dinny Ltd. one of the clause in the agreement 
was formed to tantamount to the restrictive trade practice 
in as much as a condition had been imposed that the stockist/ 
dealer shall not deal in the similar products of other manufac-
turer. This was in breach of the notice of inquiry the 
respondent filed an application under section 37(2) of the said 
Act, undertaking to amend the agreement so as to remove the 
taint of restrictiveness as alleged. As after the modification, 
the agreement would no longer remained prejudicial to the public 
interest, the application of the respondent was accepted. 
The finding of the MRTP Commission regarding public 
benefit is a question of fact and can not be re-opened by the 
53 
Supreme Court u n l e s s some e r r o r of law i s r e v e a l e d . 
52. RrP£ No. 51/87, decided on 31s t J u l y , 1989. 
5 3 . H i n d u s t a n l e v e r L t d . V. xMRTP Comnaission, (1977) 47 , 
:;omp. C a s . 581 S.C. 
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the 
D. Power of/coomission to Exenqpt Particular Classes o£ Goods 
from sect ions 39 & 40. 
The MRTP Commission's power i s not only to Control 
r e s t r i c t i v e trade p rac t ice but also to g l ide through the econo-
mic po l i c i e s and programmes/ so as to provide nectar not only 
to Consumer, but producers of goods and services as wel l . I t 
p roh ib i t s ce r t a in prac t ices from ab initto, r e l i e v e s cer ta in 
p rac t ices on t h e i r pos i t ive ef fec ts a t the end, pennits other 
p rac t i ces as permissible l i m i t s . 
One of the glar ing example of r e s t r i c t i v e t rade p rac t i ces 
i s , maintain minimum re - sa le p r i c e . The Monopolies Inquiry 
Commission emphatically observed tha t resa le pr ice maintenance 
agreements may have some good r e s u l t s too but general ly i t i s 
adversely affecting the consumers and new and pe t ty t raders , 
so i t need to Oe spec i f i ca l ly t rea ted by the Commission, The 
MIC held?^ 
" . . . . . o n an anxious considerat ion of the problem 
we have come to the conclusion that the harmful 
ef fec t of re-3ale p r ice maintenance for out weights 
i t s advantages. In our opinion the i n t e r e s t s of 
the general public demand tha t resa le p r ice mainten-
ance should be prohibi ted subject to exceptions 
being made" 
The Gominission i s , thus, entrusted with power to 
exempt ce r t a in re-sale pr ice maintenance p rac t i ces on the grounds 
54. Monopolies Inquiry Commission Report, p . 162. 
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tha t without re-sale pr ice maintenance much inconvenience may 
r e s u l t vrtiich will be detrimental to consumers and users of goods. 
Section 41 of the MRTP Act/ reads as follows: 
(1) The Contunission may, on a reference made to i t by 
the Director General or any person in te res t ed , by order 
d i r e c t tha t goods of any c lass specif ied in the order 
shal l be exempt from the operation of Sections 39 U 40, 
i f the Commission i s s a t i s f i ed tha t in defaul t of a 
system of maintained minimum re—s4le pr ice applicable 
to those goods-
(a) The qua l i ty of goods avai lable for sale or the 
v a r i e t i e s of goods so avai lable would be subs-
t a n t i a l l y reduced to the detriment of the publ ic 
as consumeis or users of those goods, pr 
Cb) The pr ices a t v*iich the goods are sold by r e t a i l , 
would, in general and in the long run, be increased 
to the detriment of the public as such consumers 
or users , or 
(c) Any necessary services ac tual ly provided in 
connection with or af ter the sale of the goods 
by r e t a i l would cease to be so provided or would 
be subs t an t i a l ly reduced to the detriment of the 
public as such consumers or use r s . 
(2) On a reference under t h i s section i . e . , section 41(2)', 
in respect of goods of any c l a s s which have been 
subject of proceedings before the Commission under 
section 31, the Commission may t r e a t as conclusive any 
evidence of fact made in those proceedings. 
In U.K. as well as, in U.S.A. ce r t a in resa le pr ice 
maintenance p rac t ices are exempted from the purview of general 
prohib i t ion , keeping in view the i r good effects a t l a r g e . Thus 
under Re-sale Prices Act, 1976 in U.K. and Meguire Act, 1952 in 
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U.S.A., are provided some exemptions where no action can be 
55 
taken against the undertakings indulging in such practices. 
The MRTP Conmission had the occassion to discuss the law 
of exemption in detail in the case of RRTA V« Bennett QOleman 
56 
and Co. L td . where the Commission allowed exemption t o charge 
re-saifi p r i c e s keeping in view the p e c u l i a r bus ines s of news 
pape r s , under s e c t i o n 41(1) (a) of the Ac t . S i m i l a r l y i n WIMCO 
57 
Ltd. which related to safety matches, the application for 
exemption from sections 39 & 40 was granted by the Commission 
in view of the provisions of sub-raile( 5) of rule 71 of the 
Central Excise Rules, 1944 framed under the Central Excise and 
Salt Act, 1944. 
E. Power to Levy Penalty for Contravention of Provisions 
Relating to Restrictive Trade Practices 
The MRTP Commission is a quasi-Judicial body with the 
function of adjudication and execution of its orders like a 
modern Administrative Tribunals. It is empowered to assess 
how for its order were implemented and in case these orders are 
not honoured or implemented it can levy the appropriate penalty 
for such contravention. The following penalty has been provided 
for the contravention of statutory provisions or orders 
55. Dugar, S.M. MRTP Law and Practice (1984) Taxman Pub. Ltd., 
p. 379. 
56. RTPE No. 30/1979. Char.Sec. Jan. 1982 p. 46. 
57. Third Annual Report on MRTP Act for the period ended 31-12-73, 
p. 73. 
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regarding r e s t r i c t i v e t rade p r a c t i c e s . 
Penalty for non- reg is t ra t ion of agreements which require 
r e g i s t r a t i o n under the Act^ extends to rupees five thousand/ 
imprisonment upto three years with continuing penalty of rupees 
five hundred for every day, during which such f a i lu re continues 
(Section 48(1) . 
If any person contravenes any order made under sect ion 13, 
he shal l be punished with imprisonment for a term which may 
extend to one year, or with fine upto rupees five thousand or 
both . However, in case of a continuing offence, a further fine 
upto rupees five hundred per day can be imposed (Section 50(1). 
If any person contravenes any order made under section 37, 
he shall be punished with imjprisonment for a terra ranging 
from six months to two years . However, in the case of subsequent 
offence the person shal l be punishable with imprisonment for 
a term ranging from two years to five years . For continuing 
offence a fine upto rupees five thousand be imposed (Section 50(2) 
If any person c a r r i e s any trade prac t ice prohibi ted by 
th<2 Act, he shal l be punished with imprisonment upto s ix 
months, or with fine upto rupees five thousand, or with both. 
In case of a continuing offence, a further fine upto rupees 
five thousand per day shal l also be imposed (Section 50(3) . 
The contravention of provisions re la t ing to the prohibi t ion 
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of maintenance of mini mum re-sale prices is punishable with 
imprisonment for a term upto three months^ or with fine upto 
rupees five thousand or both (Section 51). 
If any person contravenes the provisions of sections 33(3) 
& 41, he shall be punishable with fine upto rupees one thousand. 
In the case of a continuing offence, a further fine of rupees 
one hundred shall also be imposed (Section 52 A ) . 
If any person making false statement if any documanjb/ 
he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term upto two 
years and shall also be liable to fine (Section 52 B). 
If any offence relating to restrictive trade practices 
committed by a company, the person concerned with the managcnent 
and control of the business of the company shall be punished 
with imprisonment and also with fine (Section 53) . 
The thrust of penal sanction is prevention and restriction 
rather retribution and extinction. The role of the Cotnnission 
is not of a strict court but of a liberal tribunal, so that 
58 
penal sanctions are used for social goods. 
58. Monopolies Inquiry Comnxission Report, at 162. 
C H A P T E R - V 
UNFAIR TRADB PRACTICES 
The e x p r e s s i o n ' u n f a i r t r a d e p r a c t i c e * i s a c o n v e n i e n t 
d e s c r i p t i o n of p r a c t i c e a g a i n s t commerc ia l raorala. U n f a i r 
t r a d e p r a c t i c e s a r e a s o l d a s t r a d e and b u s i n e s s . I n a n c i e n t 
t i m e s t h e r e were p r a c t i c e s v*iich were c o n f i n e d t o e x p l o i t a t i o n 
a t m a r k e t p l a c e s such a s , ' f o r e s t a l l i n g ' ( i . e . p u s h i n g up p r i c e s 
by b u y i n g up s u p p l i e s b e f o r e t h e y r e a c h m a r k e t ) , ' r e g r a t i n g ' 
( i . e . buy ing up s u p p l i e s i n t h e m a r k e t ) , a n d ' e n g r o s s i n g ' ( i . e . 
b u y i n g up s u p p l i e s whereve r a v a i l a b l e ) . The o b j e c t was t o 
c r e a t e a r t i f i c i a l s c a r c i t y and c o n s e q u e n t l y i n f l a t i o n of 
p r i c e . These p r a c t i c e s can v i c t i m i s e h o n e s t t o e r c h a n t s a s w e l l ^^ 
consumers and i m p a i r r a t i o n a l a l l o c a t i o n of economic r e s o u r c e s . 
The m a g n i t u d e of p r o b l e m s posed by U n f a i r t r a d e p r a c t i c e i s 
v i v i d l y p i c t u r i s e d by K.B. Khare i n t h e f o l l o w i n g p a s s a g e -
"A p a t i e n t ' s e p i s o d e , vftio c o n s u l t e d b e s t p h y s i c i a n 
and took m e d i c i n e s w i t h t r a d e mark of b e s t p h a r m a c e u t i c a l 
Company b u t c o u l d n o t c u r e d b e c a u s e t h e m e d i c i n e s 
were a d u l t r a t e d . Being t i r e d of l o n g t r e a t m e n t and 
p r o l o n g e d i l l n e s s t h e p a t i e n t , consumed heavy d o s e 
of p o i s o n i n o r d e r t o commit s u i c i d e b u t t h e p o i s o n 
t o o was a d u l t r a t e d and he d i d n o t d i e . He was t o f ace 
p r o s e c u t i o n i n a Coiart of l a w f o r a t t e m p t t o commit 
2 
s u i c i d e . " 
1 . Mohana V i j y a , " L e g a l c o n t r o l of U n f a i r t r a d e p r a c t i c e " . Cochin 
U n i v e r s i t y Law Review, S e p t . 1990, V o l . XIV. N o . 3 . 
2 . Khare K . B . " C h e a t i n g / T r a d e " 1983 , C r i . L . J . 3 3 ( j ) . 
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In U.K., the Fair Trading Act, 1973, was enacted to 
regulate and control or p roh ib i t unfair t rade p r a c t i c e s . The 
main aim of the Act was to encourage competition which was 
f a i r between one business and another and f a i r towards the 
consumers, by ensuring tha t trading standards are improved 
vrtierever possible and tha t unfai r trading p rac t i ce s are 
stopped or changed, whether they be abuses of a monopoly 
pos i t ion , or p rac t i ces which are for example, oppressive of 
or inequi table to consumer; 
In U.S.A. the Federal Trade Commission Act, 1914 can be 
deemed as a principcil l eg i s l a t i on to pro tec t the Conunerce from 
unfa i r trade p r a c t i c e s . The Act declares unfair methods of 
competition in commerce and unfai r or deceptive ac ts or 
p r ac t i c e in commerce unlawful. 
Though, i n t i t i a l l y Fedesral Trade Commission Act, was 
intended to ensure competition in industry, the Commission's 
powers have been gradually enlarged to deal with a l l consumer 
pro tec t ion problems. For instance, in FTC V. Sperry U 
Hetchusion Co. , the U.S. Supreme Court empowered the Commission 
to define and prosecute an unfair competition p rac t i ce even 
th'~bagh the p rac t i ce does not infr inge e i the r l e t t e r or s p i r i t 
of a n t i t r u s t laws. 
In India the provisions of unfai r trade pract ices become 
3. 405 U.S. 233(1972). 
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necessary because the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 
relating to fraud and misrepresentation; Sales of Goods Act, 1930, 
relating to condition and warranties;specific Relief Act, 1963 
relating to specific performance, recession of contract cind 
granting of injunction in certain cases; Prevention of Black 
Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities 
Act, 1980 relating to the detention of any person with a view 
to prevention of black marketing etc. have not been able to 
give adequate protection to the Consumers against deceptive 
trade practices. 
The Sachcir Committee suggested that the Unfair trade 
practice like misleading advertisements and false misrepresent-
ations, bargain sales, bait and switch selling, offering of 
gifts and prizes with intention of not providing them, conducting 
promotional contests, supplying goods that do not comply with 
d 
safety standards and hording and destruction of goods should be 
prohibited. In the light of these suggestions, the Act was 
amended in 1984 incorporating new provisions relating to unfair 
trade practices (from section 36A to 36E) to protect the interest 
of the consumers more effectively. 
The deceptive and unfair trade practices? impede and 
prevent competition and impose unjustified cost and burden on the 
consumer in the same manner in which the restrictive trade practices 
impede competition and impose burden on the consumers. 
Ill 
The definition is to be found in section 36A of 
4 
the Act -
"Unfair trade practice means a trade practice 
which for the purpose of promoting sale, use or supply 
of any goods or for the provisions of any services, 
adopts one or more of the following practices and 
thereby causes loss or injury to the consumers of 
such goods or services, whether by eliminating or 
restricting competition or otherwise..." 
Further, clauses (1) to (5) of section 36A classify, 
the various forms of unfair trade practices such as false 
representation; bargain Sale, offering gifts and conducting 
promotional contests; supply of products which do not coniply 
with the safety standards; and hording or destruction of goods. 
A perusal of the definition of unfair trade practice 
under section 36A of the Act reveals that it is not a general 
definition of unfair trade practice but it is restricted to 
only those specific categories of unfair trade practices which 
are being enumerated in clauses (l)-(5). In Lakhanpal National 
Ltd. V. MRTPC7 it was held that "the definition of'anfair trade 
practice* in section 36A of the MRTP Act is not inclusive or 
flexible but specific and limited in its contents" It is, 
therefore, necessary to provide a general definition of unfair 
4, Inserted by the MRTP (Amendment) Act, 1984, w.e.f. 1-8-1984. 
5, (1989) 66 Corap. Cas. 519(S.G.). 
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t rade p rac t i ce so t ha t a l l the unfair trade p rac t i ces (vjhether 
covered under clauses (1) to (5) of section 36A or not) may be 
brought within the purview of the Act, However, the provis ions 
of clausesCD to(5) of sect ion 36A should be taken as i l l u s t r a t i o n s 
of such t rade p r a c t i c e s . Thus, the following general de f in i t ion 
of unfai r trade p rac t ice i s suggested to be incorporated in the 
A C t -
"Unfair trade p rac t i ce means a t rade p rac t ice vrtiich 
i s detrimental to the i n t e r e s t s of the Consumers 
whether the i n t e r e s t s are economic i n t e r e s t or 
i n t e r e s t s in respec t of heal th , safety or other 
matters vrtiich ought to be regarded as unfair to 
the consumers" 
Further, to invoke sect ion 36A, the following c r i t e r i a 
must be s a t i s f i e d -
(i) " i t must be a trade p rac t i ce within the meaning of 
sect ion 2(u) of the Act; 
( i i ) the trade prac t ice must be adopted for the purpose of 
promoting the Sale, use or supply of any goods or 
for the provision o f / se rv ices ; 
( i i i ) the t rade prac t ice must f a l l within one or more of 
the p rac t ices enumerated under clauses(1) to (5) of 
the Section 36A; 
(iv) the trade prac t ice iciust cause loss or injury to the 
Consumers of such goods or services ; and 
6 . See also 9th Annual Report r e l a t i ng to the Execution of the 
provisions of the MRTP Act, 1969, pp. 148-149. 
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(v) the loss or injury to the Consumers must be 
accompanied by adverse ef fect on coa5>etition 
or othervd.se" 
I t i s the duty of the Commission to p ro tec t to the 
consumers from any loss caused to them from any unfair t rade 
p r a c t i c e . In order to p ro tec t the consumers, the Commission 
i s empowered to inves t iga te the matters which i s p re jud ic ia l to 
the consumers. The Commission can curb these p rac t i ces in the 
following manner: 
A- Inquiry into Unfair Trade Practice 
Unfair t rade p rac t i ces are sought to be regulated by way 
of 'cease and desis t* or any other appropriate order passed by 
the I4RTP Commission. Before passing such an order, the 
Commission i s required to conduct an inquiry in to the impugned 
trade p r ac t i c e . 
The object of l e g i s l a t i o n i s to bring honesty and t ru th 
in re la t ionsh ip between the s e l l e r and the consumer. The 
Commission has to thrashout fac ts so tha t v i s i b l e misrepresentation 
i s brought fo r th . The same pos i t ion preva i l s in U.S.A. and 
C an ada. 
The procedure of inves t iga t ion and raachinary for 
inves t iga t ion in to unfair trade p rac t i ce s has not been changed 
from that which i s applic*ble to r e s t r i c t i v e trade p r a c t i c e s . 
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The Sachar Committee f e l t t h a t i t was not necessary to c rea te 
a pa r a l l e l machinery for these newly introduced prac t ices when 
we have an elaborate machinery avai lable in the shape of the MRTP 
Commission. The essence of these p rac t i ces i s a lso prevention 
of cotqpetition l i k e tha t of r e s t r i c t i v e and monopolistic trade 
p rac t i ces and the i«lRTP Commission which i s supposed to be a 
body of experts , i s the appropriate body to guard against , 
7 
such evils of trade and protect the consumer at large. 
The jurisdiction conferred on the Commission is on the 
same lines as in section 10 relating to restrictive trade practices, 
It seems that the Jurisdiction of the Commission is limited to 
the categories of unfair trade practices listed in section 36A. 
Section 36B of the Act confers jurisdiction on the MRTP 
Commission to make an inquiry into unfair trade practice-
(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitutes 
such practice from any trade or consumers' association 
having a membership of not less than twenty five 
persons or from twenty five or more consumers; 
(b) upon a reference made to it by the Central Government 
or a State Government; 
(c) upon an application made to it by the Director General; 
or 
(d) upon its own knowledge or information. 
7. The Sachar Committee Report, para 21.16, 
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( i ' Inquiry upon Consximera.* or traders' Complaint^ 
I t i s the duty of the consumers* or t r a d e r s ' associat ion 
(raerttoership not l e s s than 25) to bring to the not ice of the 
Commission about unfair t rade p r a c t i c e s . On receiving con^laint 
the Commission i n i t i a t e s i t s proceedings. The conplaint has to 
contain the facts which cons t i t u t e unfair trade p r a c t i c e . 
Section 36c provides tha t in respect of any unfair 
t rade pract ice of which complaint i s made under clause (a) of 
sect ion 36B, the Commission shal l ,before issuing any process 
requiring the attendance of the person complained against, 
cause a preliminary inves t iga t ion to be made by the Director 
General, in such a manner as i t may d i r ec t , for the purpose of 
sa t is fying i t s e l f tha t the complaint requires to be inquired 
i n t o . This provision i s s imilar to sect ion 11(1) of the Act. 
While Section 11(1) gives a d i sc re t ion to the Commission, 
whether or not an inves t iga t ion to be made by the Director -
General (in respect of a r e s t r i c t i v e t rade pract ice) the 
provision of Section 36C i s mandatory and the Commission, wherever 
any con^jlaint i s received under clause (a) of sect ion 36B must 
cause a preliminary inves t iga t ion to be made by the Director-
General . But, the d i sc re t ions conferred on the Commission vinder 
sect ion 11 can not normally be withheld by the Commission 
because the regulat ion provides tha t a preliminary inves t iga t ion 
must necessar i ly be made, vAiether the complaint i s under section 
10(a) ( i ) or under sect ion 36B(a). However, section 36C i s s i l e n t 
8. See MRTP Coracoission Regulation, 1974 (as amended upto da te) , 
regulat ion 19(1) . 
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as to the manner in which the Director-General would carryout 
the inves t iga t ion . But in view of sect ion 36E (which confers 
ce r t a in res idual powers on the Commission and the Direc tor-
General) , the Director General would have the same powers as he 
can exercise under section 11 ( r e l a t ing to r e s t r i c t i v e trade 
p r a c t i c e s ; while conducting an inves t iga t ion under sect ion 36C. 
the 
After receiving the repor t from/Director-General, the 
Commission inves t iga tes the matter i t s e l f and co l l ec t s other 
information which i s re levant to the case, and take appropriate 
ac t ion . 
Thirty two inquiries were pending as on 31st March, 1987, 
under section 36B(a) of the MRTP Act, thirty two more inquiries 
were instituted by the Commission during the year 1987-88. 
Out of total 64 inquiries, 11 inquiries were disposed of leaving 
53 inquiries pending with the Commission as on 31st March, 1988, 
87 inquiries including 53 inquiries forward from the previous 
year were considered by the Commission during April-Decennber, 1988. 
Of these, 14 inquiries were disposed of and the remaining 73 
inquiries were pending as on 3lst December, 1988. 
Cli) References by the Goveroment-
The Central Government or a State Government can make a 
reference under section 36B(b) to the Commission regarding unfair 
trade practices which come to their knowledge. The reference 
BA. (1989)2 Comp. LJ, 132-133 (Global Newspost) . 
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made by the Central Government or S ta te Government has to 
contain the relevant fac ts which cons t i t u t e an unfair trade 
p r a c t i c e . On receiving reference made to i t by the Government, 
i t i s the duty of the Commission to make necessary inves t iga t ion 
and, thereby, pass the appropirate order for the prevention of 
such pract ices* 
(iil) j ^ p l l c a t l o n by the Director-General-
Under sect ion 36B(C) of the Act, the Commission can 
i n s t i t u t e s an inquiry in respect of any unfair trade pract ice 
on the bas i s of an application made to i t by the Director-
9 
General. The Sahara India Ltd. case was broughtto the not ice 
of the Commission by the Director-General/ in vrtiich the Director-
General prayed tha t the Scheme ca l led "Gold Leaf Cash Cer t i f i ca te" 
was false and misleading and amounts to unfa i r . After hearing 
the case the Commission passed an injunct ion order r e s t r a in ing 
the respondent from making such claim. The Director-General 
besides making applicat ion to the Commission under Section 36B(c) 
performs other functions. I t can suo motu make a prel iminary 
inves t iga t ion or make such inves t iga t ion i f the Commission 
d i r ec t s i t to do so, regarding these p rac t i ce s as are enumerated 
in section 36A. Besides,the Director-General i s a lso empowered to 
make such arrangements as would help the Commission to a r r ive 
a t a r igh t conclusion. The Director - General i s thus empowered 
to take every precaution to see tha t the Complaints made by the 
9 . Director-General (I & R) V. Sahara India Saving & Investment 
Corporation Ltd . u Another (1990) 68 Conqp. Cas. 153. 
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Consumers is a rightful claim. 
Under section 36B(c)4 190 inquiries, including 39 
inquiries brought forward from the previous year, were considered 
by the Commission during the year 1987-88^ Out of 190 inquiries 
38 inquiries were disposed of leaving 152 inquiries pending 
with the Commission as on 31st March, 1988. 213 inquiries 
including 152 brought forward from the previous year, we,re 
taken up by the Commission during the period April to December, 
1988. 66 inquiries were disposed of during the period and 
the remaining 147 inquiries were pending as on 31st December, 
9 A* 1988. 
(iv) suo pootu Inqui r ies 
Section 36B(d) of the Act authorises the Commission to 
inquire in to any unfair t rade p rac t ice upon i t s own knowledge 
or information. 
Under regulat ion 84A of MRTP Regulation, 1974 the 
procedure l a id down in Chapter IXA of the said regula t ions 
for inquiry in to a r e s t r i c t i v e trade prac t ice s h a l l , mutat is-
mutandis, , apply to the inquiry in to an unfair trade p r a c t i c e s . 
The MRTP Commission i s empowered to inquire in to even 
defect ive complaint. As i t was observed by the Commission in 
Indian Tube Co. V. MRTPC -
10. £xplanation; For the purposes of th i s regula t ion-
(i) Reference to sub-Cls(i) to (iv) of Cl(a) of sec. 10 of the 
Act sha l l be construed as a reference to the correspondini 
clauses(a) to (d) of sec . 36Bj 
( i i ) reference to sec.37 of the Act sha l l be construed a 
reference to sec.36D. 
11 . (1976)46 Comp.Cas.619. 
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"The Commission may inquire into any restrictive 
trade practice vrtiich may conve before it 
for inquiry it may come either directly through 
Complainant application and reference, or 
it may be assumed under sec,10(a) (iv) i.e., by 
its own knowledge or information gathered through 
defect in complaint by consumers and so on " 
so, it is now well established that a suo motu inquiry 
under section 36B(d) of the Act can be initiated by the 
Commission on its own knowledge or information derived from 
any source and there is no constraint in the Act regarding 
the source from which such knoweldge or information is derived. 
A total of 643 suo motu inquiries, including 29 2 
inquiries brought forward from the previous year under section 
36B(d) were considered by the Commission during the year 1987-88. 
140 cases were disposed of during the year and 503 were pending 
with the Commission at the close of the year. 691 inquiries, 
including 503 brought forward from the previous year, were 
taken up by the Commission during Apri-December, 1988. 146 
inquiries were disposed of and 545 inquiries were pending 
disposal with the Commission as on 31st December, 1988. 
B- Power to Impose Restrictions 
One of the main objective of the MRTP Commission is to 
bring unfair trade practices to the limelight and investigate 
it properly and pass an appropriate order. The nature of the 
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unfair t rade p rac t ices i s sucli which seems to be in no way^  
impairing competiton or r e s t ra in ing t rade , but inherent ly , 
these p rac t ices do have adverse e f f e c t . The glar ing example 
of i t i s advert is ing tha t does not contain t r u t h . The Sachar 
12 
Committee observed-
"Advertisement and Sale promotion have become well 
established modes of modern business techniques 
that advertisement and representation to the 
consumers should not become deceptive has, always 
been, one of the point of conflicts between business 
and consumer. The object taken is nottobe advertisement 
of the product what is, however, insisted on 
that there is an obligation on the seller - he must 
speak truth". 
The Sachar Committee also recommended for an appropriate 
legislation to protect the interest of the consumer? in India. 
The Sachar Committee observed-
"We can not say that the type of misleading and 
deceptive practices which are to be found in other 
countries are not being practised in our country. 
Unfortunately, our Act is totally silent on this 
respect. The result is that the consumer has no 
protection against false or deceptive activities 
this has created a situation of a very safe haven 
for the suppliers and a position of frustration and 
uncertainity for the consumers. It should be the 
function of the any consumer legislation to meet 
this challenge specifically". 
12. Sachar Comnittee Report at 21.30. 
13. Id., at 21-17. 
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The recommenda t ions of t h e S a c h a r Commit tee was 
14 
a c c e p t e d and a new s e c t i o n 36D was i n s e r t e d i n t o t h e A c t . 
S e c t i o n 3 6 D r e a d s a s f o l l o w s -
1) " S e c t i o n 3 6 D ( 1 ) , t h e Commission may i n q u i r e i n t o any 
u n f a i r t r a d e p r a c t i c e which may come b e f o r e i t f o r 
i n q u i r y and, i f a f t e r such i n q u i r y , i t i s of o p i n i o n 
t h a t t h e p r a c t i c e i s p r e j u d i c i a l t o t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , 
o r t o t h e i n t e r e s t of any consumer o r consumers g e n e r a l l y , 
i t may, by o r d e r , d i r e c t t h a t -
(a) t h e p r a c t i c e s h a l l be d i s c o n t i n u e d o r s h a l l n o t 
b e r e p e a t e d ; and 
(b) any agreement r e l a t i n g t o such u n f a i r t r a d e p r a c t i c e 
s h a l l be v o i d o r s h a l l s t a n d m o d i f i e d i n r e s p e c t 
t h e r e o f i n such manner a s may be s p e c i f i e d i n t h e 
o r d e r . 
2) The Commission may i n s t e a d of making any o r d e r u n d e r 
t h i s s e c t i o n , p e r m i t any p a r t y t o c a r r y o n any t r a d e 
p r a c t i c e i f i t so a p p l i e s and t a k e such s t e p s w i t h i n 
t h e t ime s p e c i f i e d b y t h e Coraraiss4.on a s may be n e c e s s a r y 
t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e t r a d e p r a c t i c e i s no l o n g e r p r e j u d i -
c i a l t o t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t o r t o i n t e r e s t of any consumer 
o r consumer s g e n e r a l l y , and, i n any such c a s e , i f t h e 
Gonunission i s s a t i s f i e d t h a t n e c e s s a r y s t e p s have been 
t a k e n w i t h i n t h e t ime so s p e c i f i e d , i t may d e c i d e n o t 
t o make any o r d e r u n d e r t h i s s e c t i o n i n r e s p e c t of t h a t 
t r a d e p r a c t i c e . 
3) No o r d e r s h a l l be made u n d e r s u b - s e c t i o n (1) i n r e s p e c t 
of any t r a d e p r a c t i c e which i s e ; q ? r e s s l y a u t h o r i s e d by 
any l aw f o r t h e time b e i n g i n f o r c e ? 
1 4 . S u p r a n o t e 4 . 
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Now the Commission is fully authorised to investigate 
unfair trade practices which come to its knowledge and pass an 
appropriate order. The Conomission is also empowered to pass 
a final order. The Commission can cxirtail unfair trade practices 
in the following ways: 
(ij Cease and Desist Orders 
The MRTP Commission like U.S. Federal Trade Commission 
guards against malpractices indulged in by trade combinations 
and monopoly houses which tend to curb competition and facilitate 
concentration of economic power to the common detriment. The 
power to restrain such trade practices become very vital in view 
of its adverse effect on public interest and consumer interest. 
The Federal Trade Cocnmission has been given the power of 'Cease 
and desist' in order to prevent violation of unfair nature. 
The MRTP Act has borrowed this concept from U.S.A. and is avail-
able to the Commission, whenever and v^ ierever unfair trade 
practices are indulged in. 
Clause (a) of section 36D(1) empoweree the MRTP Commission 
to pass "Cease and desist' order. It siinply means that the 
unfair trade practice shall not only be discontinued in future. 
In other words, the delinquent party against whom the order is 
made shall not only cease to indulge in the practice but shall 
also desist from indulging in the practice in future. Further, 
clause (b) of Section 36D(1) enopoweres the Commission to declare 
any agreement relating to such unfair trade practice as void or 
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to order tha t the agreement shal l stand modified in respect 
of the unfair t rade p rac t i ces in ce r t a in manner to be specified/ 
Thus, t i l l the orders are pa;5sed by the Commission, the agreement 
remains in operat ion. 
The provisions of sect ion 3 6 D ( 1 ) seem to have been adopted 
from the provisions of section 37 of the Act. In fac t clauses 
(a) and (b) of section 3 6 D ( 1 ) are the reproduction of clauses 
(a) and (b), respect ive ly of section 37(1) . 
The Commission cannot pass such cease and desifit orders 
unless i t i s s a t i s f i ed tha t these t rade p rac t i ces are not otxly 
unfai r trade p rac t ices but also p re jud ic ia l to the public i n t e r e s t 
or to the i n t e r e s t of any consumer or consumers genera l ly . The 
reference to public i n t e r e s t in sect ion 36D on the l i n e of 
reference to public i n t e r e s t in sect ion 37, i s not understandable. 
To invoke section 3 6 D ( 1 ) two things must be proved, f i r s t l y , tha t 
the p rac t i ce inquired in to i s an unfair trade p rac t i ce within 
the meaning of section 36A; and secondly, i t i s p re jud ic i a l to 
i n t e r e s t the public i n t e r e s t , or to the/of the consxiraer or consumers 
general ly . In other words, i t i s open to the p a r t i e s to plead 
tha t although the prac t ice complained of f a l l s within the scope 
of section 36A, but s t i l l the same i s not p re jud ic ia l to public 
i n t e r e s t , or to the i n t e r e s t of the consumer or consumers. I t 
i s not sa t i s fac to ry pos i t ion of law. I t i s submitted tha t a l l 
the unfair trade p rac t i ce spe l t put in section 36A should be 
deemed as per se p re jud ic ia l to public i n t e r e s t or to the i n t e r e s t 
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of the consumer or consumers, and thus they should be prohibited^ 
Non discolosure of information to the consumer will 
amount to unfair trade practice and also against the interest 
of the consumer. In M/S Fedders Lloyd Corporation Pvt. Ltd* 
the Commission held that the respondent indulged in the unfair 
trade practice under clauses (i), Ciii), (iv) and (viii) of 
sub section (1) of section 36A of the Act on account of 
nondisclosing the consumer that the air - conditioner contained 
Kirloskar made compressor instead of U.S.A. made by Tecumseh, 
that it was an old, renovated one instead of new one and till 
after complaint having been addressed to the Comnission. A 
cease and desist order was passed against the respondent 
directing that the respondent shall refrain from repeating the 
said unfair trade practices in future. 
False advertisement about the quality of goods, scheme 
etc. always anounts to prejudicial to the public interest or to 
the consumer or consumers generally. In Indian Reyon Corp.Ltd. 
the respondent made a public representation that by investment 
in fully convertible debenture of the respondent company an 
investor would earn eighty percent per annum. It was further 
represented that the market price of one quality share to be 
allowed on conversion would be Rs. 76.50 and the interest earned 
on the debenture would be Rs. 5.06. It was alleged that the 
15. UTPE. No. 125/1986. 
16. DG(I Si R) V. Indian Reyon Corp. Ltd., (1987)8 CLD 59. 
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advertisement about benefit was false on the ground; (i) it 
created a wrong impression that the investor would get eighty 
percent annualised return, (ii) representation made by the 
respondent as to the benefit to accure from the advertisement 
in the fully convertible debenture was false and misleading. 
It was found by the Commission that the above practice was against 
the interest of the consumers and passed a cease and desist 
order and the respondent was directed to desist from such 
representation in the matter investigating offers whether for 
debenture or for equity share from public or from existing share 
holders on rights basis. 
(ii) Consent Orders 
The MRTP Commission is empowered to pass consent orders 
instead of passing cease and desist orders. Section 36D(2) of 
the Act provides that the Commission may instead of making any 
order under this section, permit the party to any unfair trade 
practice, if he so applies to take such steps within the time 
specified in this behalf by the Commission as may! lie necessary to 
ensure that the trade practice is no longer prejudicial to the 
public interest or to the interest of any consumer or consumers 
generally and in any such case, if the Conamission is satisfied 
that the necessary steps have been taken within the time 
specified, it may decide not to take any order under this 
section. Thus, section 36D(2) clearly contemplates two steps-
the first is the permission by the Commission to the party to 
take certain steps as may be necessary to ensure that the trade 
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practice was no longer prejudicial to public interest or 
to the interest of any consumer or consumers generally. The 
Second is that the Commission hasto be satisfied that necessary 
steps had been taken within the time specified and on such 
satisfaction, it may decide not to make any order under section 
36D. 
Section 36D(2) clearly shows that the Commission can 
exercise jurisdiction in matter of unfair trade practice even 
when no grave question of public interest involved and only 
the interest of a single consumer is involved. That being so, 
the reference to the public interest as the basis for exercise 
of power appears to be in the nature of unnecessary fetter 
on the powers of the Commission. 
The power given in section 36D(2) gives some latitude 
to the Commission to analyse the econonoic and other forces working 
in the countri^ . Besides, it also provides a chance to the 
deviating party to come to the right and stipulated direction, 
which our economy is destined to proosed to. However, it may 
be acted that the proceedings before the Commission are in 
nature of quasi-judicial character so the Commission is required 
to give an opportunity appropriate to the parties, before 
taking action against them. If it does not provide adequate 
opportunity to the parties to represent and plead their case 
effectively, it will be violating principles of natural justice. 
The Supreme Court of India has observed in Bonfcay Oil Industries 
Priviate Ltd. V. Union of India^ '^  
17. (1984) 55 Comp. Cas. 356. 
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" The re levant material roust be made 
avai lable to the objectors because, without i t 
they cannot possibly meet the claim or contentions 
of the applicants The refusal of the 
Government to furnish such material to the objectors 
ccin amount to a denial of reasonable opportunity 
to the objectors , to meet the app l i can t ' s case and 
denial of a reasonable opportunity to meet the other 
man's case i s denial of na tura l ju s t i ce^ 
The Coirniission* 3 power to c u r t a i l unfair t rade prac t ices 
lacks in one respect i . e . i t does not provide the consumer 
gui lds to supervise the adverse e f fec t s of these p rac t i ces on 
Consximer i n t e r e s t , which aure in existence in U.S.A. and 
18 
some other western count r ies . 
Section 36D(3) provides tha t no order shal l be made 
under sub section (1) in respect of any t rade p rac t ice vrtiich i s 
expressly authorised by any law for the time being inforce . 
This provision i s also s imilar to 37(3) (b) (which represents 
r e s t r i c t i v e t rade p r ac t i ce s ) • However there i s no reference 
in section 36D about the monopolistic or r e s t r i c t i v e , t rade 
p rac t i ces vrtnich the Commission may find during the Course of 
inquiry in to unfair t rade p r a c t i c e . I t i s not c lear whether 
the Commission may inquire in to monopolistic or r e s t r i c t i v e , 
t rade p rac t i ces v^ich i t finds during the course of an inquiry 
in to the unfair trade p rac t i ce or i t should confine i t s e l f only 
18. Company Law Digest, Vol. XIV, No. I l l (1985) a t 46. 
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to the inquiry of unfair trade p r a c t i c e . There seems to be no 
reason that why not the Commission should have the j u r i sd i c t i on 
to inquire in to such monopolistic or r e s t r i c t i v e , trade p r a c t i -
ces simultaneously alongwith the inquiry in to unfair trade 
prac t ice or v ice-versa . Further, i t will be j u s t the wastage 
of time and dupl icat ion of work, i f the Commission i s required 
to i n s t i t u t e separate inqu i r i e s in to such trade p r a c t i c e s . 
C- power to Protect Consumers 
A perfect market i s an economist 's dream and consumers 
sovereignty a myth said John Martin George W. Smith. So there 
i s a great need to protect the Consumer not only from the 
e f fec ts of monopolistic and r e s t r i c t i v e trade p rac t i ce s but 
also which are resor ted to by the trade and indus t ry to mislead 
or dupe the customers. 
Prior to 1984 Amendmant no ef fec t ive law was applicable 
in India to p ro tec t the Consumers' i n t e r e s t . Only public 
i n t e r e s t was the touchstone of the anti-monopoly l e g i s l a t i o n 
and nothing e l s e . Itie Sachar Committee made an empnatic 
declara t ion about the insufficiency of Consximer pro tec t ion in 
India and accordingly pleaded for recognit ion of these prac t ices 
for appropriate remedy. The iMRTP (Amendment) Act, 1984 was 
accordingly introduced in 36A to 36E dealing with unfair trade 
p r a c t i c e s . 
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In order to pro tec t the i n t e r e s t of the Consumers the 
fiRTP Cotnmission i s empowered under section 36B of the Act to 
inquire in to unfair trade p rac t ices and i f a f te r inves t iga t ion 
the I'^ TP commission i s of opinion that a p a r t i c u l a r trade 
prac t ice i s pre judic ia l to the public i n t e r e s t or to the 
i n t e r e s t of any consumer or consumers general ly i t may, by 
order, declare them void. 
rne commission has been entrusted with many fold powers 
culminating in i t s special ro le as the pro tec tor of Consumers, 
who were otherwise l e f t to the mercy of wind and God. In the 
absence of such protect ion, the Consumers can face the following 
s i tua t ions which commons have to face when l e f t free and 
19 
undaunted. To quote Hardin G, from the Tragedy of Cooimons 
"Picture a pasture open to a l l . I t i s to be expected 
that each herdsman will t ry to keep as many c a t t l e as 
possible on the Common pasture As a ra t iona l 
being, each hexdsman sealcs to raaxiruize h i s gain 
The only sensible course for him to pursue i s to add 
another animanal to h i s hard. And another, and 
another But t h i s i s the conclusion reached by 
each and every r a t iona l herdsman sharing a Coranvons. 
Therein i s the tragedy. Each man i s lacked in to a 
system tha t compels him to increase herd without l i m i t . 
. . . . i n a world that i s l imi ted . Run i s the des t ina t ion 
toward vrtaich a l l men rush, each pursuing h i s own bes t 
i n t e r e s t in a society t h a t bel ieves in the freedom 
of the Commons. Freedom in tla Commons br ings ruin to 
all'.' 
19. Hardin G. The Tragedy Common's Science (1968), 162, at 1244. 
130 
The trade and industry given such freedom crea te problems 
for a l l commons i . e . Consumers. So the Commission has to 
provide special guidance to the consumers so tha t they are 
protected against the unscruplous, immoral, unethical and 
oppressive prac t ice metedout to them by trade and indust ry . 
20 
In Bal Krishna Case, the Comnaission observed tha t the 
loss or in jury caused to the Consumer by the advertisement for 
sale a t a bargain pr ice without the in ten t ion of offering the 
goods a t the bargain pr ice was impl ic i t in the trade p rac t i ce 
which was pre judic ia l to the i n t e r e s t to the public 
or a t l e a s t the i n t e r e s t of Consumer. 
21 
In Avon Cycles Pvt. Ltd. case tl^Commission was of the view 
tha t the Consumer i n t e r e s t i s in tegra l to any socio-economic 
oraer spec ia l ly under the I'lRTP Act and therefore , what deprives 
tne consumer as a body or a f a i r l y large number of them to the 
benef i ts from market affluence and competition must be regarded 
as injur ious to the consumer i,within the meaning of Section 36A 
of the Act) . 
Similarly, statements made in respect of wonder cures 
which are not substaintiated by medical au thor i t i e s are held 
unfai r trade p rac t i ces , as being in jur ious to public or Consumers, 
22 
In DG (I & R) V. Bhargav Clinic, an Aurvedic Clinic issued 
20. shri Bal Krishna Khurana, Jaipur, (UTPE No. 40/1984) order, 
dated 8-1-1985. 
21. UTPE No. 43/1984, order, dated 10-9-1986. 
22. UTPE No. 1/1987. 
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an advertisement claiming to t r e a t white patches of skin. The 
claim was found misleading and not medically soxind. In DG 
23 
(I fct R) V. Ravi Foundation^ i t was claimed t h a t d i e t treatment 
offered to a woman before pregnancy could give b r i t h to a boy 
or g i r l of one 's choice. In Consumer Education & Research Center 
24 
V. Sheri Louise Slimming Centre Pvt« Ltd. , the respondents made 
a l l claims about the i r treatment to reduce one 's weight, viz. 
Safe Health Weight Loss Programme. On inquiry i t was found t h a t 
drugs l i ke amphetamine administered for reducing the appet i te 
were harmful to the p a t i e n t s . 
25 
In D.G (I &t R) V. Oriental Finance and Exchange Co. 
the Commission held that the claims made by the respondent in 
its advertisements and brochure (giving higher rate of interest) 
and 
were false/misleading and amounted to unfair trade practices as 
defined in section 36A(i) and were also prejudicial to public 
or consumer interest and issued an exparte injunction. 
D- Residual Powers 
26 
Section 36E of the Act Confers cer ta in residual powers 
on the Commission, on the Director-General in r e l a t i o n to unfair 
23. UTPE do, 93/1986. 
24. UTPE NO. 23/1986. 
25. (1990) 67 Comp. Cas. 481. 
26 . I n s e r t e d by i-lRTP (Amendment) Ac t , 1984 . 
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trade p r a c t i c e s . It provides tha t without prejudice to the 
provisions of Section 12A, Section 12B and Section 36D, the 
Coraraission/ Director-General or any other person authorised 
in t h i s behalf by tlie Commission or Director - General, may 
exercise, or perform in r e l a t i o n to any unfair trade p rac t i ce , 
the same power or duty which i t or he i s empowered, or required, 
by or under th i s .-vet to exercise , or perform, in r e l a t i o n to a 
r e s t r i c t i v e trade p r a c t i c e . Thus these res idual powers are in 
addit ion to the powers conferred on the Commission and the 
Director-General by sect ions 12A, 12B and 360. However, i t i s 
not c lear to what extent the powers can be exercised by the 
Corajoission and the Director-General while dealing with case of 
unfair trade p r a c t i c e . Whether the Commission may invoke 
section 38(which deals with presumption as to the public i n t e r e s t 
and provides various gateways of escapes in respect of r e s t r i c t i v e 
t rade pract ices) in respect of unfair trade p rac t i ces i s doubtful . 
Thus, to c lear such doubts, i t i s submitted tha t su i tab le 
amendments should have been made in the re levant provisions 
while incorporating the new provis ions dealing with unfair trade 
prac t ices in the Act. 
E- Penalty for Contravention of Orders Relating to Unfair 
Trade Practices; 
If any person contravenes by order made by the Commission 
under Section 36D, he shal l be punishable with imprisonment for 
a term which may extend to three years, or with fine which may 
extend to ten-thousand rupees, or with botn. This i s a new 
27. Section 43C. 
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provision inserted by the (Amendment) Act, 1984. Although, the 
provision provides for stringent punishment, it is yet to be 
seen how for the Commission and Courts will make use of this 
section while working on the provisions relating to unfair trade 
practices. 
A person who i s deemed under section 13, to be gu i l ty of 
cin offence under the Act, shal l be punishable with imprisonment 
for a term of upto one year or with fine upto five-thousand 
rupees or both, and where the offence i s a continuing one, with 
28 
a further fine of upto five-hundred rupees per day. 
In case an offence i s committed by a comapny, the person 
concerned with the administration shal l be deemed to be gu i l ty 
29 
of the offence and shall be punishable accordingly. 
28. Section 50(1) . 
29. Section 53. 
C H A P T E R - V I 
FOREIGN LEGISLATIONS 
U n i t e d Kingdom 
In United Kingdom, the a n t i - t r u s t l e g i s l a t i o n s came 
immediately af ter the world war-I I . Between 1948 and 1973, a 
number of s t a tu t e s were passed for the purpose. These s t a t u t e s 
were the Monopolies and Res t r i c t ive Prac t i ces (Inquiry and 
Control) Act, 1948, amended by the Monopolies and Res t r i c t ive 
Prac t ices Act, 1953; the Res t r i c t ive Trade Prac t ices Act, 1956 
sxibstituted by the Res t r i c t i ve Trade Prac t ices Act, 1968. The 
Re-sale Prices Act, 1964; the Monopolies and Mergers Act, 1965; 
and the Fair Trading Act, 1973. All these l e g i s l a t i o n except 
tile Fair Trading Act, 197 3, has been repealed by the consol i -
dating enactments, the Res t r i c t ive Trade Prac t i ces Act, 1976; 
the Re-sale Pr ices Act, 1976; the Res t r i c t ive Prac t ices Coxirt 
Act, 1976. The Res t r i c t ive Trade Pract ices Act, 1976 has been 
supplemented by the Res t r i c t i ve Trade Prac t ices Act, 1977. 
The Fair Trading Act, 197 3, while introducing new and 
comprehensive measures for consumer protect ion, a lso extends 
the scope of the exis t ing laws of monopolies and mergers and 
r e s t r i c t i v e trade p rac t i ces , and bring these r e l a t ed Acts under 
the common administrat ive agencies for effect ive achievement of 
135 
of i t s tasK. The Act e s tab l i shes two agencies for i t s 
administrat ion-Director General of Fair Trading and Consumer 
2 
Protection Advisory Council. 
The Director General is appointed by the Secretary 
of State. He has a broad duty to keep under review the carrying 
on of connmercial activities in U.K. that relate to supply to 
consumers of goods and services. He does so in order to 
become aware of practices that may adversely affect the economic 
3 
interests of the Consumers, He has to receive and collect 
evidence of practices that may adversely affect the interest 
of consumers here the remit is not limited to practices that 
affect the economic interest of consumers but also cover their 
4 
health, safety or other matters. He may also make references 
to the Consumer Protection Advisory committee leading to tne 
possible imposition of criminal sanctions by the Secretary of 
State in respect of Consumer trade practice that may adversely 
affect the economic interests of U.K. Consumers. Alternatively, 
he may report directly to the Secretary of State under 
section 2 of the Fair Trading Act, 1973, where a person 
carrying on business has persisted in a course of conduct 
that is detrimental to the economic interests, health or safety 
of Consumers, or is otherwise unfair as defined by the Statute, 
1. See Fair Trading Act, 1973, Sec. 1. 
2. Id. at Sec. 3. 
3. Id. Sec. 2(1) (a)* 
4. Id. Sec. 2(1)(b)' 
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the Director-General can require tha t assurances be given 
that course of conduct wil l be discontinued. If t h i s does not 
succeed he may bring proceedings against the person concerned 
witn Res t r i c t ive Pract ices Court. 
The Consumer Protect ion advisory Committee cons i s t s of 
a minimom of 10 and a maximum of 15 members appointed by the 
^Secretary of the Sta te including Chairman. In making the 
appointment, the Secretary of State must have regard to the 
need for having members knowledgeable about or experience in 
the supply of goods and services to consumers, the Trade 
Description Act, 1968 and s imilar l eg i s l a t i on , and Consumer 
protect ion organizat ion. The Committee, i s an independent 
and advisory body. I t s a c t i v i t i e s are defined solely in 
r e l a t ion to references made to i t by the Director-General, 
the Secretary of State or another lylinister. I t s a c t i v i t i e s 
are en t i r e ly dependent upon such a reference being made. The 
references which may be dealth the Committee are of two types-
general references and pa r t i cu l a r references . General references, 
which can be made oy the Secretary of State or any other minis ter 
or Che Director General of Fair Trading, may r e l a t e to the 
6* 
question whetner a consumer trade practice, specified in the 
reference adversely affects the economic interests of consumers 
in the UiK, The consumer trade practices which fall under the 
5. Id. Sees. 34 & 35. 
6* Pi. see on next page. 
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Foot note No» 6 
A, consumer Trade Practice, means: any practice which is 
for the time being carried on in connection with the.supply 
o± goods (v^ether by Sale or otherwise) to Consumers or in 
connection with the supply of services to consumers and which 
relates to-
(a) to the terms or conditions (whether as to price or 
otherwise) on or subject to which goods or services are or 
are sought to be supplied, or 
(b) to the manner in which those terms or conditions are 
communicated to persons to whom goods are or are sought 
to be supplied, or 
(c) to promotion (by advertisement, labelling or marking of 
goods, convassing or otherwise) of the supply of goods 
or the supply of services, or 
(d) to methods of salemanship employed in dealing with 
consumers, or 
(e) to the way in which goods are pacted or otherwise got up 
for the purpose of being supplied, or 
(f) to methods of demanding or securing payments for goods 
or services supplied. 
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other category ( i . e . pa r t i cu l a r references) are those which 
have or l i k e l y to have effect of-
(a) misleading consumers as to t he i r r i gh t s and obl igat ions 
under relevant consumer t ransact ions , or wi.t]tiJiolding 
information about such r igh t s , or an adequate record of 
them; or 
(b; Otherwise misleading or confusing consumers with respect 
to any matter; or 
(c) subjecting consumers to undue pressure to enter in to a 
t ransac t ion; or 
(d) causing the terms and condit ions of a t ransact ion to be 
7 
so adverse to the Consumer as to inequ i tab le . 
In case of general reference, the Advisory Committee 
considers the matter referred to them and make a repor t to the 
person making the reference. The pa r t i cu la r reference can only 
be made by the Director-General himself. He may decide to 
include in the reference proposals for recommending to the 
Secretary of Sta te that the trade prac t ice should be the 
subject of his power to impose Criminal l i a b i l i t y . In these 
circumstances the Advisory Committee must oonsider the reference 
and proposals and repor t on them to the Secretary of S t a t e . 
T'ne Secretary of S ta te may on r ece ip t of report , p roh ib i t the 
consumer trade p rac t i ce in question by s ta tu tory instrument. The 
7. see Fair Trading Act., 1973, Sec. 17(2)* 
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instrument i s subject to affirmative resolut ion by both Houses 
of Parliament. 
P a r t - I l l of the Fair Trading Act, 1973 provides for a 
separate dealing with unfair p r a c t i c e s . An unfair pract ice 
involves a course of conduct which i s detrimental to the 
i n t e r e s t s of consumers in the U.K. whether i n t e r e s t s in r e s -
Q 
pact of health, safety or other matters. 
Further, a course of conduct shall be regarded as 
unfair to consumers if it consists of contraventions of one 
or more enactments which impose duties, prohibition or 
restrictions enforceable by Criminal proceedings, whether 
any such duty, prohibition or restriction is imposed in relation 
to consumers as such or not and whether the person carrying 
on the business has or has not been convicted of any offence 
9 
in respect of any such contravention. A course of conduct 
shall also be regarded as unfair to consumers if it consists 
of things done, or omitted to oe done, in the course of that 
Dusiness in breach of contract or in breach of a duty (other 
than contractual duty) owed to any person by virtue of any 
enactment or rule of law and enforceable by civil proceedings, 
whether (in any such case) civil proceedings in respect of the 
breach of contract or breach of duty have been brought or not. 
8. Id. , Sec. 34(1) (a)• 
9. Id. , Sec. 34(2) . 
10. Id. , Sec. 34(3). 
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The course of conduct must not only cons i s t s of 
unlawful acts or omission but also be detr imental to the 
of int.erests/consumers in the U.K. 'Consumer* here i s governed 
oy the de f in i t ion in section 137(2) of the Act and would 
appear to mean 'non-business p a r t i e s ' . I n t e r e s t s are not 
confined to economic i n t e r e s t s , such as heal th , safety, 
welfare, e t c . 
The area to which p a r t - I l l of the Act can apply i s 
extremely wide. There are no speci f ic exclusions, so tha t 
a l l the professions and a l l business including nat ional ised 
12 
industries and public undertakings are withxn its scope. 
There are two procedures open to the Director-General 
to deal with unfair trade practices-the informal procedure 
wnich ne may initiate. Under the informal procedure, the 
Director - General shall use his best endeavours, by 
communicating to that person or otnerwise, to obtain from 
him a satisfactory written assurance that be will refrain 
from continuing unfair practice and from carrying on any other 
similar course of conduct. However, where the informal 
procedure has failed and no assurance has been given, the 
Director-General may initiate the formal procedure. In normal 
circumstances, the formal proceedings are in Restrictive 
Practices Court. The purpose of the proceedings is to procure 
11. See also James P.Chunnigham, The Fair Trading Act, 1973; 
Consumer Protection and Competition Law, (1974) pp.32-33. 
12. Ibid. 
13. Id. at 34-35. 
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order of the Court against the respondent or an undertaking 
14 
from him refraining him from continuing unfair practice. 
'Where the persistent unfair conduct is carried on by a small 
15 
local t rader , the Direcotr-General may bring proceedings 
in the appropriate local court where the person i s in 
question. 
Thus, p a r t - I l l of the Fair Trading Act, 1973 i s a very 
effect ive weapon against the unscrupulous t r ade r . I t can be 
used against the l a rges t and the smallest concerns. Where 
the individual consumer does not have the resources, or the 
individual t ransact ion i s too small to j u s t i f y action, the 
Director-General can act i f i t i s not an i so l a t ed t ransact ion 
17 
but are in a pe r s i s t en t course of conduct. 
Further, the competition Act, 1980 has been enacted to 
make provisions for the control of ant i-competi t ive prac t ices 
in supply and acquis i t ion of goods, and the supply and securing 
of services ; to provide for the inves t iga t ion of p r i c e s . 
14. Id. at 36. 
15. A trade with issued capital of i, 10,000. 
16. supra note H at 40. 
17. Ibid. 
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United States of America 
The American a n t i - t r a s t laws t ry to ensure free 
competition in the economy and, for th i s purpose, a l l the 
r e s t r i c t i v e trade prac t ices are presumed to be necessar i ly 
contrary to the puolic i n t e r e s t and hence they a l l with few 
exceptions, are declared unlawful because they r e s t r i c t 
competition. Trte competition i s ensured because of the various 
advantages which i t confers on the economic welfare and 
progress . Tne r e s u l t was the enactment in 1890 of the Sherman 
Act, which has been acclaimed asa 'Charter of Freedom" for 
American indust ry . This Act with the two l a t e r Acts of 1914 -
tne Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act forms the 
core of the United S ta tes Monopoly, a n t i - r e s t r i c t i v e p rac t i ces 
and an t i -unfa i r trade p rac t i ces l e g i s l a t i o n conveniently 
referred to in the Sta tes as " a n t i - t r u s t l e g i s l a t i o n " . 
The Sherman Act of 1890 contains two main p roh ib i t ions -
Section-1 : 'Every contract , combination in the form of 
t r u s t or otherwise, or conspiracy, in r e s t r a i n t 
of trade or commerce among the several S ta tes 
or with foreign nations i s hereby declared 
to be i l l e g a l * 
Section-2 : 'Every person who shal l monopolize, or attempted 
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any 
other person or persons to monopolize any peirt 
of the trade or cominerce among the several s t a t e s , 
or with foreign nat ions, shal l be deemed gu i l t y 
of a misdemeanour ' 
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In the United States, the courts have evolved two main 
principles to judge v^ :>ether a given trade practice conforms to 
the dictates of the Sherman Act. The first is }cnown as 'rule 
18 19 
of reason* and tne second as the 'per se rule I The supreme 
court of America propounded the 'rule of reason' in the 
20 
leading case Standard Oil Company V. United States. It was 
held by the court as a 'rule of reason' that the terms 'restr-
aint of trade' means what it meant at Co/nmon Law and in the 
law of the U.S. when the Sherman Act was passed and it covered 
only those acts or contracts or agreements or combination which 
prejudice public interest by unduly restricting competition or 
unduly obstructing the due course of trade or which injuriously 
restraint trade either because of their inherent nature or 
21 
effect or because of their evident purpose. It was also pointed 
out that the 'rule of reason' does, not freezen the meaning of 
'restraint of trade' to what it meant at the date when the 
Sherman Act was passed and it prohibits not only those acts 
which deemed to oe undue restraints of trade at Common law but 
also those acts which new times and economic conditions make 
unreasonaole. This 'rule of reason' evolved by the Supreme 
22 23 
Court in Standard Oil Company and American Tobacco Company 
was governed the application of Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
18. The approach of 'rule o| reason' is coming to a finding after 
due examination. 'Rule^reason' is a rule of construction. 
19. Per se means finding an illegality on the face of an 
agreement or practice. 'Per se rule' is a rule of evidence. 
20. 221,U.S. 1 (1914) 
^1 . See a l s o U . S . V. Afnerican Tobacco C o . , 221 U . S . 1 0 6 ( 1 9 1 4 ) . 
22 . S u p r a n o t e 2o. 
2 3 . Supre n o t e Zl. 
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since then and though i t does not furnish an absolute and 
unvarying standard and has been applied/ sometimes more broadly 
and sometimes more narrowly, to the d i f fe ren t problems coming 
before the courts at d i f ferent times, i t was held the f ie ld 
and, as pointed out by Mr. Jus t i ce Reed in the United Sta tes 
24 
V. £ . 1 . Du Pont the Supreme Court has not receded from i t s 
posi t ion on th i s r u l e . The ' r u l e of reason' has, to quote 
again the words of the same learned judge given a workable cont-
ent to a n t i - t r u s t l e g i s l a t i o n . 
While applying the ' r u l e of reason' J u s t i c e Brandeis 
25 
in Chicago Board o£ Trade V. U.S. observed-
"Every agreement concerning trade, every 
regulation of trade, restraints. To bind, 
the restraint, is of their very essence. 
The true test of legality is whether the 
restraint imposed is such as merely regulates 
and perhaps thereby promotes competition, or 
whether it is such as many suppress or even 
destroy competition. To determine that 
question the court must ordinarily consider the 
facts peculiar to the business to which the 
restraint is applied; its condition before 
and after the restraint was imposed; the nature 
of the restraint, and its effect, actual or 
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil 
24. 351, U.S. 377(1956) . 
25. 246, U.S. 231(1918). 
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believed to exist, the reason for 
adopting the particular remedy, the pur-
pose or end sought to be attained, are 
all relevant facts. This is not because 
of good intention will save on otherwise 
objectionable regulation, or the reverse, 
but because knowledge of intent may help 
the Court to interpret facts and to predict 
consequences" 
It may be pointed out that there may be trade practices 
which are such that their inherent nature and inevitable 
effect they necessarily inpair competition and in case of 
such trade practices, it would not be necessary to consider 
any other facts or circumstances, for they would be per se 
restrictive trade practices. Such would be the position in 
case of those trade practices which of necessity produce the 
prohibited effect/such an overwhelming proportion of cases 
that minute inquiry in every instance would be wasteful of 
27 
j ud i c i a l and administrat ive resources . Even, in the United 
S ta te s , a s imilar doctr ine of per se i l l e g a l i t y has been 
28 
evolved in the case of U.S. V. frenton Potteriesr while 
interpreting the provision of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and 
it has been held that certain restraints of trade are 
unreasonable per se and because of their pernicious effect on 
26. Id. at 237. 
27. Ibid. 
28. 273, U.S. 392(1927). 
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competition and lack of any redeeming virtue, they are 
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable, and, therefore, 
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm, they 
caused or the business excuse for their use. 
The per.se rule was strongly defended by Mr. Justice Mashell 
in his dissenting judgement in U.S. V. Container Corp. of 
29 
America . He observed-
"per se rules always contain a degree of 
a r b i t r a r i n e s s . They are j u s t i f i e d on the 
assumption tha t the gains from the imposition 
of rule will far outweighl the losses and 
that significance administrat ive advantages wil l 
r e s u l t . In other words, the po ten t ia l competitive 
har.-n plus tne administrat ive costs of determining 
in wridic pa r t i cu la r s i t ua t ion the p rac t ice may be 
harmful must far outweigh the benef i t s that may 
r e s u l t . If the po ten t ia l benef i t s in the aggregate 
are outweighed to t h i s degree, then they are simply 
30 
not worth identifying xn individual cases" 
Tne aforesaid discussion, c l ea r ly shows that the U.S. 
Courts have developed a balance between per se ru le and the 
'ru.le of r eason ' . Every r e s t r i c t i v e trade p rac t i ce tha t 
s ign i f i can t ly impairs the competition i s i l l e g a l per se in the 
U.S. and in cases where the cour ts have held a prac t ice not 
i l l e g a l per se, i t only means tha t the p rac t ice may not in every 
29 . 398, U . S . 333 ( 1 9 6 9 ) . 
30. Id . a t 337. 
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i n s t a n c e have a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on compet i t ion a t a l l . 
Thus, t h e r e seems to be no i n c o n s i s t e n c y between the ' r u l e of 
r ea son ' and pe r se r u l e , while the f i r s t i s r u l e of c o n s t r u c t i o n 
and the second xs the r u l e of ev idence . The irule of reason 
r e q u i r e s t h a t to determine whether a t r a d e p r a c t i c e i s r e s t -
r i c t i v e or not , i t s a c tua l or probable e f f e c t on compet i t ion 
must oe examined by cons ide r i ng a l l the f a c t s and f e a t u r e of 
the t r a d e in q u e s t i o n . But, i n case of per se r u l e the p a r t y 
merely has t o e s t a b l i s h the e x i s t e n c e of c e r t a i n t r a d e p r a c t i c e s 
which are presumed to be harmful t o compet i t ion and, t h e r e f o r e , 
r e s t r i c t i v e t r a d e p r a c t i c e s . I t would not be necessa ry to 
i n q u i r e i n t o t h e i r e f f e c t on compe t i t i on . 
The Clayton Act of 1914 d e c l a r e s i l l e g a l four s p e c i a l 
types of r e s t r i c t i v e or monopol i s t i c p r a c t i c e s . They are i n 
b r i e f -
( a) p r i c e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ( sec t ion2) 
(b) e x c l u s i v e - d e a l i n g and ty ing c o n t r a c t s ( s e c t i o n 3 ) , 
(c) a c q u i s i t i o n s of competing cot i^aaies ( s e c t i o n 1} , 
(d) i n t e r l o c k i n g d i r e c t o r a t e s ( s e c t i o n 8) . 
The Clayton Act was passed to suppliraent the Sherman Act . 
I t i s designed t o s p e c i a l l y dea l with the problem of mergers 
3 1 . See A.D. Neal/ the A n t i - T r u s t laws of U.S.A. / 
(1970), a t 28. 
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and to prohibit certain types of individual conducts which 
were beyond the reach of ths Sherman Act. In its approach, 
the Clayton Act, however, differ significantly from the 
Sherman Act. The Sherman Act is not violated (except in the 
area of per se violations as held by the courts) unless actual 
and substantial adverse competition effects have resulted. On 
the other hand, the Clayton Act, apart from declaring certain 
practices unlawful, seeks to restrain certain acts in their 
incipiency which, if allowed, might impair competition. The 
distinction as between the two enactments is thus, related 
to the 'actual' and the 'potential' effects on con^jetition. 
The Federal Trade Commission Act can be deemed as the 
principal legislation to protect the consumer from unfair trade 
practices. The Act declares xuifair methods of con:5)etition in 
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, 
32 
unlawful. 
Further Section 52 of the Act provides-
( a) It shall be \inlawful for any person, partnership or 
corporation to disseminate or cause to be disseminated 
any false advertisement. 
1. By U.S. Mails, in or having an effect upon commerce 
by any means, for the purpose of including or vftiich 
is likely to include, directly or indirectly the 
purchase of food, drugs, devices or cosmetics; or 
2. By any means for the purpose of including or which 
is likely to include directly or indirectly, to 
purchase in or having an effect upon commerce of food, 
drugs, devices or Cosmetics. 
3 2. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 1914, Sec. 5(a) (1). 
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(b) The dissemination or causing to be dissenoinated of 
any fa lse advertisement vd.thin the provision of 
(sub-sect ion/clause) (a) of t h i s sect ion shal l 
be unfair or within the meaning of sect ion 45. 
The enforcement of the An t i - t r u s t laws takes place 
in three ways - by the Department of Ju s t i c e (Ant i - t rus t 
Division) Federal Trade Commission, and by p r iva te p a r t i e s 
v io la tors for damages. 
The Ant i - t rus t Division of the Department of Ju s t i ce 
i s entrusted with the task of enforcing the Sherman Act. I t 
has also concurrent j u r i s d i c t i o n with Federal Trade Coraniission 
for the enforcement of Clayton Act in respec t of some of 
p r ac t i c e s , e .g . , p r ice discremination and ant i -competi t ive 
mergers. While the l i a b i l i t y under the Sherman Act may be 
e i t h e r c i v i l or cr iminal , under the Clayton Act the l i a b i l i t y 
i s only c i v i l (expect in few minor s ec t i ons ) . The Department 
of J u s t i c e normally enforces these laws through c i v i l s u i t s 
seeking a declarat ion from the court t ha t the p rac t ice in 
question i s unlawful and an order agadnst the v io l a to r to 
prevent continuance and/or recurrence of the unlawful p r a c t i c e . 
If the circumstances so warranted, criminal prosecution under 
the a n t i - t r u s t laws may also be i n s t i t u t e d by the Depcirtraent 
of J u s t i c e . The Sherman Act ( in section 4) and Clayton Act 
(in section 15) confers Ju r i sd i c t i on on Federal Courts to 
prevent v io la t ion of these laws and d i r e c t l y to Government to 
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i n s t i t u t e proceeding in equity to prevent and r e s t r a i n t 
v i o l a t i o n s . Except in merger and monopoly cases, a n t i - t r u s t 
are usually i n i t i a t e d by the complaint of a competitor or a 
customer to the Ant i - t rus t Divis ion. After inves t iga t ing 
tne matter, the court give i t s f ina l order or decree . 
The Federal Trade Commission Act provided for establishment 
of an independent body, the Federal Trade Commission to enforce 
i t s provis ion. The Commission i s composed of five members 
who are designated as Commissioners eind one of them serves as 
33 
the Chairman. The Commission is organised into two principal 
operating Bureau, the Bureau of consumer Protection and the 
Bureau of Competition. The Bureau of Consumer Protection has 
principal responsibility of monitoring advertising, labelling 
and deceptive practices, reviewing applications for complaints, 
drafting proposed complaints concerning such practices, and 
prosecuting cases after the Commissioners issue a formal 
compalint. The Commission has 12 Regional Offices located in 
major cities in various parts of the country. Each Regional 
Offices nas a staff of attorneys and consumer protection 
specialists and is given the responsibility of monitoring 
advertising and competitive practices in area of several states, 
of conducting investigation of complaints and suspected 
violation and of trying cases concerning alleged unfair practices 
34 
m the area. The Commission can initiate proceedings on the 
33. Id. Sec. 1. 
34. See Oppenheim 3.C., Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer 
Protection cases and Comments (19*^ 4) ^ 88-599. 
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complaints of competitors, consumers, t he i r associat ion e t c . 
or i t s own. The Commission was i n i t i a l l y intended to ensure 
competition in industry although consumer protec t ion was also 
provided for . But, now the Commission centers i t s a t t en t ion 
on the d i r ec t protect ion of the consumers where formerly i t 
could pro tec t him only i nd i r ec t l y through the protec t ion of 
the competitor. The Comraissiorfs most important power i s to 
pass 'cease and d e s i s t ' order against an offender for the 
conduct v^ich cons t i t u t e s a v io la t ion of the Act, a f t e r giving 
him ful l hearing. The 'Cease and d e s i s t ' order of the Commi-
ssion can be j u d i c i a l l y reviewed by the United .States Court 
of Appeals a t the instance of the person or concern against 
whom the order was passed. In 196 2, the Commission also 
adopted the prac t ice of issuing advisory opinions of business 
concerns contemplating a proposed course of business conduct. 
Upon request, the commission will advise the requesting party 
v^ether the proposed course of action v io l a t e s any of the 
laws administrated by the Commission or cons t i tu te compliance 
35 
with an outstanding order of the Commission. 
Apart from the two Government agencies - Department of 
J u s t i c e and Federal Trade Commission, action under the a n t i -
t r u s t law can be i n i t i a t e d by any pr iva te par ty , provided the 
v io la t ion has caused actual in jury of h i s bus iness . The injured 
party i s e n t i t l e d to recover damages i f i t succeeds in 
36 
es tab l i sh ing a n t i t r u s t v i o l a t i o n s . 
35. Ib id . 
36. Dugar S.M. Law of Res t r i c t i ve Trade Practices(1976) 
at 105 (Taxman). 
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Belglxm 
Till 19 24, there was no law in Belgium to control 
cartels or monopolies. In 19 24, the price provisions in the 
Penal Code of Belgixim were amplified to include measures 
against illicit speculation, the practices like abnormally 
increasing the prices or restricting the production or 
distribution were made punishable offences. The law now in force 
is the Protection Against Abuse of Economic Power Act, 1960. 
This Act regulates restrictive trade practices in Belgium. The 
Act also seeks to curb practices which distort or restrict 
competition, or which obstruct either the economic freedom of 
producers, distributors or consumers or the development of 
production or trade. 
The administrative machinery for implementation of the 
provisions of the Act comprises Council for Economic Deputies, 
Reporting Commissioner and Minister of Economic Affairs. The 
Council of Economic Deputies is specialised consultative body 
whose duty is to keep the executive informed euid to make 
liecessary recommendations. The Council is appointed by the 
King and is composed of public prosecutors of the courts and 
tribunals, technical persons may also be taken on the council 
in an advisory capacity to lend their pwn competence in well 
defined manners. 
The Reporting Commissioner is also appointed by the King. 
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He is responsible for examining any abuse of economic power. 
The Reporting Commissioner is principal investigatig authority 
he has the right of search and seiisajre and he may nominate 
experts in connection with, investigation. He collects all the 
information and data, records all depositions and ascertains 
necessary facts on the spot, as may be necessary to accomplish 
his task. After the investigation is complete and, if the 
complaint is found to be baseless, the Reporting Commissiner 
informs the i'^ inister of Economic Affairs of his opinion 
that the case should oe dismissed; in case he does not receive 
any orders to the contrary within the specified period; the 
matter is closed and the complainant and the person whose 
activities are subject matter of inquiry are informed accor-
dingly. If the complaint is found to be justified, the 
Reporting Commissioner submits a report containing his conclu-
sions to the Council for Economic Deputies. The Council then 
makes an investigation and submits a reasonable opinion 
together with its recommendations for terminating the abuse to 
the Minister of Economic Affairs. However, if the Coxincil 
finds that no abuse exists, no further action is necessary; the 
negative opinion of the Council is bindings on the Minister 
who has to confirm the opinion. The final authority in this 
regard is the Minister of Economic Affairs, 
Canada 
On the recommendations of a Select Committee of the House 
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of Common for the first time, an Act was passed in 1889 making 
any attempt to combine or agi~ee or arrange unlawfully to 
restrain or limit or injury production, trade or commerce in 
restraint of trade a criminal offence. 
The law now enforce is the Combines Investigation Act, 
1960. The provisions for administrating and enforcing the 
Act contemplate three agencies, namely (i) the Director of 
Investigation and Research, (ii) the Restrictive Trade Practices 
Commission and (iii) the Courts. The Director of Investigation 
and Research occupies a key position in the enforcement of the 
Act. In addition to institute investigation into offence in 
relation to trade, a research inquiry relating to the existence 
of monopolistic situation or practices in restrain of trade 
can De undertaken by the Director, either on his own initiative 
or at the instance of the Minister of Consumer and Corporate 
Affairs or the Restrictive Trade Practices Conmission. Such 
inquiries are regulated by the same procedure vrtiich g9verns 
investigation by the Director. The Restrictive Trade Practices 
Commission set up under the Act consist of four members 
(including a Chairman) and functions only in an advisory 
capacity in that it submits its report to the Minister containing 
its recommendations as to application of remedies. All inquires 
and investigations under thi;; Act are conducted in private unless 
otherwise ordered by the Cha:lrman of the Commission. 
Germany 
In Germany, systematic a n t i - t r u s t l e g i s l a t i o n came in to 
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existence with the enactment of Restraints of competition 
Act, 1957. This Act was repeatedly ammended and finally in 
1973 major revision of the Act was effected. The object of the 
Act is to secure freedom of competition, to prevent abuse of 
economic power and to create conditions for individual 
enterprises to develop freely in a competitive economy. 
The Administration of the Act is entrusted to the 
Federal Minister of Economics, the Federal Cartel Office and 
the Cartel authorities of various States. TSae Federal Cartel 
Office consists of eight divisions - five decision divisions 
and tnree special departments for general legal and economic 
questions and for intematioaal restraints of competition. When 
delivering decisions, the decision devisions act as quasi-
judicial bodies and the decisions or orders of the Federal 
Cartel Office are subject to appeal to the Appellate Court in 
Berlin. From there a further appeal on question of law lies 
with the Federal Supreme Court. The Courts also required to 
inform the Federal Cartel Office of all civil litigation 
concerning question of Cartel law. The Cartel Office thereupon 
can participate in the proceedings by presenting arguments at 
the court hearing and submitting written statements. 
The Act provides for establishing of Monopolies Commission 
whose .nain duty, however, is to prepare a binnial report 
on the current level of business concentration. In addition the 
Federal Minister of Economics may also request an opinion from 
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the Monopolies COfnmission in individual cases. 
Switaerland 
In Switzerland/ although the Government/ the Courts and 
the public opinion were concerned about the activities of 
cartels and monopolies for a longtime* the Cartel legislation^ 
Tne Federal Act on cartels and similar Organisation was passed 
only in 1962. 
The Act applies to 'Cartels' and similar 'organisations'. 
r\ 'cartel' under the Act is deemed to include agreements and 
decisions, whether enforceable in law or not, which influence 
or are likely to influence the market in any goods or services 
by the collective restriction of Competition, including in 
particular the regulation of the production, sale or purchase 
of gooas, or prices or other conditions. Re-eale price 
maintenance agreements are treated as cartels when imposed or 
enforced by a cartel or a similar organisation. Similar orga-
nisations are tnose individual enterprises, or inter-connected 
enterprises, or enterprises naving a tacit understanding to 
standardiza their ousiness practices, which dominate the market 
in certain goods or services, or exert a determining influence 
upon it. The peculiar feature of the Swiss legislation on 
cartels is that it places cartels and dominant enterprises 
(which are styled as 'similar Organisation' under the Act) on 
an equal footing. 
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The authorities concerned with the administration of 
the Act are (i) Cartel Conunission, (ii) Federal Economic 
Department and (iii) Courts. The Gartel Commission is the 
center piece of the administrative machinery of the Act. It 
is an independent body constituted of 11-15 members representing 
sciences of law and economics, economic circles and consumers 
whoare appointed Dy the Federal Commission. 
The Act provides for inquiries to be undertaken by the 
Commission at the behest of the Federal Economic Department 
with a view to establishing whether certain cartels or similar 
organisations have a harmful effect either socially or 
economically. After the proceeding is completed, the Commission 
submits reports and its proposals to the Federal Economic 
Department. The Federal Court is empowered to order appropriate 
measures to be taken and in particular, it may cancel or modify 
certain clauses or forbid meausres taken by cartel or similar 
organisation. 
Under the .^ ct, any person whose interests are adversely 
affected can bring an action in the Canton Court. The Court may 
on the complainant's application institute the proceedings and 
if necessary order discontinuance of the harmful provisions or 
order that the complainant should also join the cartel or 
association with rights and obligation involved. The order of 
tne Court is appealable to the Federal Court. 
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Sweden 
For the f i r s t time in Sweden Anti-monopoly law was 
enacted in 19 25. That enactment was Known as Inves t iga t ion on 
.^lonopolistic Combination Act, 19 25. However, t h i s did not 
y ie ld the desired r e s u l t . In 1946, the law on 'Supervision of 
Res t r i c t ive Prac t ices in Industry and Trade' was enacted. 
Consequently, in 1953, the law of 1946 was supplemented by 
Res t ra in t s of competition Act, 1953 to counter act r e s t r a i n t s 
on competition in business in ce r ta in ins tances . This law was 
amended in 1956 and 1966. The Act thus amended cons t i t u t e s 
the present Swedish l e g i s l a t i o n on r e s t r i c t i v e business prac t ices , 
Apart from the Act of 1953, ichere are other r e l a t ed s t a tu t e s 
in force in Sweden, v i z . , (i) the Act concerning the obl igat ion 
to submit Information as to Conditions of Price amd Competition 
19 56, ( i i ) the Marketing Pract ices Act, 1970 and ( i i i ) the 
i-larket Court Act, 1970. 
The Market Court Act provides for the administrat ive 
machinery for enforcing the r e s t r i c t i v e trade prac t ices 
l eg i s l a t i on in Sweden. The Market Court Set-up under the 
Market Court Act, 1970, deals v/ith the cases under (i) the 
Res t ra in t s of competition Act and ( i i ) the Marketing Prac t ices 
Act. The court consis ts of a Chairman, vice-Chairman and 8 
other members representing various i n t e r e s t s . The proceeding 
Defore the Market Court are akin to an ordinary court 
procedure. The Market court Act also provides for the appoint-
ment of Freedom of Commerce Ombudsman for dealing with questions 
concerning r e s t r a i n t s of competition and consumer Ombudsman for 
questions concerning marketing p r a c t i c e s . 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
A c r i t i c a l s t u d y of t h e f o r e g o i n g c h a p t e r s p r o v e s 
t h a t t h e MRTP Commission i s r e c o g n i s e d a s an i n e v i t a b l e 
i n s t i t u t i o n f o r b r i n g i n g a b o u t economic p r o g r e s s a l o n g w i t h 
s o c i a l j u s t i c e . I t s u t i l i t y a s a mechanism of c h e c k s and 
b a l a n c e s i n t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of a n t i - m o n o p o l y law h a s been 
f u l l y v i s u a l i s e d . I t h a s s o u g h t t o curb c o n c e n t r a t i o n of 
economic power i n p r i v a t e hands vrtierever i t c a u s e d d e t r i m e n t 
t o common i n t e r e s t . L i k e w i s e i t h a s e n j o i n e d on i t s e l f t h e 
t a s k of c u r b i n g m o n o p o l i s t i c , r e s t r i c t i v e and u n f a i r t r a d e 
p r a c t i c e , when t h e s e p r a c t i c e s a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d p u b l i c a s 
w e l l a s consumers ' i n t e r e s t . The e p i t o m e of i t s powers i s t o 
condone t h e 'good* and condemn t h e ' b a d * . 
U n d e n i a b l y t h e MRTP Commission h a s of l a t e become an 
e f f e c t i v e i n s t r u m e n t f o r consumer p r o t e c t i o n and f o r c u r b i n g 
t h e u n f a i r and r e s t r i c t i v e t r a d e p r a c t i c e s t h a t p l a g u e t h e 
c o u n t r y ' s Commercial a c t i v i t i e s . The Commission which was j u s t 
l i m p i n g a c o u p l e of y e a r ago w i t h n o t many c a s e s i n hand i s 
now moving wi th j e t s p e e d . T h i s i s e v i d e n t from t h e f a c t t h a t 
i t s i n v e s t i g a t i n g wing r e c e i v e d a s many a s 23 , 482 c o n p l a i n t s 
d u r i n g t h e y e a r 1987 a s g a i n s t 9 ,096 i n 1986 and 5 ,262 i n 1 9 8 5 . 
rhe Commission t o o i s s e i z e d of t h o u s a n d s of r e g u l a r u n f a i r 
a n d / o r r e s t r i c t i v e t r a d e p r a c t i c e s i n q u i r i e s - a number which 
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never crossed a couple of hundred before. 
For the enforcement of its provisions, the MRTP Act, 
1969, lays down a dual machinery i.e. the Central Government 
and the i-lRTP Commission. The Commission consists of a Chairman 
and not less than two and not more than eight members. But 
as a matter of fact the Commission has remained without a 
Chairman or with a lone member for long duration. The undue 
delay on the part of the Central Government in filling up the 
vacancies of the Chairman and members focussed the attention 
of the Supreme Court in Mahindra & Mahindra and also in M»L» 
2 
Sachdeva' s case; The supreme Court had directed to the Central 
Government to fill the minimumi sanctioned posts of the Chairman 
and members. At present all the sanctioned posts of the 
Chairman and members are complete. 
A casual vacancy caused in the Office of the Chairman 
due to his resignation or removal shall be filled by a fresh 
appointment. But in case of his illness or absence, the senior 
most member of the Comnission acts as Chairman if authorised 
by the Chairman in writting. On the groiinds of insolvency, moral 
turpitude etc*members of the Commission may be removed by the 
Central Government, But the Act is silent about the removal 
of the Chairman. It is, therefore, suggested that if the 
Chairman is the person who was a sitting judge of a Supreme 
1. Mahindra & Mahindra V. Union of India A.I.R., 1979 s.C. 798. 
2. M.L. Sachdeva V. Union of India (1990) 3CLJ 297 (S.C.) . 
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court or a High Court prior to his appointment, as a Chairroan 
of the Commission, his removal will be governed by the relevant 
provisions of the constitution of India as applicable to a 
Judge o£ a aigh Court of Judge of a Supreme Court as the case 
may be. In any other case the removal of a Chairman should be 
governed by the provisions laid down under section 7 of the 
Act, for removal of a member of the Commission. 
The powers and functions of the Commissions may be 
exercised or discharged by the Benches formed by the Chairman 
of the Commission from aunong the members. The Chairman may 
form a Bench with just one or more members only. Even one 
member of the Commission could validly constitute the Bench. 
The MRTP (Amendment) Act* 1984 confers on the Commission 
power to grant ad-interim injunction and to award condensation. 
The power to grant ad-interim injunction was very much needed 
in order that the Consumers could avail of immediate relief 
instead of waiting for months and sometimes years for the 
inquiries to reach the culmination. It is stated that in the 
year 1987 itself the Commission issued as many as 59 injunction 
- more than one injunction in a week. The power to award 
compesnation was necessary in order to conqpensate the consunaers 
who Were compelled to pay higher prices. The Commission can 
award any amount of compensation which it deems fit. 
3. In re Graphite India Ltd., 2R.T.I, 85 (MRTPC) . 
4. Neru Anand V. Shri Louise Slimming Center, Bombay (1990) 20 
CLD 49. 
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In respect of monopolistic trade p r a c t i c e s the 
Commission has only l imi ted power i . e . to inquire in to the 
case and repor t to the Central Government for appropriate 
ac t ion . The f inal authori ty in t h i s regard i s the Central 
Government. The Commission i s empowered to inquire i n to the 
matter sua rnotu or upon reference made by the Central Government. 
All the references made by the Central Government and suo motu 
inquiries were not inquired by the Commission because of the 
Stay orders granted by the Supreme Court and a High Court. 
The def in i t ion of r e s t r i c t i v e trade p rac t i ce under 
sect ion 2(0) i s the cornerstone of the Act. I t i s exhaustive 
5 
and r e s u l t or iented . Inqui r ies in to r e s t r i c t i v e t rade p rac t i ces 
may be i n s t i t u t e d by the Commission upon receiving a conplaint 
by the trade or consumers' associat ion (roentoership of not l e s s than 
25) ; or upon a reference made to i t by the Central Government 
or S ta te Government; or upon an appl icat ion made to i t by the 
Director General; or upon i t s own knowledge or information. 
During April-December, 1988, the MRTP Commission considered 61 
inqu i r i e s under sect ion 10(a) ( i ) ; 831 inqu i r ies under section 
10(a) ( i i i ) and 366 inqu i r i e s under section 10(a) ( i v ) . The 
above fact shows tha t the maximum number of inqviires were 
considered by the Commission upon an applicat ion made to i t by 
the Director-General . This i s an indica t ion t h a t the Director 
General i s qui te v i g i l a n t . In respect of r e s t r i c t i v e trade 
p rac t ices the Commission i s free to inves t iga te the matters and 
5. Supra n o t e - 1 . 
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pass an appropriate orders. It has either to pass cease and 
desist orders or pass consent orders. It has also power to 
protect the public interest. 
The provisions of unfair trade practices were added 
to the I4RTP Act, 1969 in 1984. The definition of unfair trade 
practice in section 36A of the Act is not inclusive or flexible 
but speific and limited in its contents. The powers of inquiry 
of the Commission in respect of unfair trade practices seem 
to be similar to those which are available in respect of 
restrictive trade practices. 
During April to December, 1988, the Commission considered 
87 inquiries under section 36B (a); 213 inquiries under section 
36B(c) cind 691 inquiries under section 36B(d). The above fact 
shaws that the maximum number of inquiries were considered by 
the Commission suo motu. This is an indication that the 
Commission has been quite vigilant, and its power to initiate 
suo motu inquiries has proved be an effective weapon in curbing 
the unfair trade practices. 
If after the inquiry the Commission is of opinion that 
the unfair trade practice is prejudicial to the public interest 
or to the interest of the consumer or consumers generally, it 
may pass cease and desistorders. It has also power to pass 
consent orders. The Commission has power to protect the 
6. Lakhan Pal National Ltd. V. MRTPC (1989) 66 Comp. Cas. 
519(3C). 
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interest of the consumers, if the consumer or consumers 
adversely affected by unfair methods of competition. 
In view of the vitality of the role of the Commission 
it becomes necessary to suggest some measures that may boost 
up the sanction and sanctity of this Commission. 
a) It is essential for the Commission to create Bences 
in four region atleast in order to facilitate effective disposal 
of cases. The creation of redressal forura by various state 
Government under the Consumer Brotection Act may bridge the gap 
to great extent but many States are yet to set up even Consumer 
protection Councils, leave alone the setting up redressal forum. 
It is, therefore, necessary to provide for the setting up of 
Regional Benches of the commission, 
b) Although the statutory provision (i.e. Sec. 12B) of 
payment of compensation for unfair, restrictive and monopolistic 
trade practices was introduced with effect from 1-8-1984, the 
Commission has not been able to pronounce orders granting 
reliefs, though deserving in many cases. In this respect two 
things required consideration namely, (a) power to be conferred 
on the Commission to award compensation suo- naotu, and (b) ampli-
fying the procedure for applying for compensation. 
On the basis of the nature of applications for 
compensation received by the Commission, and the problems involved 
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in the actual enforcement of compensation, the Central Government 
should simplify the crucial provisions r e l a t i n g to award of 
compensation. 
c) The terra 'Consumer' has not been defined in the 
ex i s t i ng law. Broadly speaking the consumer may be an individual 
or an associat ion or a family who seeks or acquires, by purchase, 
or hire-purchase or lease any goods or services for personal, 
family or hose-hold purpose. The goods nust be acquired for 
f ina l consumption and not for the purpose of manufacturing or 
re-saX9> i t i s , ti^erefore, submitted tha t to remove doubt, i f 
any, the l e g i s l a t u r e should incorporate a su i t ab l e def in i t ion 
of the term 'Consumer' r e f l ec t ing the t rue s p i r i t of the 
l e g i s l a t i o n . 
d) The def in i t ion of Unfair t rade prac t ice under sect ion 
36A of the MRTP Act i s not a general def in i t ion but i t i s 
r e s t r i c t e d to only those specif ic ca tegor ies of unfa i r trade 
p rac t i ces which are being enumerated in clauses (1) to (5) of 
Section 36A. I t i s of course, t rue t ha t most of unfa i r trade 
p rac t i ce s will be covered within the scope of the ca tegor ies 
mentioned in Section 36A. But s t i l l there may be a case where 
a t rade prac t ice may be unfair to the ccxisuroers but may not f a l l 
within the scope of the categories of unfair trade p rac t i ces 
l i s t e d in section 36A. I t i s , therefore, necessary to provide 
a general def in i t ion of unfair t rade p rac t i ce so tha t a l l the 
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unfai r trade p rac t i ces (whether covered under clauses (1) to 
(5) of section 35A or not) may be brought within the purview 
of the Act. However, the provision of clauses (1) to (S) of 
sect ion 36A should be taken as i l l u s t r a t i o n s of such trade 
p r a c t i c e s . I t seems tha t the specif ic ca tegor ies of unfair 
trade prac t ices s ta ted in section 36A are per se unfair trade 
p r a c t i c e s . 
e) The scope of the MRTP Commission* s ijower i s l imi ted 
to p r iva te sector only which i s not j u s t and reasonable. In 
fac t publ ic sector undertaJcings have a lso been monopolizing 
p a r t i c u l a r trade and business and these underta)cings a lso . 
Indulge iu a l l so r t s of raal-practices which are inimical to 
publ ic and consumer i n t e r e s t s These \aadertaking also ia^pede 
and d i s to r t conpeti t ion by the i r manoeuverasand t a c t i c e s . 
Besides, the pr iva te sector c o n s t i t u t e s only a marginal proportion 
of the whole economy while as, public sector more or l e s s , 
occupies 80X of the t rade and business in the country. I t i s , 
therefore , des i rable tha t public sector may also be brought 
under the purview of the MRTP Commission. 
f) In order, to see tha t t h i s Commission r e a l l y works 
as an independent expert body* people of diverse f ie lds should 
De p r a c t i c a l l y appointed. I t i s qui te unreasonable to bel ieve 
tha t only three members can work so much tha t i t s posi t ion can 
be res tored . TJne. Government should not wait and see in choosing 
i t s members but should choose from v*iatever stuff i s avai lable 
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in the legal and other diverse fields. Even the Suprenae Court 
suggested that Government sbuld not wait as the new star is 
not going to rise in the shortes period to whom it may appoint 
as such. It is suggested that not only minimum statutory 
members i.e. 3, but the maximum members should be appointed 
so that different members could be assigned different jobs 
according to their field of specialization. 
g) The Commission or the Director-General may exercise 
or perform in relation to any unfair trade practce, the same 
power or duty which it or he is empowered* or required, by or 
under MRTP Act to exercise, or perform in relation to a 
restrictive trade practice. These residual powers ace in 
addition to the powers conferred on the Commission and the 
Director-General by Sections 12A/ 12B and 36D. However, it is 
not clear to what extent the powers can be exercised by the 
Commission and the Director General while dealing with the 
cases of unfair trade practices. Whether the Commission may 
invoke section 38 (which deals with presumption as to the pubxic 
interest and provides various gateways of escapes in respect of 
restrictive trade practices) in respect of unfair trade practices 
is very much doubtful. Thus, to clear such doubts, it is 
submitted that suitable amendments should have been made in 
the relevant provisions while incorporating the new provisions 
dealing with unfair trade practices in the Act. 
h) There is at present no power with the Commission to 
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punish for contempt of i t s e l f . This i s a serious lacuna 
as a l l bodies having adjudicative functions must necessar i ly 
have these powers. This i s e s sen t i a l not only to safeguard 
the properworking of the Commission but a lso to see tha t the 
proceedings before the Commission are conducted proper ly . I t 
i s , therefore, suggested tha t the Commission should have the 
power, to punish for contenpt. 
i ) Despite the recommendations of the Sachar Conuuittee 
and overhauling of the Act, the Commission's pos i t ion i s 
subsidiary to the Central Government, Although, i t i s the 
Comtnission v^ich s tudies the nature , cause and e f fect of these 
p r ac t i ce s , given the economic or other considerat ions, i t i s 
the Central Government which makes their orders as i t may thinks 
f i t . I t i s , therefore, suggested t h a t the Commission should be 
given to pass f inal orders in respect of monopolistic trade 
prac t ices as in the ases of r e s t r i c t i v e and unfair trade p rac t i ces , 
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